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Epochs of Modern History 

EDITED BY 
EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A., J. SURTEES PHILLPOTTS, B.C.L. 

AND 

C. COLBECK, M.A. 



FREDERICK THE GREAT 

and the 

SEVEN YEARS' WAR 



F. W. LONGMAN 



Epochs of Modern History 



FREDERICK THE GREAT ' 



AND THE 



SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 



v\ BY 

\^ 

V F. \V. LONGMAN 

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD 

Author of a Pocket Dictionary of the German and English Langtuigei 



NEW YORK: 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

1886. 



I1I14./1 



BylNiiifej: 



y^- 3^v^2 / 



PREFACE. 



Although this little book is mainly intended for school- 
boys, it may perhaps be read by some who will desire a 
fuller knowledge of Frederick the Great, and of the 
time in which he lived, than can be derived from its 
pages: for the sake of thes^ I pjopose to mention a 
few of the best books on the subject. Anything like 
an exhaustive list of the authorities I have laid under 
contribution would be out of place, for, as may well 
be supposed, in the case of events which happened 
in a period so near to us as the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the literature of the subject is very extensive. 
All I offer, therefore, is a selected list containing the 
books which appear most likely to be of use. 

The first to be mentioned is, of course, Carlyle*s 
" History of Frederick the Great," a noble work which 
is appreciated most by those who know it best. Much, 
however, has been written since the publication of its 
last volume, especially in Germany, where several 



vi Preface, 

books have appeared founded in part on materials 
that were not accessible to its author. 

Foremost among these are Arneth's " Geschichte 
Maria Theresia's," a very important work based on 
documents in the Vienna archives, from which until 
recently historical enquirers were jealously excluded, 
and Schafer's ** Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Kriegs," 
the most accurate and comprehensive history of the 
war in existence. Some of Ranke's works deal with 
parts of the subject. For the war itself the professor 
has only a series of short studies, but its origin is 
elaborately investigated in his *' Ursprung des Sieben- 
jahrigen Kriegs." An excellent account of the early 
part of Frederick's reign and of the history of Prussia^ 
up to the king's accession, will be found in his 
" Zwolf Biicher Preussicher Geschichte," while the 
later policy of Frederick is discussed in "Die Deutsch- 
en Machte und der Fiirstenbund." 

To the works of these great modern writers may be 
added Preuss's well-known biography of Frederick the 
Great, and the king's own historical writings, of which a 
separate edition has recently been published in France. 

For Ferdinand of Brunswick, and that part of the 
war in which England was directly concerned, the 
great authority is Westphalen's ** Geschichte der Feld- 
ziige des Herzogs Ferdinand," but though this work is 
invaluable to students, it is altogether unsuited to the 
general reader, who will find Manvillon's biography 
more adapted to his requirements. 



Preface. vii 

Of contemporary French history most readers will 
find as much as they want in Voltaire's " Siecle de 
Louis XV.," and in either Sismondi or Martin. Several 
recent publications, such as the Due de Broglie's " Le 
Secret du Roi," and the *' Memoires et Lettres du Car- 
dinal de Bernis," possess considerable interest, though 
the amount of new information which they contribute 
is somewhat less than has been supposed. 

For the English history of the period, and for the 
war regarded from an English point of view, the 
standard modern work is Lord Mahon's " History of 
England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of 
Versailles," but here it is easier as well as more de- 
sirable for the student to bring himself into contact 
with some of the original authorities. The following 
may be consulted with advantage : Horace Walpole's 
Letters and Memoirs," *' The Chatham Correspond- 
ence," *'The Annual Register," and "The Gentle- 
man's Magazine" for the years in question. The Me- 
moirs of Sir Andrew Mitchell, the English ambassador 
at the Prussian Court, derive great value from the fact 
that Mitchell accompanied the king throughout the 
campaigns of the Seven Years' War. 

Among later Enghsh works, Coxe's ** House of 
Austria," and Thackeray's *' Life of Pitt," are useful 
though dull. Several of Macaulay's Essays relate to 
the period, but that on Frederick is rather to be ad- 
mired for its brilliancy than commended as trustworthy. 
Mr. Lecky's " History of England in the Eighteenth 



viii Preface. 

Century" will be read with deep interest by such as 
already possess some knowledge of the period. For 
America Bancroft's ** History of the United States " 
is the standard work. Readers who desire a more 
detailed account of the affairs in India will find in 
Orme the storehouse whence subsequent historians 
have drawn their materials. The French side of the 
story is admirably represented in Colonel Malleson's 
interesting *' History of the French in India." 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

PAGE 

Why the Seven Years' War is an Epoch in History . , i 

CHAPTER n. 

BRANDENBURG AND PRUSSIA. 
SfiCT. 

1. Foundation of the Margraviate, 928-1440 ... 3 

2. The Hohenzollerns in the i6th and 17th Centuries^ 

1440-1640 6 

3. The Great Elector, 1640-88. The First King, 1700 . 9 

CHAPTER HI. 

THE REIGN OF FREDERICK WILLIAM, I713-4O. 

1. Frederick William and the Army .... 16 

2. Frederick William and the Balance of Power . 18 

3. Father and Son 24 

4. The PoHsh Election War and the Close of Frederick 

William's Reign ...... 28 



X Contents, 

CHAPTER IV. 

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR. 

SECT. PAGE 

1. Accession and Character of Frederick, 1740 . . 31 

2. State of Europe at Frederick's Accession . 39 

3. The Emperor's Death and its Results ... 42 

4. The Conquest of Silesia, 1740-2 .... 46 

CHAPTER V. 

THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR, 1744-5, AND THE PEACE 

OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1748 .... 56 

CHAPTER VI. 
ENGLAND AND FRANCE. 

1. - The North American Colonies , . • . • 6 

2. Newcastle and Pitt 69 

3. Breaking out of the Naval War, 1756 ... 78 

CHAPTER VII. 
POLICY OF AUSTRIA DURING THE PEACE. 

1. Kaunitz 83 

2. Negotiations with France, 1755-56 .... 87 

3. Austria and Russia 90 

CHAPTER VIII. 

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR. 

1. Frederick's reasons for War 93 

2. The Invasion of Saxony, 1756 .... 99 

3. The War becomes general « 103 

4. English Affairs during the Winter, 1756-7 . * 107 



Conie?its, 



CHAPTER IX. 

SECT. ^ PAGE 

1. The Invasion of Bohemia 112 

2. The French in North Germany . • . . 120 

3. Rossbach, November 5 124 

4. Silesia regained 132 

•-5. Pitt and the War .... . . 142 

CHAPTER X. 
FREDERICK REDUCED TO EXTREMITIES. 

1. The Last Year of Offensive Warfare, 1758 . . . 147 

2. Kunersdorf and Maxen, 1759 .... 155 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE WAR IN WESTERN GERMANY. . . 164 

Battle of Minden, August i, 1759 . " * • 170 

CHAPTER Xn, 

THE CONQirEST OF CANADA AND THE DESTRUCTION 
OF THE FRENCH FLEETS. 

1. Preliminary Operations, 1758 175 

2. Quebec, September 13, 1759 '^77 

3. Quiberon, November 20, 1759 186 

4. The Capitulation of Montreal, 1760 . * . 190 

CHAPTER XIII. 

INDIA. 

1. Dupleix «.....••.. 193 

2. Clive 194 

3. Clive in Bengal, 1756-60 ...... 204 

4. Lally, 1756-62 .**...< aio 



xii Contents, 



CHAPTER XIV. 
THE FALL OF PITT, 1761 . . 215 



CHAPTER XV. 

END OF THE WAR. 
SECT. 

1. Prussia, 1760-2 225 

2. England, France, and Spain, 1762 .... 234 

3. The Peace and its Results, 1763 238 



CHAPTER XVI. 

CLOSE OF FREDERICK'S REIGN . . 243 

The Partition of Poland, 1772 
The Bavarian Succession War, 1778 
The League of Princes, 1785 
Death of Frederick, 1786 



MAPS. 

Europe at the Accession of Frederick . . To face title 
The Seat of War " P- 47 



WOODCUTS. 



Rossbach • • • • 129 

Leuthen 137 

Minden • • • 170 

Quebec •••*«*»*»• 179 



FREDERICK THE GREAT 



AND THE 



SEVEN YEARS^ WAR. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

The importance of the Seven Years' War as an epoch 
in the history of Europe Hes chiefly in its bearing on the 
question of German unity. The war re- 
sulted in placing the young Prussian king- Years^ wL r 
dom on a footing of equality with the old ^poch^n the 
monarchy of the Hapsburgs, and so raising history of 

• , . ^ ... . Europe. 

up withm Germany a rival and counterpoise 
to Austria, a rallying point round which all opposition to 
her might gather. It thus laid the foundations of the 
unification of Germany, which could never have been 
effected as long as the Austrian supremacy remained un- 
broken. For though Austria, before the time of Frede- 
rick the Great, was indisputably the greatest of German 
powers, she was after all more foreign than German. 
Her external interests in Hungary, Italy, and elsewhere 
were too extensive for her to care much for the welfare 
or union of Germany ; in fact, the tendency and avowed 
aim of her policy was to keep it weak and divided. On 

I 



2 Introductory. 

the other hand, Prussia was thoroughly German ; if a 
large portion of her territory was originally Sclavonic, it 
had been thoroughly Germanized before the time of 
Frederick. Her victories first awakened within the 
German people a yearning for national existence, while 
her successful resistance to the foreign enemies that Aus- 
tria arrayed against her marked her out as its fitting 
leader. The Seven Years' War may therefore be looked 
upon as the first act of the drama that was played out at 
Sadowa and Sedan. 

It must not be supposed that Frederick had any visions 
of a united Germany such as now exists, or that he ever 
consciously aimed at anything of the kind. The chief 
ifnot the sole object of his policy, like that of every Hohen- 
zollern before and after him, was the aggrandizement 
of his own kingdom, and for Germany outside Prussia 
he cared very little. If on various occasions he appeared 
as the champion of the smaller German states, that was 
simply because he desired to limit the influence of Aus- 
tria in Germany, and to check her encroachments. But 
it so happened from the nature of the case that the car- 
rying out of his policy necessarily conduced to the future 
welfare, or at any rate to the independence, of Germany. 
The aggrandizement of Prussia, whether in territory 
or influence, could in the main only be effected at the 
expense of Austria, and what Prussia gained at Austria's 
expense Germany gained too. Therefore, though Fre- 
derick's aims were selfish, he was none the less working 
for Germany as well as for Prussia, and it would have 
been a calamity for Germany, and for Europe too, if he 
had been compelled to succumb to the coalition which 
the not unreasonable jealousy of Austria directed against 
him. 

True it is that German unity has not been accom- 



Introductory. 3 

plished in a way or with results altogether satisfactory 
to Germans themselves or to the rest of Europe. For 
the present, at any rate, Prussia has rather swallowed 
up Germany than been absorbed in her. But, on the 
one hand, it must be considered that perhaps in no other 
way could the fragments have been welded together at 
all ; and, on the other, it may be hoped with some con- 
fidence that the present condition of the new Empire is 
merely a phase due to personal causes which are not 
likely to be permanent. 

In the history of the world the Seven Years* War has 
a yet wider significance. The war which England waged 
with France in alliance with Frederick left her the ab- 
solute mistress of the seas, gave her the 
French colonies of North America, and ^s L epoch 
founded her empire in India. It decided in the history 

^ of the world. 

the question whether North America and 
India were to be English or French ; and here there is 
little doubt that the decision was given in the way most 
accordant with the interests of humanity. Furthermore, 
the acquisition of Canada by England freed her own 
colonists from the dread of a powerful and hostile neigh- 
bour, and consequently removed their need for depend- 
ence on the English Crown. Thus the way was paved 
for the formation, a few years later, of the United States 
of America. And this, again, had a considerable influ- 
ence on the French Revolution. 



CHAPTER II. 

BRANDENBURG AND PRUSSIA. 

I I . Foundation of the Margraviate of Brandenburg. 
Prussia is, with the exception of Italy, the youngest of 
the great European powers. Unlike the other states of 



4 The Margraviate of Brandenburg, 928- 

western Europe, which rose out of the ruins of the old 
Roman Empire, she grew up amid the de- 
dom of"^" cay of the Romano-German Empire. Her 

Prussia. development may be traced step by step 

from the very beginning, and some slight knowledge of 
it is necessary for a right understanding of her position 
at the time of the accession of Frederick the Great. The 
present chapter contains a short account of the Margra- 
viate of Brandenburg and of the Duchy of East Prussia, 
the union of which in the seventeenth century gave birth 
to the modern Prussian kingdom. 

The early history of Brandenburg is the history of a 
German colony planted in the midst of a foreign race, of 
an outpost guarding the north-eastern frontier of the 
Empire. The year 928 is given as the date of its foun- 
dation. In that year the Emperor, or rather, to speak 
correctly, the German king, Henry the Fowler, march- 
ing in winter across the frozen bogs, took 
and"the° Brannibor, a stronghold of the Wends, a 

Wends. tribe of Sclavonian origin inhabiting the 

lands between the Elbe and the Baltic. The Wends 
were a barbarous heathen race, and very troublesome 
neighbours to the more civilized dwellers in the Empire ; 
so Henry appointed a margrave (Markgraf or Warden 
of the Marches) to hold them in check and keep order 
along his frontier. The first head-quarters of the mar- 
grave was Salzwedel, a place on the German side of the 
Elbe, about sixty miles to the north-west of 
BeaJ^Mar^- Brannibor, or Brandenburg as it was after- 
grave and wards called. 

Jirlector 01 

Brandenburg, It was not till two ccnturics later, when 
1130 70. ^^ Wends had been brought into tolera- 

ble subjection, that the margraves took up their re- 
sidence at Brandenburg. The first of them who did so 



-1415 "^he Hohenzo Herns. 5 

was Albert, Count of Ascanien and Ballenstadt, surnamed 
the Bear from the device on his shield. 

From Albert's time onwards the Margrave of Bran- 
denburg ranks among the leading princes of Germany, 
and is recognised as an elector, that is to say, as one 
of the princes to whom the right of choosing the Empe- 
ror belonged. 

Under Albert and his descendants Brandenburg grew 
and prospered till the beginning of the fourteenth cen- 
tury, when the direct line of the house failed, Branden- 
and then followed ninety years of anarchy, burg con- 

, ^ '' ferred on 

under two weak dynasties of electors. At Frederick of 
last, after many vicissitudes, the Emperor em, Ap. 30, 
Sigismund gave it to Frederick of Hohen- '^^^^' 
zollern, Burggrave of Nuremberg, in pledge for various 
sums of money he had advanced. Four years later 
(April 30, 141 5) Sig^ismund formally conferred the mark 
and electoral dignity upon Frederick ; and with this 
event the real history of Brandenburg may be said to 
commence. 

The new elector came of a family already distin- 
guished in German history. Its founder was a cadet of 
the Swabian family of Hohenzollern, named ^, , 

•' The house 

Conrad, who was made Burggrave of Nur- of Hohen- 
emberg by the Emperor Frederick Barbar- 
ossa, somewhere about the year 1170. Conrad's de- 
scendants held the burggraviate for two centuries and a 
half, and gradually acquired large territories in the 
neighbourhood by purchase or inheritance. Baireuth, 
Anspach, and Culmbach, afterwards known collectively 
as Culmbach, thus came into their possession. The 
activity and energy of the burggraves, combined with the 
importance of their office, the central position of their 
territories, and the powerful matrimonial alliances which 

B 



6 The Hohenzollerns, &*c. 1415-" 

they had made, enabled them to take a prominent part 
in all affairs of the Empire. Thus, though not electors 
themselves, they had great influence in the choice of 
emperors. Rudolph, Count of Hapsburg, the first of 
that family to attain the Imperial dignity, owed his elec- 
tion to the exertions of one of the burggraves. 

On his arrival in Brandenburg Frederick found the 
country in a very disorganized condition, owing to the 
^ , . , ^ weakness of its rulers ever since the extinc- 

Frederick I., 

Elector of tion of the Ime of Albert the Bear. The 
burg, Hi's- nobles, secure in their strong castles, defied 
^^- the central authority with impunity, in an age 

when the powers of defence were much stronger than 
those of attack. The towns, however, were disposed to 
support him cordially. They had suffered from the tur- 
bulence and licentiousness of the nobility, and longed 
for the establishment of a strong and settled govern- 
ment. By means of artillery, then first coming into use 
in war, Frederick was able to batter down some of the 
principal castles, and amongst them the great strong- 
hold of Friesack with walls said to be fourteen feet thick. 
In the course of a few years, by a judicious mixture of 
conciliation and severity, he reduced his unruly vassals. 
to obedience, and had little further trouble with them for 
the rest of his reign, 

I 2. The HohenzoUerns in the fifteenth ai^d sixteenth 
centuries. 

Between the death of Frederick I. and the accession 
of the Great Elector there was an interval 
^^^rh^ H ^h^^' ^^ exactly two hundred years, during which 
zoiiern Eiec nine Hohenzollem electors ruled in Bran- 
denburg. None of them can be described 
as really great men, but there was only one of con- 



-1640 The Teiito7iic Order. 7 

spicuous feebleness. They seem to have been for the 
most part hard-headed, energetic, unimaginative men, 
devoting themselves to the internal administration of 
their mark, enlarging its borders from time to time and 
never letting go what they had once fairly grasped. 
With one or two exceptions they mixed very httle in na- 
tional affairs, and even in the stirring times of the Re- 
formation they played an insignificant part, In common 
with the majority of North German princes they em- 
braced Protestantism, not indeed with enthusiasm, but 
after some hesitation, following instead of leading their 
people. The present greatness of the Hohenzollerns is 
unquestionably due, in no slight degree, to their having 
been gradually recognised as the champions of the Pro"^ 
testant religion in Germany ; it is therefore worthy of 
remark that for more than a century after the commence- 
ment of the Reformation the electoral branch of the 
family rendered it no real service. 

During this period more interest attaches to the his- 
tory of the younger branch settled in Culmbach, which 
produced many men of note in their day, 
among whom was Albert the Grandmaster JoiierS'or" 
(Hochmeister) of the Teutonic order, who Culmbach. 
contributed largely to the rise and progress of his 
family. 

The Teutonic Order, founded at the time of the third 
Crusade, first rose into distinction early in the thirteenth 
century, under the Grandmastership of Her- 
mann von der Salza, who undertook the TheTeu- 
con version of the heathen Prussians, a Lith- ^^'^''' ^'^^^' 
uanian tribe inhabiting the plains about the mouth of 
the Vistula. After the Prussians had been converted or 
extermmated, the knights took possession of the whole 
country known at present as East and West Prussia 



8 The Hoheftzollerns, &^c. 1440- 

They also acquired vast property in Germany ; but to 
them, as to the Templars, wealth brought degeneracy. 
The consequence was that they were worsted after a 
long struggle with their neighbour, the King 
^"^ ' of Poland, and forced to cede West Prussia, 
and to do homage to the Polish Crown for East Prussia, 
which they were permitted to retain. 

The homage was naturally regarded as a grievous in- 
dignity, and when Albert was elected to the Grandmas- 
tership he had to take an oath to refuse it. This, how- 
ever, was easier said than done. From the knights who 
had exacted the oath, or at least from the great body of 
them scattered through Germany, he received little or 
no assistance, and he was at last compelled to come to 
terms with the King of Poland. The king was his mo- 
ther's brother, and perhaps on that account not indis- 
posed to an amicable settlement of the dif- 

Albert con- ^, , a i -r^ r ^ 

verts East ficulty. At the Pcace of Cracow it was 
a hereditary agreed that the order was degenerate and 
duchy, 1525. unworthy of further existence, and conse- 
quently that the Prussian portion of it should be con- 
sidered as dissolved ; further, that Albert should be 
hereditary Duke of East Prussia, and do homage for it 
to Poland in that capacity. This arrangement was fa- 
cilitated by the fact that Albert had recently, from con- 
viction or interest, become a Protestant. It was of 
course regarded in Germany as a very nefarious pro- 
ceeding, and Albert was put to the ban of the Empire ; 
but he was too far off to be easily got at, so he remained 
in secure possession of his duchy. Some forty years 
afterwards the electoral branch of the family 
^^ * obtained the right of succession in the event! 
of male issue failing to Albert, and to the other Culm- 
bachers. 



-1 683 Treaty for Partition, b^c, 9 

Early in the seventeenth century the whole Culmbach 
line died out, and the electors of Brandenburg became 
possessed of East Prussia. At the same time 
they came into, what was perhaps more im- TheCleves 
portant, a well-founded claim to the rich "'^^"''^"^^• 
duchies of Cleves and Juliers, Albert's only son having 
married Maria Eleonora, the eldest daughter of Duke 
William of Cleves, on whom her fafher had settled all 
his lands if the male line of his house should fail. In 
1609 the male hne did fail, and the whole inheritance 
ought to have gone to Maria Eleonora and her children. 
Maria Eleonora herself was dead, but she had left 
daughters, of whom one was married to the Elector of 
Brandenburg. The Hohenzollerns claimed the duchies, 
but their claim was disputed by the Count Palatine of 
Neuburg, who had married the second daughter of 
Duke William. There were other competitors, and the 
affair was not settled till long afterwards, when a com- 
promise was effected by which the inheritance was di- 
vided between the two principal claimants, the Duchy 
of Cleves with the counties of Mark and r^^^^^ ^^^ 
Ravensburg going to Brandenburg, Juliers partition of 

J -r, XT 1 • 1 . , . ihe inberi- 

and Berg to Neuburg, with a stipulation tance drawn 
that if the male line failed in either family car/ied'^out 
the other should have the whole. This in- ''^^^^ 
tricate question is of more consequence than perhaps it 
appears ; it is bound up with much of the early history of 
the Prussian kingdom. 

? 3. The Great Etector, 1640-88. 
In the Thirty Years' War Brandenburg played a tho- 
roughly contemptible part. The shifty and vacillating 
elector, George William, was unable to attach himself de- 
finitely to either side, and saw his lands ravaged by both, 



lo The Great Elector, 1640- 

Himself a Calvinist, ruling over a Lutheran population, 

he was the tool of his Catholic Prime Minister, Schwar- 

zenberg. Even when the King of Sweden, 

George Wii- the noble Gustavus Adolphus, landed in 

Ham and 

toe Thirty Germany, and made the cause of German 
ar. Pi;otestantism his own, he hesitated long 
before he could make up his mind to a complete 
breach with Austria. As soon as Gustavus was dead, he 
abandoned the Swedes, though they had the hearty 
sympathy of his subjects, and patched up a peace with 
the Emperor. 

Luckily for Brandenburg Gieorge William died before 

the war was quite done, and the reins of government 

passed into stronger hands. His son and 

The Great successor, Frederick William, known as 

Elector. * ^ ' 

the Great Elector, is, with the exception of 
his great-grandson, Frederick the Great, by far the most 
remarkable prince of the line of Hohenzollern. Though 
only twenty years old at the time of his accession, he 
had long looked with disfavour on his father's aimless 
policy, and at once set himself to undo its fatal results. 
By degrees he deprived Schwarzenberg of the almost 
absolute power he enjoyed, and, after freeing his for- 
tresses from Imperial garrisons, came to terms with the 
Swedes, and induced them to evacuate the places they 
still held in Brandenburg. 

The gradual formation of a standing army secured for 
him a consideration which had never been shown to his 
father, and enabled him at the Peace of Westphalia to 
obtain more favourable terms than could otherwise have 

been hoped for. It is true that he failed to 

Peace of ^ 

Westphalia, get the whole of Pomerama, though he had 
^ ^ ' an undoubted right to it in virtue of an old 

agreement with the dukes of that country, the last of 



1 688 His Policy a?id Administration, ii 

whom died during the war. The justice of his claim was 
admitted, but the Swedes had got possession of Pomera- 
nia, and it was impossible to dislodge them. A compro- 
mise had to be made. It was settled that the Swedes 
should keep Lower Pomerania with Stettin and some 
other towns that did not properly belong to it. The rest 
was given to the elector, and to console him for his dis- 
appointment the sees of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and 
Minden were secularized in his favour, that is to say 
they were made part of the electoral dominions. He 
was no loser by the bargain. 

The Great Elector is deservedly regarded as the 
founder of the Prussian monarchy. During his long 
reign of forty-eight years he reorganized 

1 T / 1 1 • -. • • ^ Policy ani 

and consolidated his dominions, strength- administra- 
ening the central authority in the various Great 
provinces over which he ruled. His chief Elector, 
political success was the extortion from Poland of a 
complete and formal renunciation of her sovereign 
rights over his duchy of East Prussia, which was accom- 
plished by taking part first on one side, then on the 
other, in a war between Poland and Sweden. 

In domestic affairs one of his most beneficial measures 
was the establishment of an excise on arti- 
cles of consumption in place of the old ^^^ ^'''''^^' 
direct tax on houses and lands, which pressed very 
heavily on the towns, depopulated as they were by long 
continued war. Besides being less burdensome to his 
subjects, the excise was also more profitable to the 
elector than the old system of taxation, and 
gave him the means of maintaining- a con- Standing 

•J 1 1 T army. 

siderable standing army. The maintenance 

of a standing army in the time of peace was undoubtedly 

a startling innovation, but it was rightly judged by the 



1 2 The Great Elector. 1 640- 

elector to be indispensable not merely for the security of 
his own struggling dominions, but also for the protection 
of the Empire itself against its powerful and ambitious 
neighbours. His subjects objected to it strongly at first, 
but they were not insensible to the renown acquired in 
several successful campaigns, and the elector^s victories 
tended to cement his territories into an united whole, 
and to inspire them with the feeling that they were all 
parts of one nation. At the same time he 
Economic conferred on them benefits more tangible 

meabures. , . ^ 

than military glory by draining bogs, cut- 
ting canals, bringing waste-lands into cultivation, and 
other economic measures. 

One of the last acts of the elector's life was calculated 
to teach German Protestants to look upon Brandenburg 

as their leader and protector. In 168$ Louis 
Eilct^r and XIV. revoked the Edict of Nantes, by which 
thereyoca- ^ certain mcasurc of toleration had been 

tion 01 the 

Edict of secured to the French Protestants. Fred- 

erick William replied to this arbitrary act 
by the Edict of Potsdam, which offered a home in Bran- 
denburg to any of the Protestants who could effect their 
escape. This bold measure threatened to disturb the 
friendly relations which had hitherto subsisted between 
Brandenburg and France, and rendered a close alhance 
with Austria necessary for the former, and thus perhaps 
explains — what otherwise seems unaccountable — the 
elector's renunciation for a trifling equivalent of his 
really considerable Silesian claims. 
^^ ^., . The Silesian claims were twofold. In the 

The Silesian , , . 

claims of first placc there was a claim on the duchies 

burg. ^Lieg- of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau, which ac- 
^^^'^' cording to an old agreement ought to have 

fallen to Brandenburg in 1675. ^^ ^537 Joachim II., 



-1 688 The Silesian Claims, 13 

Elector of Brandenburg, had made with the Duke of 
Liegnitz an Erbverbriiderung, or compact of inheritance, 
by which if the duke's line should die out his duchies of 
Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau were to go to Brandenburg, 
and in like manner, if the electoral HohenzoUern line 
should become extinct, certain fiefs of Brandenburg were 
to go to Liegnitz. Similar arrangements were frequently- 
made by the German princes ; but the then Emperor, 
Ferdinand L, who was also King of Bohemia, protested 
against this one, on the ground that the dukes of Lieg- 
nitz had voluntarily constituted themselves vassals of 
the Bohemian Crown about two centuries before. That 
they had done so was perfectly true, but their right to 
dispose of their territories as they pleased had always 
been acknowledged, and it seems that Ferdinand had no 
right whatever to interfere with it. He was, however, 
strong enough to compel the duke to give up the Erbver- 
briiderung as far as he himself was concerned, though 
the elector firmly refused to resign his own claims. 
Nevertheless when the dukes of Liegnitz became extinct, 
the Emperor Leopold successfully opposed the succes- 
sion of the Hohenzollerns. Unwilling to let a strong 
Protestant power gain a footing in the heart of his 
hereditary dominions, he took possession of the duchies 
when they became vacant, and refused to give them 
up. 

In the second place there was a weaker claim on the 
duchy of Jagerndorf. Early in the sixteenth century 
Jagerndorf had been granted by the King 
of Hungary and Bohemia to George of Ans- ^^^" 

pach, one of the Hohenzollerns of Culmbach. On the 
extinction of the Culmbach line Jagerndorf fell home to 
the elector of Brandenburg, and was given as an appan- 
age to a junior member of the family named John 



14 The Great Elector. 1700- 

George. John George took an active part on the an- 
ti-imperial side in the Thirty Years' War, and 
^ ^^* Jagerndorf was confiscated by the Emperor 

not altogether in accordance with law and precedent. 

Frederick William found, after repeated solicitations, 

that it was impossible to obtain any of these territories 

from the Emperor, and at last agreed to resign his claims 

on them and to accept instead a small patch of territory 

known as the circle of Schwiebus, situated 

Schwiebus |-q |-]-^g north of Silesia on the borders of his 
1000. 

own electorate. Schwiebus was according- 
ly handed over, but the Austrian Court had no intention 
of permanently giving up even this miserable little bit of 
territory. It had previously made a secret agreement 
with the electoral Prince and had induced him to pro- 
mise that, if his father should accept Schwiebus, he 
would restore it when he succeeded him as elector. 

The prince appears to have been in ignorance of the 
real strength of the Silesian claims, and to have been led 

to believe that they were put forward by 
Theelec- ^^ French party in his father's council 

merely with the view of defeating the Aus- 
trian alliance. What induced him to consent to the 
secret agreement was that, besides being himself really 
anxious for the alliance, he was anxious to purchase the 
Emperor's assistance in his domestic affairs. He seems 
to have feared that his stepmother, who had great influ- 
ence over the elector, would prevail on her husband to 
make a will unfavourable to his interests, and providing 
large appanages for his half-brothers. He might then 
be glad to have the Emperor's help in setting the will 
aside. Soon after his accession to the electorate he dis- 
covered the deceit that had been practised upon him, 
and though, for the sake of his promise he restored 



"1713 1"^^ First King, 1 5 

Schwiebus, he at the same time resumed his claims upon 
the Siiesian duchies. 

The position to which Brandenburg had been raised 
by the Great Elector enabled his son Frederick to de- 
mand the Emperor's permission to assume the title oi 
king. The Emperor gave his consent re- 

Frederick 

luctantly. It is said that his ministers were 111., Elector 
bribed freely, but there is no certain proof bur^^be-^'^' 
of that. What weighed with the Emperor of Pms^iia ^ 
was the advantage of securing Frederick's November 
assistance in the Spanish Succession War, ^ ' ^^°°' 
then on the point of commencing ; and the price which 
Frederick demanded for his services v/as the royal title. 
The coronation was performed at Konigsberg, the capi- 
tal city of the duchy of Prussia, which gave its name to 
the new king. The reason why he took his title from 
Prussia was that it formed no part of the empire. In 
Prussia therefore he was an independent sovereign, 
while in respect of the lands he held in Germany he was 
a vassal of the Emperor. 

Frederick's assumption of the royal title is rather a 
landmark than an epoch in history, but it is a great deal 
more than a mere landmark. The royal 
dignity was a source of moral, if not of mate- Importance 

^ ^ ' of the event. 

terial strength to the Hohenzollerns. It 
raised them into the same class as the sovereigns of Eng- 
land and France, and brought them into more or less 
of a rivalry with the emperors themselves. As Frede- 
rick the Great very truly remarked, Frederick I. by 
erecting Prussia into a kingdom sowed a seed of ambi- 
tion in his posterity which was certain to bear fruit 
sooner or later. Prince Eugene was well aware of this 
when he said that the ministers who advised the Empe- 
ror to give his consent to it deserved to be hanged. 



1 6 Frederick William. 1713"" 

CHAPTER III. 

THE REIGN OF FREDERICK WILLIAM, I713-40. 

\ I . Frederick William and the Army, 

The ''seed of ambition" bore no fruit in the time of 
the first king. Frederick I., a man of somewhat feeble 
character, was satisfied with giving a lustre to his crown 
by the splendour of his ceremonials. His son and suc- 
cessor was of a totally different stamp. A coarse, un- 
cultivated boor, with a passionate temper and a touch 

of insanity, P^rederick William had never- 
Frederick theless Considerable merits as a sovereign. 

He saw clearly that the dignity of his new- 
ly-created kingdom, composed as it was of detached 
provinces, extending from the borders of France on the 
west to those of Russia on the east, could only be main- 
tained by an army out of all proportion to its population, 
and he determined to have it. Frugal and simple in his 
own life, he could not endure that the wealth of the na- 
tion should be squandered on empty show, and he 
promptly curtailed the expenditure of the Court, which 
had been very lavish in his father's time, and introduced 
economy into every branch of the public expenditure. 

The resources thus obtained provided the means for 
adding regiment after regiment to the army, until from 

the '^8,000 which it had numbered at the ac- 

Frederick . . ^ 

William in- cession of Frederick William it rose by de- 
reforins the grccs to nearly 84,000. To give it a nation- 
^^"^y* al character and to insure its being kept at 

the required strength, the whole'country was divided into 
circles, and each regiment was assigned to a particular 



-1740 The Balance of Power, 17 

district, from which two-thirds of its members were re- 
cruited—by forcible enlistment if necessary. 
The recruits for the remaining third were ^^^"^ '"^" 
raised by so-called voluntary enlistment in the empire 
and in foreign countries, or, to speak more correctly, 
they were in too many cases kidnapped by devices 
which made the Prussian recruiting sergeant a byword 
in Europe. Army organization was the one business of 
Frederick William's life. He took a delight in even the 
minutest details of the service, and though his mania for 
tall recruits and the prices he paid for them must pro- 
voke a smile, he still deserves great credit for the perse- 
verance with which he went on perfecting the machine 
until in drill and discipline his army stood far in advance 
of any in Europe. The efficiency was greatly promoted 
by the introduction of iron ramrods, an in- 
vention of Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Des- ^^°^ '*^"^" 

^ rods. 

sau, which enabled the muskets to be load- 
ed more rapidly than was possible with the old wooden 
ones, and so gave the Prussian soldiers an advantage 
similar to that which they derived from the needle gun 
in 1866. 

But it was not in Frederick William's time that this 
superiority was manifested. The eccentric king was too 
fond of his w^ell-drilled battalions to risk 
them in battle, and with the exception of a posTnon m' 
single campaign in Pomerania, he waged Smv^^^*^^ 
no war on his own account, though he had 
on one occasion to send a contingent to the army of the 
Empire. 

The Pomeranian campaign, in which he Pomeranian 
was involved against his will, forms part of ^^^' ^715- 
the long war between Charles XII. of Swe- 
den and Peter the Great of Russia. Its result for Prussia 

C 



1 8 Frederick William, 1713' 

was the important acquisition of Stettin and some 
other parts of Swedish Pomerania. 

J 2. Frederick William and the Balance of Power. 
The reign of Frederick WilHam is an important period 
in the history of Prussia. It forms the transition from 
the old condition of entire dependence on 

Reign of . ^ 

Frederick the Empire to the complete independence 

period"of^ achieved for her by her next sovereign, 
transition. 'pj^^ change was brought about purely by 

the force of circumstances, and not at all by any delibe- 
rate intention on the part of Frederick William. Though 
very = sensitive about his rights as an independent sove- 
reign, he was devotedly loyal to the Empire, and never 
forgot that he was a prince of it. It was with great re- 
luctance that he ever placed himself in opposition to the 
Emperor, badly as the latter often treated him. 

The war of the Spanish Succession had just been 

brought to a close when Frederick William ascended 

the Prussian throne. The Peace of Utrecht 

State of 

Europe. recognized the claims of Philip of Anjou, 

Utrecht. the French claimant of the Spanish crown, 

April, 1715. ^^^ ^|. |.|^g same time divested the monarchy 
of several provinces for the benefit of the Austrian 
claimant, the Archduke Charles, who, upon the death 
of his brother Joseph, had become Emperor with the 
title of Charles VI. Charles thereby received Naples, 
Milan, the ports of Tuscany, and the Spanish Nether- 
lands, the latter being designed to form a barrier for the 
protection of Holland against France. England retained 
Gibraltar and Minorca, which she had conquered during 
the war. Prussia was recognized as a kingdom by 
France, and had her borders slightly enlarged by the 
acquisition of Spanish Guelders. 



iy40 The Great Powers, 19 

The peace aimed at preserving a balance of power by 
preventing either France or Austria from becoming too 
powerful ; but it really left the preponder- 
ance with France. France was a compact Balance of 

^ power. 

and homogeneous nation, grown rich and 
powerful under a strong and settled government. Aus- 
tria was not a nation at all, but a collection 
of nationalities, whose sole bond of union France and 

Ausiria. 

lay in the circumstance that they all owed 
allegiance to the same man. The Empire was dead in 
all but name. The strength it seemed still to possess 
was derived from the power of the House 
of Austria, from which for nearly three cen- ^ mpire. 
turies the Emperors had without interruption been 
chosen. Ever since the Peace of Westphalia the Empe- 
ror had been little more than the head of a loose con- 
federation of independent sovereigns, many of them 
very insignificant, who could never be united for any 
national purpose. All affairs of importance were settled 
at the diet to which the princes and Free Cities sent their 
representatives, and what power the Emperor still had 
in Germany was used for the furtherance of purely Aus- 
trian objects. 

Austria could never have made head against France 
in the war but for the steady support she received from 
England. In fact, throughout the war Eng- 
land rather than Austria appeared as the "^^^ 
principal ; and one of its most important results was the 
increased influence that England consequently obtained 
in Continental affairs. 

Another important change in the states-system of 
Europe was at the same time brought about 
by the rise of Russia, which, under the able Hussia. 
rule of Peter the Great, emerged from barbarism and 



20 Frederick William, 1713^ 

conquered for itself a commanding position in the north- 
east. The rise of Russia is contemporaneous with the 
decHne of Sweden, at whose expense the aggrandize- 
ment of the former was effected. 

These were the four great powers — France, Austria, 
England, and Russia — but at this period Prussia begins 
^ . , to take place by their side as a fifth. At 

Prussia the ^ 

fifth great first, of coursc, shc was not a match for any 

power. ^^^ ^^ them, but year by year she ap- 

proached them more nearly as Frederick William added 
battalion after battalion to his well-organized army. 
Throughout his reign Prussia seems, as it were, to be 
unconsciously preparing for the great struggle which lay 
before her, and which, owing to the consummate skill 
and resolution of Frederick the Great, ended in her re- 
cognition as an equal of the other four powers. 

The Peace of Utrecht was not a satisfactory settlement 
of affairs. Many elements of discord remained out- 
standing, and others soon began to crop up. 
'state of To begin with, the peace had failed to 

Europe. reconcile the Emperor and the King of 

Spain, for while Charles refused to recognise Philip as 
the rightful king of that country, Philip could not bring 
himself to acquiesce in the loss of the provinces which 
had been adjudged to the Emperor. Moreover, Philip 
was bent on securing for a younger son the reversion of 
the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany, and this 
the Emperor as feudal superior of the duchies was indis- 
posed to grant. Then Spain had a grudge against Eng- 
land on the score of Gibraltar and Minorca, and showed 
it by openly countenancing the Pretender even after his 
unsuccessful attempt in 171 5. To increase the compli- 
cation, the Emperor managed to offend his allies, Eng- 
land and Holland, by founding a company at Ostend 



-1740 The Alliance of Hanover, 21 

for the purpose of trading with the East Indies. The 
commercial jealousy of the English and Dutch was 
aroused, and they protested vehemently that Charles 
was violating the conditions on which the Netherlands 
had been assigned to him. 

Lastly, a far more serious source of danger lay in the 
possible extinction of the male line of the House of 
Hapsburg. Charles VI. was the last male of his house, 
and, though he had been married some time, he had 
only daughters. There had been a son, but he had died 
in infancy. It was feared that there might be a war of 
the Austrian Succession, as there had been one of the 
Spanish. The Emperor drew up a Pragmatic Sanction, 
a document of a very solemn and formal 
n-ature, settling all his vast hereditary pos- Pragmatic 
sessions on his eldest daughter, Maria The- 
resa, in default of heirs male. It was, however, ex- 
tremely probable that the validity of this document 
might be contested by interested parties, unless it could 
be placed under the protection of Europe, and the Em- 
peror's whole policy was for many years directed to pro- 
curing guarantees for it from every European power. 

A vague feeling of uneasiness pervaded Europe, and 
it was decided that a congress should be held to settle 
everything. A congress was accordingly 
held at Cambrai, but, in the midst of its Congress of 

' ' Cambrai. 

tedious and protracted deliberations, the 
world was startled by hearing that Spain and Austria 
had come to a private understanding. All at once the 
old dread of Austria revived, the fear lest, leagued in 
close friendship with Spain, she should regain the as- 
cendancy in Europe which she had enjoyed two centu- 
ries before. The balance of power was supposed to be 
in danger, and England, France and Prussia united in 

C 



2 2 Frederick William, 17^3" 

a defensive alliance, known as the Alliance of Ha- 
^,,. - never. 

Alliance of i t?-- r t-» • 

Hanover, The King of Prussia was won over by the 

1725?°^ ^^ ^' promise of France and England to guarantee 
his succession to Juliers and Berg. Juliers 
and Berg, it will be remembered, formed part of the Cleves 
inheritance, which was divided between 
Berg.^^ ^" Brandenburg and Neuburg, with the stipu- 

lation that if male issue failed to either 
house, the other should inherit the whole. This con- 
tingency seemed now likely to occur in the case of Neu- 
burg, and it was known that the Elector Palatine, the 
representative of the Neuburg line, wished to bequeath 
th=e duchies to the Sulzbach branch of his house. 

Against the alliance of Hanover the Emperor would 
of course have been powerless had he not succeeded in 
detaching the King of Prussia from it, a 
of' Frederick Stroke of policy which proved easier than 
William. might have been expected. The king had 

hardly consented to the alliance before he began to re- 
pent of the precipitation with which he had acted. 
Though he had often been slighted and insulted by the 
Emperor, he remained ardently loyal to the Empire, and 
felt uneasy at having joined with its natural enemies the 
French. He feared that he was being drawn into wide 
schemes which he would not be able to control, and that 
he might have to fight for objects in which he had no 
interest. The balance of power was indeed of vital im- 
portance to him, more so than to either England or 
France ; but he had no commerce to suffer from the 
rivalry of the Ostend Company, nor did it matter to him 
whether Spain or England held Gibraltar. He suspected 
that England and France were aiming at the destruction 
of Austria, and a partition of her dominions, a prospect 



-1740 The Alliance of Hanover, 23 

that filled him with horror. Nor could it escape his 
penetration that, in the event of war breaking out, he 
would have to bear the chief brunt of it. England was 
protected by the sea, France by fortresses, but his terri- 
tories lay exposed to the ravages of Austrian armies. 

With thoughts like these in his mind Frederick 
William sat smoking his pipe one evening in his 
Tobacco Parliament, as he called the little 
assemblacre of chosen friends whom he Tobacco 

° Parliament. 

used to gather round him when the work of 
the day was over. Looking out from the window, he 
saw his old friend Count von Seckendorf crossing the 
esplanade in front of the palace. Seckendorf was a 
general in the Austrian service whose acquaintance he 
had made in the Spanish Succession war. It was not 
mere chance that had brought him to Ber- 
lin. He was ostensibly passing through on 
his way to Denmark to transact business there, but his 
real business was with Frederick William, to whom he 
had been sent by the Austrian Court to cajole him into 
abandoning his allies. Seckendorf was an agreeable 
talker and a pleasant companion, and he soon insinuated 
himself into the confidence of the simple-minded king, 
over whom for seven years he exercised an almost un- 
bounded influence. His efforts were seconded by 
General von Grumbkow, one of Frederick William's 
most trusted advisers, and a constant attendant at the 
Tobacco Parliament, who nevertheless allowed himself 
to be seduced by a pension from Austria. Frederick 
William became a mere puppet whose strings were held 
at Vienna. 

The immediate result of Seckendorf s machinations 
was the Treaty of Wusterhausen, by which the King of 
Prussia agreed to abandon the alliance of Hanover, and 



24 Frederick William. 1713^ 

to support the Emperor if he should be attacked in Ger- 
Treaty of many. He also guaranteed the Pragmatic 

Wuster- Sanction on condition of receiving a gua- 

tober 12, rantee for his own succession to Juliers and 

^^^ * Berg, or at any rate to Berg. The Emperor 

readily gave the required promise, though he had already 
bound himself to the Elector Palatine, 

After much diplomacy and some little fighting, most 

of the difficulties which had agitated Europe -since the 

Peace of Utrecht were disposed of by the 

Treaty of Treaty of Vienna. England and Holland 

Vienna. '' ° 

March 16, guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, while 

^^^ ' the Emperor consented to abolish the Os- 

tend Company, and to admit Spanish garrisons into the 
fortresses of Parma and Piacenza. The active co-opera- 
tion of the King of Prussia enabled him to obtain a 
similar guarantee from the diet of the Empire, though 
the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony protested against it 
because they had claims on some of the Austrian terri- 
tories. The Elector Palatine protested also, because he 
suspected that the double-dealing Emperor had gua- 
ranteed Juliers and Berg to Prussia. France was now 
the only power of importance that refused to consent to 
the Pragmatic Sanction, Spain and Russia having re- 
cognised it some time before. 

? 3. Father and Son. 
While tbe balance of power in Europe was being la- 
boriously adjusted, the Court of Berlin was distracted by 
the most violent dissensions, ending at last 
at the Prus- in an open breach between the king and 
sian Court j^j^ ^ij^^^ 5^^^ ^^ Crown Prince Frederick, 

known afterwards as Frederick the Great. 

The youth of this prince was passed amid surround- 



-1740 The Crown Prince. 25 

ings of singular unpleasantness. The imperious will 
and ungovernable temper of Frederick 
William rendered him an object of dread JfRe^i^n^^ 
and hatred to his family, and the gloomy se- 
verity of his religious views cast a dark shadow over their 
lives. His rude, uncultivated nature banished refine- 
ment from the Court, while his economical habits, de- 
generating into sordid parsimony when applied to the 
arrangements of his own household, divested it of every- 
thing approaching to luxury. Even the food set upon 
the royal table was often too nauseous to be eaten. 

Frederick William purposed to bring up his eldest son 
as an exact copy of himself. In his seventh year the 
prince was taken from the hands of the 

T , , T .1 r. , Education of 

women and placed under the care 01 tutors, the Crown 
the mode in which he was to spend his days ^^^^^^• 
being exactly prescribed by the king. Very little time 
was left for amusement of any kind, and by way of 
making him hardy he was even stinted in his food and 
sleep. His education was to comprise only such things 
as were practically useful. Latin was strictly forbidden, 
and of French and German he was to learn only so 
much as would enable him to express himself with flu- 
ency. Endowed by nature with an acute and refined 
mind, it is not surprising that Frederick revolted from 
the narrow groove into which his father attempted to 
force him. He soon became disgusted with the inces- 
sant round of drills and reviews to which he was sub- 
jected, and he took no pleasure in the great hunting- 
parties which were the king's favourite recreation. Beer 
and tobacco, his father's invariable evening solace, were 
alike odious to him. On the other hand he developed 
at an early age a taste for literature and music, which 
was only intensified by the violent efforts made to sup- 



26 Frederick William. ^l^Z" 

press it. One of his most heinous sins was playing the 
flute, which to Frederick Wilham appeared a sign of 
shocking effeminacy. "Fritz," he said with infinite 
contempt, '' Fritz is a fiddler and a poet and will spoil 
all my labour." 

Tyranny on one side produced disobedience on the 
other, and various causes helped to widen the breach 
between father and son. The king got to detest his 
heir, and showed his detestation on every possible occa- 
sion. Once he seized him by the hair, dragged 
Breach be- \{\vcv to the window, and would have stran* 

tween King 

and Crown glcd him with a cord of the curtain had he 
not been prevented by a chamberlain. 
Even in public he treated him with the greatest indig- 
nity, and would then taunt him with cowardice for not 
resenting the affronts. 

Frederick's position became intolerable, and he re- 
solved to escape from it by flight. The attempt was 
^^ ^ . made at a villas^e near Frankfort, on the 

The Prince . . *^ 

attempts to occasion of a journey through the Empire 
August 4, on which he accompanied the king. Fre- 

'^2°' derick was then in his nineteenth year. 

The attempt failed, and the prince lay at the mercy of 
his enraged father. His crime was aggravated in the 
king's eyes by the fact of his being an officer in the 
Prussian army. He was therefore s^uilty of 

but fails, and . ^ . o y 

is thrown descrtion, and the punishment of desertion 

prison. ^^^ death. He was thrown into prison in 
the fortress of Ciistrin, where he was treated with brutal j 
severity, while his fate and that of his accomplice. Lieu- I 
tenant von Katte, were being decided by a court- 
martial. 

Katte was condemned to imprisonment for life in a 
fortress ; but this sentence was too lenient to satisfy the 



-1740 The Crown Prince, 27 

savage monarch, so he altered it to death, and caused 
Katte to be executed before the window of the room in 
which his son was confined. The court then, after pro- 
testing its incompetence to try such a case, 
sentenced the prince to death, two only of to dcauf by a 
its members being in favour of mercy. Whe- ^^'J""] 
ther the king ever really intended to execute 
this sentence, it is impossible to say ; but those who 
knew him best feared the worst. Such of the European 
sovereigns as were on friendly terms with him implored 
him not to stain his hands with so unnatural a crime, 
and their entreaties were seconded by the remonstrances 
of his generals. At last he relented, saying 
himself that the Emperor's letter had turned epneve 
the scale ; but it w^as more than a year after his attempted 
flight before he saw his son, and a partial reconciliation 
was effected. 

The prince's character had been formed and hardened 
by his sufferings. He had grown from a boy into a man, 
proud, reserved, and capable of deep dissi- 
mulation. He saw the necessity for con- reconciled 
forming, outwardly at least, to the will of J^It?^^^^ 
the king, whose favour he gained by apply- 
ing himself diligently to the affairs entrusted to his ma- 
nagement. Gradually, too, he came to perceive the 
good qualities which lay underneath the rugged exterior 
of his father, who, in his turn, recognized with pleasure 
the abilities of his son. The prince now obtained a 
separate establishment, and married soon 
afterwards the Princess Elizabeth Christine 
of Brunswick Bevern, whom the king had selected for 
him. From this time he enjoyed a larger measure of 
liberty than had hitherto been allotted to him — his main 
reason for consenting to the marriage; so that he could 



28 Frederick William, ^1^2r 

without hindrance cultivate his literary and artistic tastes 
in the society of friends of his own choice. 

§ 4. Ihe Polish Election War, and the Close of Frederick 
William' s Reign. 

The treaty of Vienna had not been signed much more 
than two years before a great war broke out. Its cause 
was the election of a King of Poland, always a source of 
danger to Europe, owing to the intrigues and jealousies 
of the neighbouring powers. 

Poland was an aristocratic republic, or, as it has been 
well put, " a democracy of nobles" with an elective king 
possessing a mere shadow of power. In 1697 the nobles 
had chosen the Elector of Saxony, who be- 
came king with the title of Augustus II., but 
was driven out some years afterwards by Charles XII. 
of Sweden, who set up in his stead a Polish nobleman 
called Stanislaus Lesczinsky. Stanislaus in his turn was 
expelled by Russian influence, and Augustus remained 
king for the rest of his life. Nothing more would in all 
probability have been heard of Stanislaus had not Louis 
XV. married his daughter, whereby he found a powerful 
protector. 

In 1733 Augustus II. died, and the Pohsh nobles, 
bribed by French gold, and assured, as they thought, of 
French support, proceeded to elect Stanis- 
f^lTJl. ^^"^' though aware that they thereby in- 
curred the hostility of Russia and Austria, 
both of these powers being jealous of French interference 
in Poland. 

Ten days after the election Stanislaus arrived in 
Warsaw, but was almost immediately expelled by a 
Russian army under Marshal Lacy, and compelled to 
take refuge in the fortress of Dantzig. Lacy then 



-1740 The Polish Election War, 29 

caused a faction of the Polish nobles to elect the late 
king's son, Augustus, Elector of Saxony. 

Austria took no part in the election, but Expulsion of 

^ fetanislaus. 

it was notorious that she favoured the Election of 
Saxon candidate, who had gained the Em- 
peror by agreeing to recognise the Pragmatic Sanction, 
to which his father had always refused to consent. 

France then declared war on the Emperor ; but, in- 
stead of burdening herself with the reinstatement of 
Stanislaus, she marched an army into Lor- ^ 

rr^i r 1 • • France de- 

raine. The conquest of this provmce was, dares war on 
in fact, her motive for meddling in the and in^adeT 
Polish election, and she had shown great Eorrame. 
astuteness in making the election a casus belli, for it was 
a matter as to which England and Holland were indif- 
ferent, and therefore unlikely to support the Emperor. 
Spain and Sardinia joined with the spoiler and attacked 
the Austrian dominions in Italy. 

It is obvious that it now became a matter of import- 
ance for Austria to secure the friendship of Prussia. 
When France declared war, Frederick William, though 
personally inclined to favour Stanislaus, offered to sup- 
port the Emperor on the Rhine with 30,000 or 40,000 
men. Such, however, was the infatuation of Austria 
that she refused this handsome offer from 
jealousy of the rising power of Prussia, and Infetuation 
curtly demanded the contingent of 10,000 
which Frederick William was bound by treaty to supply. 

The king was bitterly mortified by the refusal and by 
the studied neglect and contempt of the Austrian Court, 
which persisted in reecardinsf him as a sub- ,^ . . 

^ o & Hesitation of 

ject and an inferior. But he was not yet Frederick 

prepared to throw himself into the arms of 

France, for, apart from the consideration that he would 



30 Frederick William. ^1^Z~~ 

thereby lose the Imperial guarantee of Juliers and Berg, 
he was too mindful of his position as a prince of the 
Empire to join with a power engaged in dismembering 
it. Moreover, he had more regard for treaties than was 
common at that time. Yet the situation was one from 
which his more clear-headed and less scrupulous son 
would assuredly have found means to extract some ad- 
vantage for Prussia. 

In June, 1734, Dantzig capitulated, but Stanislaus 
made his escape into Prussian territory, whereupon the 
Emperor demanded that he should be given up to the 
Russians. Frederick William indignantly refused to do 
anything of the kind ; nor was he more disposed to com- 
pliance when Charles went on to demand the dismissal 
of the French ambassador from Berlin because the 
Empire was at war with France. The Polish war marks 
a stas^e in the transition already alluded to. 

Prussia tend- _. ° ^ _ , ^ _ . 

ing to inde- The dcmcanour of Austria was forcmg 
pendence. Frederick William to break loose from his 

old habit of considering every question from the point of 
view of a prince of the Empire. More and more he 
came to look upon Prussia as an independent power, 
though he was never able to bring himself to any defi- 
nite act of self-assertion. 

The war ended in the utter discomfiture of the Em- 
peror, who had to surrender Naples and Sicily to Don 
Carlos (the second son of the King of 
End of the Spain), and a portion of Lombardy to Sar- 
\.ar, 1735. (jinia. Augustus remained King of Poland, 
and Stanislaus, whose rights were quietly passed over, 
though he was permitted to retain the em.pty title of roy- 
alty, was compensated by receiving for hfe the duchies 
of Lorraine and Bar. After his death they were to pass 
to France. The Duke of Lorraine, on whom the Em- 



1740 The Polish Election War, 31 

peror intended to confer the hand of Maria Theresa, 
obtained the reversion of Tuscany in compensation for 
the loss of his hereditary dominions, the Grand-duke of 
Tuscany, the last of the Medici, being at the point ot 
death and without heirs. Parma and Piacenza reverted 
to the Emperor. Finally, France agreed to guarantee 
the Pragmatic Sanction. 

As Frederick William's life drew to a close he expe- 
rienced more and more the ill-will of the Austrian Court. 
Satisfied at last that it was not, and perhaps 
never had been, in earnest about Juliers and FredeAck ° 
Berg, he had the mortification of feeling that William, 
the devotion of a lifetime had been thrown away. One 
consolation alone remained to him. Pointing to his son, 
with whom he was now completely reconciled, he said 
with pride and sorrow, " There stands one who will 
avenge me.'* 



CHAPTER IV. 

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR. 

I I. Accession a7id Character of Frederick. 

Frederick was born on January 24, 17 12, and became 
king on May 31, 1740. In personal appearance he was 
rather e^ood-lookincr than otherwise, well- _ 

, 11-.-. 1 . 1 Personal ap- 

made, though below the average height, pearance of 
and inclined to stoutness. He had the fair 
hair and blue eyes of the North Germans, regular and 
delicate features, and a face with great power of expres- 
sion. 

At the time of his accession he was little known ex- 
cept to a few intimate friends, and even these had no 



32 Frederick the Great- 1740 

idea what manner of man he really was. For some 
years past he had lived for the most part in retirement 
^.r . c at Reinsberg, a palace erected under his 

Life before ° ^ 

his acces- own Supervision on an estate purchased for 

him by his father. There, surrounded by 
friends of his own choosing, many of them foreigners, 
he led a careless convivial life, seemingly engrossed in 
the pleasures of society, literature, art, music, and the 
table. No one knew that while amusing himself with 
concerts and private theatricals, while writing French 
verses and corresponding with Voltaire, he was apply- 
ing himself indefatigably to military and political af- 
fairs, and acquiring a great aptitude for business. No 
one suspected that beneath the easy-going, intellectual 
voluptuary there lay concealed a stern, self-willed, am- 
bitious despot. 

During the last year at Reinsberg he had been pre- 
paring for publication a refutation of Machiavelli's 
** Prince." The " Anti-Machiavel," as the 
The'^Anti- work was called, contained an elaborate 

machiavel. ' ' 

statement of Frederick's notions of what a 
king should be, and an indignant declamation against 
ambition, conquest, arbitrary government, and so on. 
It was published in the autumn of 1740, anonymously, 
but the authorship was no secret. By the irony of fate 
it had hardly been published two months before its 
author was engaged in a war of which ambition was the 
avowed motive. 

Men thought that his accession would usher in a 
golden age of peace and plenty under the beneficent 
^ . . sway of a philosopher-king-, whose sole care 

Opinions en- ^ ^ ^ ^ 

tertained would be the happincss of his subiects. and 

about him. , , . -i i i t -i 

whose attention would be directed, not to 
the preparation for war, but to the cultivation and en- 



1740 Accession of Frederick, 33 

couragement of the arts and sciences. The illusion 
quickly vanished, though some of the young king's ear- 
liest acts were calculated to confirm it. Men of eminence 
in science and literature were invited to Berlin, and 
Maupertuis, the great French mathematician, w^as re- 
quested to preside over an academy that was shortly to 
be refounded in the Prussian capital. Within the first 
few days of his reign, Frederick abolished 
legal torture except in a few specified cases, ^^^ innova- 
granted complete freedom to the press, and 
declared himself in favour of universal toleration in reli- 
gion, in all which matters he was far in advance of his 
age. He further gave his ministers to understand that 
he regarded his own interests and those of his people as 
identical, but that he washed the preference to be given 
to the latter if ever the two should seem to be incompa- 
tible. This declaration was followed by a liberal distri- 
bution of corn from the public granaries at moderate 
rates to the poor of several famine-stricken provinces. 
Next came the disbandment of the useless and costly 
regiment of Potsdam giants, which appeared for the last 
time at Frederick William's funeral, a measure w^hich 
gave some countenance to the rumour that the army was 
going to be reduced. 

Yet Frederick soon showed that he meant to rule with 
the strong hand, as his father had ruled before him. 
His reforms were merely superficial, and 
did not touch the fabric of government be- abroludlm^ 
queathed to him by the late king. In this 
no alteration of any importance was made, except 
that Frederick took the reins into his own hands far 
more completely than Frederick William had ever 
done. 

The power of the sovereign was immense in Prussia. 



34 Frederick the Great, 1740 

There was perhaps no country in Europe where the 
^ ^ , crown was, on the one hand, less oversha- 

Power ofthe , , , -, , , . . 

Crown in dowed by great nobles or ecclesiastics, and, 

russia. ^^ ^^ Other, less limited by popular rights, 

none which offered such facilities for absolutism to a 
strong-willed and ambitious prince. The Prussian no- 
bility was very powerful ; but it was not powerful against 
the sovereign. Its privileges were enormous, and Fre- 
derick, an intense aristocrat at heart, in spite of his talk 
about equality, preserved them in their integrity. But it 
had within its ranks no great families of historical repu- 
tation, standing close round the throne, as in the an- 
cient monarchies of Europe, and exercising upon it an 
undefined influence. Nor, again, though each province 
had its own local administration, was there any general 
assembly ofthe whole nation which could place a check 
on the crown. The Prussian monarchy was in fact, as 
might be expected from its origin, a compound of sepa- 
rate units welded into a strong centralized state by a 
century of military despotism. 

Frederick saw the strength of his position, and availed 
himself of it to the utmost. When Prince Leopold of 
Character of Anhalt-Dcssau expressed a hope that he 
Frederick's and his sons might be allowed to retain the 
offices and authority they had enjoyed in 
the late reign, he repHed that they should certainly be 
continued in their offices, but that he knew of no autho- 
rity save that which resided in the king. Far from in- 
tending to reduce the army, he increased it by 16,000 
men. The strict economy of the late reign was in no 
wise relaxed, though Frederick's common sense pre- 
vented it from degenerating into the ridiculous parsimony 
which had made his father's court the laughing stock of 
Europe. It was soon remarked that Frederick as king 



1740 His Character, 35 

showed no resentment towards those who had treated 
him with harshness in the days when as crown prince 
he was out of favour with his father. Nor, on the other 
hand, did he manifest any undue partiaHty for the friends 
of his youth, by promoting them to places for which they 
were unfit. Neither present affection nor gratitude for 
the past had the least weight with him against the public 
advantage. Almost all of Frederick William's ministers 
were left in their posts, though with diminished power 
and influence. Frederick's ministers were little more 
than clerks. He kept all power in his own hands, and 
superintended every department with the keenest vigi- 
lance and with untiring energy. This system of super- 
vision or interference was carried a great deal too far. 
Frederick did all manner of things himself which might 
have been done as well or better by subordinates, and, 
if his constitution had not been a very strong one, he 
must have broken down under the weight of the immense 
mass of business which he transacted daily. When it 
passed into weaker hands, the system collapsed. 

Frederick possessed a large share of the qualities 
which make a great ruler : a strong love of order, a very 
clear insight into men and things, great ad- 
ministrative capacities, combined with inde- ^^^ qualities 

^ ' as a ruler. 

fatigable industry, and a mind capable of 
forming the most extensive schemes and of attending at 
the same time to the minutest details of their execution. 
To these qualities must be added a rare strength of will 
and a self-reliance that never faltered. 

His system of government was doubtless despotic and 
paternal, at times even tyrannical ; but 
for a young country that has to fight for its des^^otSm 
existence, a paternal despotism is no bad 
thing, at any rate when the despot identifies himself with 



36 Frederick the Great, 1740 

its welfare so completely as Frederick did. It may be 
questioned whether under any other form of government 
Prussia could have weathered the storms of the Seven 
Years' War. 

Nor should it be forgotten that under the shadow of 

this despotism an unparalleled freedom of 
VT^T" °^ speech was permitted. The liberty of the 

press which Frederick granted at the com- 
mencement of his reign was no mere empty form. Satires 
on the king were published in Berlin which would not 
have been endured in any other capital in Europe. 
** My people and I,'^ he said, "have come to an agree- 
ment which satisfies us both. They are to say what 
they please, and I am to do what I please." The under- 
standing was well observed on both sides. Conscious of 
strength and conscious of possessing the love and esteem 
of the mass of his subjects, Frederick looked down with 
serene indifference on all that his enemies might say of 
him. One day as he rode through Berlin, he saw a 
crowd of people staring up at something on the wall, and 
on sending his groom to inquire what it was, found it to 
be a caricature of himself. The placard was put so high 
that it was difficult to read it, so Frederick ordered it to 
be placed lower, in order that the people might not 
have to stretch out their necks. The words were hardly 
spoken, when with a joyous shout the placard was pulled 
down and torn into a thousand pieces, while a hearty 
cheer followed the king as he rode away. 

Frederick was a great administrator, but he was some- 
thing more. He was the most clear-sighted statesman 

in Europe. What strikes one most about 
stausman- ^lis policy is its dcfinitencss, and the limita- 
^^^P- tion of his aims to what was practically at- 

tainable. He never let himself drift. He always knew 



iy4o His Character. 37 

what he wanted, and he generally knew how to get it. 
If he was not very scrupulous about the means he em- 
ployed, he must be judged by the standard of the age in 
which he lived, and that standard was not a high one. 
The skill displayed in the formation of his plans was not 
more conspicuous than the vigour and rapidity with 
which they were executed when the proper moment had 
arrived. When he had made up his mind to strike, he 
struck at once and with decision. Equally remarkable 
were the calmness of his judgment and the power he 
possessed of taking an unbiassed survey of any situa- 
tion in which he found himself. Not elated wdth victory, 
not disheartened by adversity, he knew how to use the 
one with moderation and to bear the other with forti- 
tude. 

His fortitude was heroic. It never, except once for a 
moment, gave way amid disasters that would have 
crushed any ordinary man. For years dur- 
ing the latter part of the Seven Years' War ^jf ^°^^^' 
he must have lived in the full conviction 
that, do what he would, he could hardly escape destruc- 
tion. Yet he went on with ever-dimunishing resources, 
day after day devising new expedients, and always 
showing a bold front to the enemy. And he triumphed 
at last by the sheer force of his relentless will. 

The brilliant military talents for which he was distin- 
guished late in life are a remarkable proof, on the one 
hand, of great mental powers, on the other, 
of energy and determination. Frederick ^J^ military 

°/ ^ talents. 

had no inborn genius for war. His early 
campaigns were full of blunders, and owed their suc- 
cess to the excellence of the Prussian troops and to the 
skill of the Prussian generals. It was simply by dint of 
hard study and by long pondering over dearly bought 

D 



38 Frederick the Great. 1740 

experience that he made himself the first commander 
of his age. 

Of Frederick's personal character it is not possible to 
speak in the terms of admiration that may justly be 
applied to his character as a ruler. There 
character"^^ is, indeed, no reason for believing that the 
charges of gross immorality insinuated 
against him by certain writers have any foundation in 
fact. On the contrary, with the exception of some 
youthful indiscretions, his life appears to have been per- 
fectly pure. But he was not a man to inspire those 
about him with love and devotion. That he was capa- 
ble of deep feeling there is no doubt, but he very sel- 
dom showed it. He was cold, haughty, and reserved. 
His nature seems to have been soured by the brutal 
treatment he endured in his boyhood. Originally gen- 
tle and lovable, it became hard and selfish. He pos- 
sessed the dangerous gift of sarcasm, and he used it 
without mercy Yet when he wished to make himself 
agreeable no one could be more so. His conversational 
talents and his wit were really considerable, and he had, 
when he chose to exert it, a rare charm of manner. 

With the mass of his subjects Frederick was certainly 
popular. His sarcasms were not indulged in at their ex- 
pense. To them and especially to his sol- 

His popularity, j. ^ j j j -u- 

diers he was endeared more and more as nis 
reign went on not more by his exploits, of which they were 
justly proud, than by his genial affability, by a certain 
homely simplicity of manner, an aptitude for humorous re- 
partee, and by the good humour Avith which he often al- 
lowed the most astonishing plain-spoken things to be said 
to himself. Innumerable stories are told of old " Father 
Fritz," as his soldiers loved to call him, illustrating these 
traits of his character. One anecdote will suffice as an in- 



p 

1 740 State of Europe, 39 

stance of the extraordinary freedom which common sol- 
diers were sometimes permitted to use in addressing their 
haughty and imperious sovereign. In the course of the 
Seven Years' War, a regiment just about to go into winter 
quarters was suddenly ordered to march 
against the enemy. Frederick rode by the 
side of the men as they marched, and overhearing a 
grenadier cursing and grumbling at the hardness of their 
fate, said, " Be calm, my children, you shall have all the 
better winter quarters for it." ** I only hope you're not 
lying, Fritz," was the unblushing reply. " No," said 
the king, good-humouredly, " no, really I'm not ; I keep 
my word." ''Well then," exclaimed the grenadier, 
**now^ weareready to drive the devil out of hell." This 
particular anecdote may or may not be true, but there 
are so many of the same kind that it is impossible to 
believe all to be fictitious. 

\ 2, State of Europe at Frederick' s Accession. 
The question of Juliers and Berg, which had played so 
prominent a part in Frederick William's reign, remained 
unsettled at the time of his death, though the 
advanced aq-e of the Elector Palatine made it J^^iers and 

^ Berg. 

evident that the succession would soon be 
vacant. Disgusted with the double-dealing of the Em- 
peror, Frederick William had towards the close of his 
reign applied to France for support in maintaining his 
rights. His overtures were favourably received, but led 
to nothing, because France was unwilling to see any 
stronger power in possession of the important duchies on 
the Rhine. Moreover, the widespread belief that nothing 
would induce the Prussian king to go to war deprived 
him of the consideration that would otherwise have been 
shown to the master of so many battalions. Frederick, 



40 Frederick the Great, 1740 

on his accession, sounded both England and France to 
ascertain how far he might rely on either of them for 
assistance, but avoided entangling himself in definite 
alliances, preferring to keep his hands free so that he 
might act in whatever way seemed most advantageous. 

At the time of Frederick's accession the political 
horizon was tolerably clear. There was war between 

England and Spain, but that was far away on 
coifdkionof the Spanish main, and though it was ex- 
Europe, pected that the King of France would before 
long espouse the cause of his Spanish kinsman, he had 
not done so as yet. The peace of Europe remained un- 
broken, and there were no signs of the coming storm. 

The Emperor had procured from every state of import- 
ance a guarantee of his Pragmatic Sanction ; and 

although Prince Eugene had told him that 
The Em- ^^ only guarantee worth having was an 

army of 200,000 men and a full treasury, he 
fondly hoped that engagements obtained with such diffi- 
culty would not be lightly repudiated. There was, 
moreover, no immediate prospect of the good faith of the 
guarantors being put to the test. Charles VI. was only 
fifty-five years old and in the enjoyment of perfect health, 
so much so that he had not yet abandoned the hope of 
male issue. For this reason he had deferred getting his 
son-in-law, Francis of Lorraine, Grand-duke of Tuscany, 
crowned King of the Romans, which would have ensured 
his following him as Emperor. This might easily have 
been done, and would have been quite in accordance 
with precedent. For some centuries past the Emperors 
had usually contrived to get a son or some other near 
relation crowned King of the Romans in their lifetime, 
and, when this had been done, the King of the Romans 
succeeded at once on the Emperor's death, without any 



1 740 War between England and Spain. 41 

further coronation or election. Charles, however, not 
wishing to bar the claims of any son that he might still 
have, hesitated to get the ceremony performed upon his' 
son-in law, and the result was, that when he died the elec- 
tors chose another man instead of Francis of Lorraine. 

England and France had each for many years been 
ruled by a single minister. Sir Robert Walpole had 
been Prime Minister of England for eighteen 
years, and Cardinal Fleury had for almost f "^^J^^^ ^°^ 
as long a period governed France in the 
name of Louis XV. Both ministers were distinguished 
for their pacific policy, yet each was before the close of 
his career forced into what he believed to be an unjust 
or impolitic war. In each case the love of power proved 
stronger than political principles, and the latter were sa- 
crificed that the former might be retained. 

The war between England and Spain arose out of the 
commercial relations of the two countries. English 
trade with the Spanish colonies was restrict- „^ , 

. . , . . , War between 

ed by treaties withm very narrow limits, but England and 
smuggling went on to such an extent that ^^'^" 
almost all the commerce of Spanish America was in 
English hands. Frequent collisions naturally ensued 
between the English traders and the Spanish coast- 
guards, who claimed to exercise a right of search over 
English vessels, and public opinion in England was in- 
flamed by reports of atrocities perpetrated on English 
sailors. The stories were for the most part gross exag- 
gerations, but they were implicitly believed, and pro- 
duced a marvellous effect. So great was 
the popular ferment, and so artfully was it November 4, 
stimulated by the opposition leaders, that 
Walpole, against his better judgment, was driven to de- 
clare war. 



42 Death of the Emperor and its Results, 1740 

The near relationship of the Kings of France and 

Spain made it probable that the latter would not long 

remain neutral, and it was chiefly the con- 

Fr^aifcY ^^^' sideration of this risk which made Walpole 

should join shrink from declaring war. So lons^ as Ene- 

Spain. , , . .11-, 

land was at peace, and especially so long as 
she was at peace with France, there was little if any 
danger of a Stuart rebellion • the events of 1745-46 are 
a sufficient justification of Walpole's policy. The con- 
tingency which he dreaded — war with France — occurred, 
but not until both countries were involved in the great 
war of the Austrian Succession, which broke out on the 
unexpected death of the Emperor. 

\ 3. Death of the Einperor and its Results, 
Charles VI. died on October 20, 1740, after a very 
short illness, caused, it is said, by eating a dish of mush- 
^ ^ ^ rooms. In accordance with the Prag^matic 

Death of * 

Charles vi. Sanction, his eldest daughter, Maria The- 

Accession of i • t a i i -i /- * 

Maria The- resa, was proclaimed Archduchess of Aus- 
^^^^' tria, Queen of Hungary, Queen of Bohemia, 

and under various titles sovereign of all the lands that 
had owned her father as their lord. She was not yet 
twenty-four years old when the untimely death of her 
father suddenly called her to a position as perilous as it 
was exalted. But young as she was she showed herself 
fully equal to the emergency, and her own high spirit 
inspired all about her with enthusiasm. She was strik- 
ingly handsome, and she combined a most fascinating 

manner with a powerful and masculine un- 
Her charac- derstanding. Her energy and determination ( 

never flagged, and her courage seemed al- 
ways to rise in proportion to the difficulties she had to 
contend with. She was a very noble-minded woman, 



I740 The Bavarian Claims, 43 

animated by deep religious principles and by a strong 
sense of duty. Later on in life her religious zeal too 
often took the form of bigotry and intolerance, and, as 
was the case with Frederick too, her love of power and 
influence led her to exercise an inquisitorial scrutiny 
over the private affairs of her subjects. And yet, how- 
ever, these faults were not apparent. In all respects she 
was a worthy antagonist for the great Frederick, her 
almost lifelong foe. It is said that at one time he wished 
to marry her; but, apart from the difference of religion, 
the pride of the Austrian Court and the predilection of 
Maria Theresa herself for Francis of Lorraine were in- 
superable objections to a marriage which would have 
altered the whole course of German and European 
history. 

Charles was hardly dead before the validity of the 
Pragmatic Sanction was contested. A Bavarian envoy 
was already on the road to Vienna when the tidings of 
his decease reached Munich. The envoy had been de- 
spatched on the 2 1st, in anticipation of the event, to pro- 
test against the accession of Maria Theresa in the name 
of Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, and to assert the 
Bavarian claims to a large portion of the 
Austrian dominions. The elector was de- The claims 

of Bavaria. 

scended from the Archduchess Anne, eldest 
daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand L, who died in 1564, 
and his claims rested on the will of Ferdinand, of which 
there was a copy at Munich. The elector maintained 
that Ferdinand had settled his dominions on his daugh- 
ter Anne and her descendants in the event of failure of 
his own heirs male, and the Bavarian ambassador at 
Vienna was instructed to demand the production of the 
will. The will was produced, and to the ambassador's 
amazement was found to contain the words "lawfully 



44 Death of the E7nperor and its Results. 1740 

begotten [eheliche) descendants '* instead of " male 
(jndnnliche') descendants/' Whether the copy was in- 
correct or the will itself had been tampered with nobody 
knows, but it is tolerably certain that Charles Albert 
himself believed in the justice of his claims. 

Meanwhile a far more dangerous enemy than the 
elector was silently preparing for action. Frederick of 
Prussia saw in the Emperor's death an opportunity for 
aggrandizement such as might never occur again, and 
with characteristic promptitude determined at once to 
^ , . , utilize it by seizing Silesia and revivino; his 

Frederick . i • /• 

determines claims on the duchics of Jagerndorf, Lieg- 
Silesian ' \i\X.z, Bricg, and Wohlau. Having formed 
claims. |.]^-g resolution, he sent for Podewils and 

Schv^erin, the most trusted of his ministers and his best 
general, to consult with them as to the mode of execut- 
ing it. The seizure itself would not be difficult ; the 
real difficulties would come afterwards. 

After four days' deliberation it was decided to begin 
by taking possession of Silesia, peaceable possession if 
„ , possible, and then to open neeroiiations with 

Resolves to . a «_» 

seize Silesia, Maria Theresa. The usual practice of the 
opennego- Hohenzollcrns had been to offer their ser- 
tiations. vices to Austria, and to trust to her promises 

for obtaining what they wanted in return. The futility 
of this mode of procedure had been made apparent in 
the case of Frederick William. Austria accepted his 
services and then broke her promises. Frederick deter- 
mined to get his reward first and give her no opportunity 
for perfidy. 

The terms he was prepared to offer were the following: 
to defend Austria against all other claim- 
ants ; to assist the Grand-duke of Tuscany 
in obtaining the Imperial Crown ; to resign the Prussian 



1740 The Seizure of Silesia, 45 

claims on Juliers and Berg ; and to advance a consider- 
able sum of ready money. In return he demanded the 
whole or at any rate part of Silesia. It required some 
effrontery to offer such terms to the haughty Austrian, 
and Frederick had small hope of their being accepted, 
but he thought it advisable to proceed thus instead of at 
once taking up an attitude of irreconcilable hostility, and 
claiming the four duchies as his right. The propositions 
were not presented at Vienna until he had already en- 
tered Silesia at the head of his army. 

The question whether the seizure of Silesia was or 
was not justifiable is one on which the most divergent 
opinions have been, and are still, enter- 
tained. It looks on the face of it like a fla- ^.^^ ^^^^ 

seizure of 

grant violation of the law of nations, and Silesia justi- 
Frederick admits himself that the desire of 
making himself a name was at any rate one of his mo- 
tives. There are, however, considerations that may be 
urged in extenuation of his conduct. His father had 
guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, but his guarantee 
was conditional on the Emperor's promise to secure to 
him the succession to Juliers and Berg. Yet so far was 
Charles from doing this that he actually agreed to allow 
to the other claimant provisional possession of the 
duchies. Again, the contention that the peace of Europe 
would have been preserved if Frederick had kept quiet, 
has little to justify it. Apart from the probable contin- 
gency of the war between England and Spain spreading, 
there was the fact that the Elector of Bavaria had already 
asserted his claims to Austrian territories, and that France 
had already determined to back him. Within ten days 
of the Emperor's death, Cardinal Fleury said to the 
Prussian ambassador that France had given her guar- 
antee to the Pragmatic Sanction, subject to the clause 



46 The Conquest of Silesia. 1740-2 

* saving the rights of a third party, a reservation' which, 
as the ambassador observed, annihilated the guarantee 
altogether. Moreover, Saxony had claims, too, and if 
Bavaria moved in the matter. Saxony would move also, 
and it was almost certain that she would try to obtain 
that very Silesia over which the Hohenzollerns had an- 
cient rights. As to these Silesian claims, Frederick does 
not say much, though he alludes to them in his ' Histoire 
de mon Temps ' as being incontestable. They were cer- 
tainly valid in themselves ; their weak point was the 
length of time they had lain dormant. 

Less excusable than the actual seizure of Silesia was 
the manner in which it was done ; the perfidy with which 
Frederick concealed his intentions under the mask of 
friendship ; the hypocrisy with which, when his army 
was occupying Silesia, he pretended to be acting in the 
interests of Maria Theresa. 

It may be asked why, if Frederick wanted to seize 
something, he did not seize Juliers and Berg, where there 
was no manner of doubt about the justice of his claims. 
The answer is not far to seek. By occupying the Rhine 
duchies he would have offended France as well as Aus- 
tria, whereas France would not care a straw about his 
aggrandizing himself on the Oder. Then, again, Juliers 
and Berg were far away, Silesia was close at home, con- 
tiguous to the main body of his dominions, and in every 
respect a more valuable acquisition. 

§4. The Conquest of Silesia. 

On December 16, 1740, Frederick entered Silesia at 

the head of 28,000 men, averring that he 

invades Came with no hostile intentions against Aus- 

Silesia. ^j.-^^ |-^y^ merely to guard his own interests 

there in the troubled times he saw coming. On hearing of 




JiuMell 4iStru(MrafS!n(f'a^,T^ 



1 741 The Invasion of Silesia, 47 

his preparations, the Austrians had got together a force of 

7000 men, which, though unable to keep the field, was 

sufficient to garrison the fortresses. Three of these, 

Glogau, Brieg, and Neisse, were strong places, and it 

was hoped that they would be able to hold out till the 

spring, when they would be relieved by an Austrian 

army, especially as a severe frost set in before the close 

of the year and rendered siege operations impossible. 

Except from the fortresses, Frederick met with no 

resistance. The inhabitants were either indifferent or 

well disposed to his cause. Two-thirds of them were 

Protestants, and these welcomed him as the champion 

of Protestantism cominsr from the north, as _, _ 

^ ' The Protest- 

Charles XII. of Sweden had come before, to ants wei- ■ 

secure to them the right of worshipping God 

as they pleased. Of course Frederick had no idea of 

stirring up a religious war. Such a thing would have 

been utterly foreign to his nature. He merely announced 

that, as in his own dominions, so in Silesia all forms of 

religion were to be protected. But to men w^ho had been 

oppressed and persecuted for their religion, as the Sile- 

sian Protestants had been, even toleration and equality 

might well seem a welcome boon. 

Before the end of January, Frederick had made him- 
self master of all Silesia except Glogau, Brieg, and 
Neisse, and these fortresses were closely blockaded. 
Breslau the capital opened its gates after a mere show 
of resistance. His negotiations with Austria 
had been less successful. Maria Theresa Failure of 
absolutely refused to treat with him as long negotiations, 
as he had a man in her dominions. 

Early in the spring the war was resumed. Glogau was 
taken by storm, and the siege of Neisse had just been 
commenced, when an Austrian army appeared out of 




MuMell ,fs StruthtrtfS^MV'^' I 



48 The Conquest of Silesia. 1740-2 

Moravia under Marshal Neipperg. Frederick was una- 
^ , . , ware of its approach until it was within a 

Frederick r i • 

taken by few milcs 01 him, and he narrowly escaped 

surprise. being made prisoner. Gathering in his 

scattered posts, he retreated with all rapidity on Ohlau, 
which contained his heavy artillery and stores. But the 
Austrians were before him, and succeeded in getting 
between him and Ohlau, in fact, between him and Bran- 
denburg. He was entirely cut off from his communica- 
tions, and forced to risk a battle. 

On the morning of April lo, 1741, Frederick advanced 
against the Austrians as they lay encamped at Mollwitz. 
All through the day before the snow had 
M^oU^'^z fallen heavily, and neither army had any 

April 10, very distinct idea of the other's whereabouts. 

^''^^' Neipperg was taken by surprise, and but for 

the extreme slowness with which the Prussians manoeu- 
vred, would have been attacked before he had time to 
form his troops in order of battle. But at first the battle 
went all in his favour. The Prussian cavalry was no 
match for the Austrian ; it was routed almost at the first 
onset, and, in spite of the king's efforts to rally it, it fled 
in hopeless confusion. Then Field-Marshal Schwerin, 
who commanded the Prussian infantry, either thinking 
that the battle was irretrievably lost, or wishing to be 
relieved from the responsibility of the king's presence, 
implored him to retire from the field. Frederick con- 
sented, and galloped off towards Oppeln, where he ex- 
pected to be able to cross the Oder. In the meantime 
the steadfastness of the Prussian infantry retrieved the 
day. Again and again the gallant Romer led the Aus- 
trian cavalry to the charge, but no impression could be 
made on those serried ranks. Then was seen the ad- 
vantage of the iron ramrods and of the perfect discipline 



1 741 Belleisle, 49 

which had been impressed on the Prussian troops by 
Frederick William and the Prince of Dessau. The Prus- 
sians got five shots to two of the enemy's, and fired as 
steadily as if they had been on the parade-ground. The 
Austrians were unable to stand against this murderous 
fire, and at seven o'clock, after five hours' fighting, 
Neipperg gave the signal for retreat. 

The battle of Mollwitz made a great sensation in 
Europe. It had never been supposed that the untried 
troops of Prussia could resist the veterans of Austria. 
Louis XV., when he heard of Frederick's 
invasion of Silesia, said, " The man is mad." ?^fi^^ ^^^-^ 

' ' battle. 

But Mollwitz showed that the man was not 
mad, and that a new power had arisen in Europe. 
Frederick's camp was sought by envoys from almost 
every court in Europe, and amongst them, on the part of 
France, came Marshal Belleisle. 

Belleisle was a man of brilliant talents and boundless 
ambition. His mind was full of the wildest schemes for 
the aggrandizement of France, and his ima- 
gination soared over every obstacle that lay 
in his path. His daring projects fascinated even the 
dull soul of Louis XV. When the battle of Mollwitz was 
fought, he was making a tour in regal splendour through 
the German courts, with the object of preventing the 
Grand-duke of Tuscany from being chosen Emperor. 
He had not quite decided on whom the perilous honour 
was to be conferred, but the Elector of Bavaria was his 
favourite candidate. He saw in the difficulties of the 
House of Hapsburg an opportunity for the total destruc- 
tion of its power. He projected the formation of a grand 
alliance against Austria under the leadership of France, 
which should embrace Spain, Prussia, Bavaria, and per- 
haps Sweden and Saxony. Already he looked upon the 



50 The Conquest of Silesia, 1740-2 

Queen of Hungary as vanquished, and imagined himself 
dividing her dominions as he pleased. " He talked," 
said Frederick, '* as if all her provinces were up at auc- 
tion." The French were to get the Austrian Netherlands, 
and Germany was to be cut up into four little kingdoms, 
which France, the arbiter of Europe, might play off one 
against the other as she pleased. 

Frederick was not at all attracted by Belleisle's pro- 
gramme. He had no wish to pull down Austria in order 
to set up France in her place, Yet, situated as he was, 
it was very difficult for him to refuse the French alliance. 
He was fully alive to the danger of accept- 
Frederick's jj^cr it. The French mi^-ht use him as a tool, 

perplexity. ° '-' 

and then desert him, as they had deserted 
Stanislaus in his Polish war. To accept it would be a 
wide departure from the traditional policy of his house, 
but he could hardly dispense with French assistance un- 
less he could make an accommodation with Austria. 
Austria herself was a power of vast resources, if she only 
knew how to use them, and it was not yet certain that 
several of the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction 
would not come to her rescue. England, he knew, 
would stand by her. She had already supplied the 
money with which Neipperg's army was equipped. 

Fearing that he might be attacked by a coalition, 
Frederick was eagerly desirous of an honourable peace 
with Austria. His terms were studiously moderate. He 

would be content with Lower Silesia and 
Frederick Brcslau, the Same that he would have taken 

tries to make ' 

peace with before Mollwitz. His efforts were, however, 
in vain, though seconded by England, who 
was anxious to restore harmony between the two Ger- 
man powers and to unite them against France. The 
Court of Vienna, blind to or regardless of the dangers 



1 741 The Frtmch and Bavariaris. 51 

that surrounded it, refused to conciliate this dangerous 
enemy, who might at that time have been converted 
into a staunch friend. Relying on Cardinal Fleury's 
known aversion to war, the Austrian ministers still 
cherished the belief that France would adhere to her 
guarantee. 

When all hopes of a satisfactory peace with Austria 
had been exhausted, Frederick entered into a defensive 
alliance with France. The terms of the 
treaty were exceeding-ly vap;ue. The main Concludes 

•^ o y o ajj alliance 

points, however, were as follows : France with France, 
guaranteed Lower Silesia and Breslau to ^"^ ^" 
Frederick, and Frederick relinquished his claim on Ju- 
liers and Berg, and promised to vote for the Elector of 
Bavaria as Emperor. At the same time he stipulated 
that France should without delay send auxiliary troops 
to the assistance of the elector, and induce Sweden to 
declare war on Russia to prevent her from succouring 
the Queen of Hungary. 

France now began to act with energy. In the month 
of August two French armies crossed the Rhine, each 
about 40,000 strong. The first marched 
into Westphalia, and frightened George II. in West- 
into concluding a treaty of neutrality for P^^aha; 
Hanover, and promising his vote to the Elector of Ba- 
varia. The second advanced through South Germany 
on Passau, the frontier city of Bavaria and 
Austria. As soon as it arrived on German ^ South 

Germany. 

soil, the French officers assumed the blue 

and wdiite cockade of Bavaria, for it was the cue of 

France to appear only as an auxiliary, and the 

nominal command of her army w^as vested in the 

elector. 

From Passau the French and Bavarians passed into 



52 The Conquest of Silesia. 1741 

Upper Austria, and on September 1 1 entered its capital, 

Linz, where the elector assumed the title of 
The French Archdukc. Five days later Saxony joined 
riansin the allies. Sweden had already declared 

war on Russia. Spain trumped up an old 
claim and attacked the Austrian dominions in Italy. It 
seemed as if Belleisle's schemes were about to be crowned 
with complete success. Had the allies pushed forward, 
Vienna must have fallen into their hands. But the 
French did not wish to be too victorious lest they should 
make the elector too powerful, and so independent of 
them. Therefore, after six weeks' delay, they turned 
aside to the conquest of Bohemia. 

Breathing time was afforded to Maria Theresa, but 
her situation was still very critical. As she could not 

yet resolve to grant terms which would sat- 
ation of iMa- isfy Frederick, she was obliged to fall back 
^ ^ * on her Hungarian subjects. The Hunga- 
rians had usually been rather a source of apprehension 
than of security to the Austrian monarchy, but Maria 
Theresa won their loyal support by important conces- 

sions. She promised to restore their an- 
garians cicnt Constitution, which had been abolished 

loyaHy, ^"^ t)y her ancestors, and the Hungarian mag- 
Scptember. nates, touchcd by the misfortunes of their 
young and beautiful sovereign, voted with accla- 
mation an insurrection or general arming of the 
country. 

The insurrection would have been of little use to the 
queen if her enemies had really desired her destruction. 
She might easily have been overwhelmed before the 
Hungarians could take the field. But, while the French 
were holding back for fear of making the Elector of Ba- 
varia too strong, the King of Prussia allowed himself to 



1742 Charles VII , 53 

be detached from his alhes. Frederick had been pursu- 
ing a very tortuous poUcy during the sum- 
mer. In spite of his treaty with France he of Klein 
continued to negotiate with Austria, and on dorf^^Octo- 
October 9 he met Neipperg at the Castle of ^^^ 9- 
Klein Schnellendorf, and agreed to a secret compact. 
Neipperg was to be allowed to retire unmolested into 
Moravia, and Neisse was to be delivered to Frederick 
after a feigned siege. A definite peace was to be con- 
cluded before the end of the year. Frederick insisted 
on the compact being kept a profound secret, and inti- 
mated his intention of disavowing it if it should be allowed 
to transpire. 

The compact was of great advantage to Maria There- 
sa, as it enabled her to concentrate her forces against 
her remaining enemies. Neipperg, released from Sile- 
sia, withdrew into Moravia, where he was joined by the 
Grand-duke Francis with 30,000 men. The combined 
Austrian army advanced into Eohemia, and, though too 
late to save Prague, it was able to prevent any further 
conquests. The French generalship was 
verv bad. Belleisle oug-ht before this time Austrian 

° ^ successes. 

to have taken command of the allied army, 
but he was disabled by rheumatic gout, and forced to 
resign his post into the hands of Marshal Broglie, a very 
inadequate substitute. The French and Bavarians were 
shut up in Prague, and cut off from their conquests in 
Upper Austria, while these were menaced by another 
Austrian army under Count Khevenhiiller. 

Khevenhiiller retook Linz on January 24, 1842, the 
very day on which Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, 
was raised to the imperial throne with the 
title of Charles VII. He had reached the 
summit of his ambition, and henceforth his fortunes 

E 



54 The Conquest of Silesia. 1742 

steadily declined. He was head of the Holy Roman 
Empire, but he was no longer master of his own do- 
minions. While Khevenhiiller was reconquering Upper 
Austria the Hungarian Pandours had burst into Bavaria 
from the Tyrolese mountains, and were spreading de- 
struction far and wide. Munich fell into their hands 
(February 13) almost at the very moment when the 
Emperor was being solemnly crowned at Frankfort. 
Charles's only hope lay in Frederick, whom he implored 
to make a diversion in his favour. 

Frederick had already determined to interfere. His 

Silesian conquests were secured by no treaty, and it was 

becoming apparent that Austria had no in- 

Frederick tcntion of concluding- one. He began to be 

interieres. ^ '^ 

alarmed at her successes, and the fact that 
the compact of Klein Schnellendorf had long since been 
made public gave him an excuse for resuming hostilities. 
Early in 1742 he entered Moravia in conjunction with a 
body of Saxon troops, but the campaign was rendered 
fruitless byj:he obstinacy of the Saxon commanders, and 
when the allies parted it was with feelings of mutual dis- 
satisfaction. 

After the departure of the Saxons, Frederick retired 
into Bohemia, and fell back in the direction of Prague. 
At Chrudim he heard that an Austrian army was advan- 
cing against him, under Prince Charles of Lorraine, 
Maria Theresa's brother-in-law. A battle was fought at 
Chotusitz, and again the Prussians gained a 
Battle of complete victory. Austria was now ready 

or Czaslau, for pcace with Prussia. England had ad- 

^^ ^^' vised it all along, but Maria Theresa would 

not consent to give up Silesia, ' the fairest jewel of her 
crown,* until she had tried her fortune in another battle. 
By the Peace of Breslau she surrendered all Silesia (with 



1742 Value of Silesia. 55 

the exception of Teschen, Troppau, and Jagerndorf), 
together with the county of Glatz. The 
French were very indignant when they Bresiau, 
heard that their ally had concluded a sepa- ^""^ ^^• 
rate peace, but Frederick had good reason for believing 
that they would have treated him in the same way if they 
had had the opportunity. 

The Peace of Bresiau added to the Prussian kingdom 
a province which enlarged its area by one-third, and in- 
creased its population and revenue by about 
one-half, a rich and fertile province, full of y^^^e and 

, , importance 

towns and villages, and one which, by its of Silesia to 

- . , ,. . , , Prussia. 

geographical conditions, no less than on re- 
ligious grounds, belonged naturally to the northern 
rather than to the southern German power. From Bohe- 
mia and Moravia Silesia was cut off by mountain chains 
through which the passes were few and difficult ; the 
natural highway of its commerce was the broad stream 
of the Oder, which traverses the country from end to 
end before passing through the plains of Brandenburg 
on its way to the Baltic. 

The ease with which the conquest of Silesia was 
effected, and the loyalty with which its inhabitants held 
fast to Prussia during the Seven Years' War, show that 
the transfer of allegiance gave no violent shock to their 
feelings, and indicate a consciousness on their part that 
destiny had bound up their lot with the rising northern 
power. On the other side of the mountain chain the 
feeling of the population was unmistakably different. 
The Catholic Bohemians and Moravians were devotedly 
loyal to Austria, as Frederick found to his cost by the 
difficulty he experienced in obtaining supplies and in- 
formation when he had to make war there. 

Strategically the acquisition was of immense impor- 



56 The Second Silesian War, 1742H 

tance. Silesia, when held by Austria, has been compared 
to a glacis in front of the great mountain -rampart which 
protects Bohemia and Moravia on the north-east. As 
long as Austria possessed it it was hardly possible for a 
Prussian army to penetrate to Vienna, while the 
Austrians could at any time march without difficulty 
into the heart of the Prussian kingdom. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR AND THE PEACE oV 
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. 

The two years following the Peace of Breslau were 
years of almost unbroken success for Maria Theresa. 
England espoused her cause with enthu- 
sucSsses siasm, and besides providing large subsi- 

dies sent an army into Germany, which de- 
feated the French at Dettingen (June 27, 1743). George 
II. himself was present, and showed great bravery in the 
battle, the last in which an English sovereign has ever 
personally taken part. Before the end of the summer of 
1743 Bohemia had been recovered, Bavaria conquered, 
and the tide ©f French invasion completely rolled back. 
In Italy the Austrians more than held their own against 
the Spaniards. Every one was now ready for peace ex- 
cept Maria Theresa, who thirsted for revenge, and de- 
manded compensation for her losses. In- 
pWcts"of toxicated with success, she cherished all 
Maria manner of ambitious ideas. Alsace and 

Iheresa. . 

Lorrame were to be reconquered from 
France ; Bavaria to be incorporated with Austria. The 
late imperial election was to be declared null and void, 
because the Bohemian vote had been excluded. This 



-1744 Frederick renews the War, 57 

had been done, after full consideration, on the ground 
that a woman could not be elector, and that therefore it 
was impossible for Maria Theresa either to vote at the 
election or to transfer her vote to her husband. Her 
claim to set aside the election was simply monstrous ; 
she talked as if the Empire were an hereditary posses- 
sion of her house. 

Frederick not unnaturally became anxious. He feared 
lest she might turn her victorious arms against himself, 
and he had sufficient reasons for believing 
that she still aimed at the reconquest of Si- Frederick 

/■ alarmed. 

lesia, the Treaty of Breslau notwithstanding. 

It was, moreover, impossible for him to look on with 
indifference while the Emperor, to whose elevation he 
had largely contributed, was treated in the high-handed 
manner proposed by Maria Theresa. It ^ . 

t . . , . Desires 

was, in fact, this consideration, far more to check 

^1 , . , . ^ Austrian 

than apprehension on his own account, or influence m 

the desire of conquest, that induced him to Crermany. 

renew the war. The first Silesian war was undertaken 

in order to conquer for Prussia a position among the 

great Powers of Europe. The motive of the second was 

to secure her influence in Germany. 

With this object he sought to form a great union of 

German princes to uphold the dignity of the Emperor, 

and to resist the Austrian pretensions. The project 

failed because patriotism and national life were nearly 

dead in Germany. The union of Frankfort, 

besides Frederick himself and the Emperor, pv^ankfort 

had only two members — the Lan deprave of May 22, 

1 744. 
Hesse-Cassel and the Elector Palatine. It 

was hoped that more would join when Prussia was once 

in the field, but they never did, and the Emperor's death 

soon brought the union to an untimely end. 



58 The Second Silesian War, ^744- 

Germany failing him, Frederick turned again to 

France, and there his overtures were favourably received. 

. , Mortified with the ill-success of their arms, 

Treaty with 

France, and stung by the contemptuous manner m 

J""^^^* which Maria Theresa rejected their propo- 

sals for peace, the French had resolved to prosecute the 
war with vigour in the spring of 1744. Strange as it 
may seem, they were still nominally at peace. Hitherto 
they had acted only as auxiliaries. Now, however, 
France came forward as a principal, and declared war 
against England (March 15) and Austria (April 27). 

Frederick's plan of operations for the approaching 

campaign was well devised but not well carried out. 

He made a serious blunder himself, and the 

Plan of French were shamefully remiss in perform- 

operations. ^ ^ ^ 

ing the part assigned to them. It was 
agreed that France should send two armies into the field, 
one to act offensively in the Netherlands, the other de- 
fensively on the Upper Rhine, where it was expected 
that Austria would make a great effort for the conquest 
of Alsace. Frederick was then to invade Bohemia. 
This was certain to cause the recall of the Austrian army 
from Alsace, which was to be pursued and harassed by 
the French on its retreat. Everything happened exactly 
as had been expected, except that when the Austrians 
retreated the French omitted to pursue them. 

On the night of June 30, the Austrian army effected 
the passage of the Rhine by a masterly manoeuvre exe- 
cuted in the face of the enemy. They were commanded 
nominally by Prince Charles of Lorraine, but really by 
Count Traun, by far the most skilful of the Austrian 
Invasion of gcncrals. When the news reached Frede- 
Bohemia. rick, he began to prepare for his invasion 

of Bohemia. He did not declare war against Austria, 



-1744 Frederick Renews the War, 59 

but annomced, through his minister at Vienna, his 
intention of sending auxiharies for the defence and 
support of vhe Emperor. The Prussians marched into 
Bohemia in t.'iree columns converging on Prague. Two 
passed through Saxony, the third came from Silesia. 
Frederick had the Emperor's permission to cross the 
Saxon territory, and he was careful to commit no acts of 
hostility during his passage, as he still hoped that Saxony 
might be brought over to his side. Of this, however, 
there was no chance. Saxony was already in alliance 
with Austria, and later in the year, after Frederick had 
met with some reverses, she openly joined the enemy 
and barred his retreat. 

Early in September the three Prussian columns met 
at Prague, and after a w^eek's siege the city surrendered. 
Frederick then, in deference to the opinion 

. .^ Capture of 

of Marshal Belleisle, but agamst his own Prague Sep- 
judgment, advanced into the south of Bo- 
hemia with the view of threatening Vienna. He thus 
exposed himself to the risk of being cut off from Prague. 
Yet even so he would probably have been able to main- 
tain himself if the French had fulfilled their engagements. 
But while he was conquering the districts of the Upper 
Moldau, the Austrian army returned unimpaired from 
Alsace. The French had allowed it to cross ^, . 

111 -'^"^ Austrians 

the Rhme unmolested, and had not made return from 

the slightest attempt to harass its retreat. 

They were only too glad to get rid of it themselves. 

In the ensuing operations Frederick was completely 
outmanoeuvred. Traun, without risking a battle, forced 
him back towards the Silesian frontier. He 
had to choose between abandoning Prague outma- 
and abandoning his communications with ^oeuvred. 
Silesia, and as the Saxons had cut off his retreat through 



6o The Second Silesian War. 1744- 

the Electorate, there was really no choice in tie matter. 
So he fell back on Silesia, abandoning Prague and his 
heavy artillery. The retreat was attended wth consider- 
able loss. 

Frederick was much struck with the skill displayed 

by Traun, and says, in his *'Histoire de mon 

Temps,'*that he regarded this campaign as 
his school in the art of war and M. de Traun as his 
teacher. 

The campaign may have been an excellent lesson in 
the art of war, but in other respects it was very disastrous 
to Frederick. He had drawn upon himself the whole 
power of Austria and had learnt how little the French 
were to be depended on. His prestige was dimmed by 
failure, and even in his own army doubts were enter- 
tained of his capacity. But, bad as his position already 

was, it became far worse when the unhappy 
Ch^^i^ °yjj Emperor died, worn out with disease and 
January 20, Calamity. This event put an end to the 

union of Frankfort. Frederick could no 
longer claim to be acting in defence of his oppressed 
sovereign ; the ground was cut from under his feet. Nor 
was there any longer much hope of preventing the Im- 
perial Crown from reverting to Austria. The new 
Elector of Bavaria was a mere boy. In this altered state 
of affairs he sought to make peace. But Maria Theresa 
would not let him off so easily. In order that she might 

use all her forces against him, she granted 
FSen,° peace to Bavaria, and gave back to the 

April 22. young clcctor his hereditary dominions, 

on condition of his resigning all claim to hers, and pro- 
mising to vote for her husband as Emperor. 

While Frederick thus lost a friend in Bavaria, Saxony 
threw herself completely into the arms of his enemy, and 



1745 Death of Charles VII, 6i 

united with Austria in a treaty which had for its object, 
not the reconquest of Silesia merely, but the 
partition of Prussia and the reduction of the Warsaw, 
king to his ancient limits as Margrave of ^^^^ '^• 
Brandenburg. Saxony was then much larger than it 
is now, but it was not only the number of troops it could 
send into the field that made its hostility dangerous. It 
was partly the geographical position of the country, 
which made it an excellent base for operations against 
Prussia, but still more the alliance that was known to 
subsist between the Elector (King Augustus III. of Po- 
land) and the Russian Court. It was probable that a 
Prussian invasion of Saxony would be followed by a 
Russian invasion of Prussia. 

Towards the end of May the Austrian and Saxon 
army, 75,000 strong, crossed the Giant Mountains and 
descended upon Silesia. The Austrians were again com- 
manded by Prince Charles, but the wise head of Traun 
was no longer there to guide him. Confident of success, 
they marched along with colours flying and bands play- 
ing, hardly expecting that the Prussians would venture 
to meet them. Meanwhile Frederick, at the head of 
70,000 men, calmly awaited their approach, encouraging 
as much as possible the notion that he was too dispirited 
for action, in order that he might lure them on into the 
heart of his country, and there deliver a great battle. 
The encounter took place at Hohenfriedberg, and re- 
sulted in a complete victory for Prussia. The Austrians 
and Saxons lost 9000 killed and wounded, 
and 7000 prisoners, besides sixt}^-six can- H^ohenfried- 
nons and seventy-three flags and standards. ^^^^' -^""^ ^' 
Four days after the battle they were back again in Bo- 
liemia. 

Frederick followed, not vv'ith the intention of attacking 



62 The Second Silesian War, 1745 

them again, but in order to eat the country bare, so that 
^ , . , it mig;ht afford no sustenance to the enemy 

Fredenck .... ^ , . 

enters Bohe- durmg the wmtcr. For his own part he was 
^^^' really anxious for peace. His resources 

were all but exhausted, while Austria was fed by a con- 
stant stream of English subsidies. As in the former war, 
England interposed with her good offices, but without 
effect ; Maria Theresa was by no means disheartened 
by her defeat, and refused to hear of peace till she had 
tried the chances of battle once more. 

On September 13 her husband was elected Emperor 

by seven votes out of nine, the dissentients being the 

King of Prussia and the Elector Palatine. 

Francis ^ 

elected Em- Tliis event raised the spirits of the Empress- 
peror. Queen, as Maria Theresa was henceforth 

called, and opened a wider field for her ambition. She 

sent peremptory orders to Prince Charles to 
Sohr, Sep- attack Frederick before he retired from Bo- 
^°* hemia. A battle was accordingly fought at 
Sohr, and again victory rested with the Prussians. 

The season was now far advanced, and Frederick 
returned home, expecting that there would be no more 
fighting till after the winter. Such, however, was far 

from being the intention of his enemies. In 
invaston"of the utmost sccrccy a plan was concerted for 
h?randen- ^^ invasion of Brandcnburg itself by three 

Austrian and Saxon armies acting simulta- 
neously. It was, of course, impossible that preparations 
for such extensive operations could go on without excit- 
ing suspicion ; but it was through the indiscretion of 
Count Brlihl, the Prime Minister of Augustus, that Fre- 
derick first received certain intelligence of the designs 
against him. 

He saw directly that he must no longer hesitate about 



1745 The Peace of Dresden. 63 

attacking Saxony, even though he might thereby incur 

the hostility of Russia. He calculated that 

the Russians could not be ready for war in derermmes 

less than six months, and he hoped that, Sax"n^^ 

before that time had expired, he should be 

able to dictate peace from within the walls of Dresden. 

After joining his Silesian army at Liegnitz, Frederick 
hastened northwards to intercept Prince Charles, who, 
at the head of 40,000 Austrians and Saxons, was advanc- 
ing through Saxon Lusatia upon Frankfort-on-the Oder. 
The king's movements were effected with such rapidity 
and secrecy that Prince Charles had no suspicion of his 
being in the neighbourhood. As he marched on in 
careless confidence, with his army extended in a long 
straggling line, Frederick suddenly fell on 
the Saxon troops who formed his vanguard, Henners- 
and inflicted on them a severe defeat at the November 
village of Hennersdorf. Prince Charles had ^3- 
to fall back on Bohemia, while Frederick advanced into 
Lusatia as far as Bautzen. Some three 
weeks afterwards the Prince of Dessau de- Kelseisdorf 
feated a second Saxon and Austrian army i^ecember 
at Kesselsdorf, a few miles from Dresden. 
This victory completed the subjugation of Saxony, and 
put an end to the war. Three days after Kesselsdorf, 
Frederick entered Dresden, and astonished every one 
by the graciousness of his behaviour, and by the mode- 
ration of his terms. From Saxony he exacted no cession 
of territory, but merely a contribution of 1,000,000 thalers 
(150,000/.) towards the expenses of the war. From Aus- 
tria he demanded a guarantee of the treaty 
of Breslau, in return for which he agreed Dresden, 
to recognize Francis as Emperor. Peace ^^^°^ ^^ ^^* 
was signed on Christmas Day, and the King of Prussia, 



64 The Peace of Dresden. 1748 

returning home to the country which he had saved from 
imminent peril, was hailed by universal acclamation as 
Frederick the Great. 

The Peace of Dresden restored tranquillity to the 

Empire, but the European war was protracted for nearly 

three years longer. The French won battles 

Remainder g^^d took fortrcsscs in the Netherlands, while 

of the Aus- 
trian Sue- the Austrians got the upper hand of their 

cession War. . . ^ ^ ^ ^ _ 

enemies m Italy. In the summer of 1745 
Prince Charles Edward Stuart, son of the Pretender, 
landed in Scotland, and raised a rebellion which shook 
the throne of George II. to its foundation. The rebellion 
was, however, suppressed in the following year, and 
from that time forth the House of Hanover was freed 
from all danger from the partisans of the exiled family. 

The war was at length brought to an end by the ex- 
haustion of the belligerents. The Peace of Aix-la- 
Chapelle restored the state of affairs that 
Aix4a-Cha- 1^^^ Subsisted at the death of Charles VI. 
ber^i748^°" ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ exccptiou of importance. 
That exception was Silesia, which in spite 
of the opposition of Austria, was formally guaranteed to 
Prussia. France gave up her conquests in the Nether- 
lands, and received back Cape Breton in North America., 
which had been taken by the English. Parma, Pia- 
cenza, and Guastalla were erected into a principality in 
favour of Don Philip, the third son of the King of Spain, 
and certain cessions of territory that Austria had made 
to Sardinia were confirmed. The questions that had 
occasioned the war between England and Spain were 
quietly dropped. 

Thus ended the war of the Austrian Succession, a war 
which for Austria and Prussia may be looked upon as the 
cause of the far greater and more bloody Seven Years' 



1748 The Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle, 6 5 

War. For England and France the two wars were 
really one, divided into two parts by an ill- 

•' . , r J Connection 

observed truce of eight years. of the war 

Maria Theresa was anything but satisfied Seven Years' 
with the terms of the peace. Instead of re- ^^"^ 
joicing that she had saved so much of her father's in- 
heritance, she harped on her losses, and, ^. 

^ ^ Dissatisfac- 

forgetful of the great services which the tion of Maria 
English had rendered her, reproached 
them with the cessions which, as she asserted, they 
had compelled her to make. During the latter 
part of the war, a feeling of ill-will had been spring- 
ing up between the Empress-Queen and her allies, 
who complained of her supineness, and expected 
her to make greater efforts in return for their immense 
subsidies. This feeling was artfully stimulated by France, 
who, with her traditional diplomatic skill, contrived to 
sow dissensions between the allies by pretending to 
offer Austria better terms in secret than England was 
publicly proposing on her behalf. It was 
mere trickery on the part of France, but it pi^a^tesT^^"^" 
served the desired purpose. Already Maria change of 

T^i 1 • • 1 /- pohcy. 

Theresa began to entertam a vague idea of 
abandoning her old connection with England and Hol- 
land, and of reconciling herself with her hereditary 
enemy, France. 

To France and England, on the other hand, the peace 
was very welcome^ to France because she was 
thoroughly exhausted, to England because 
she was weary of a war in which she had no ErT^and "^ 
real interest. Unfortunately, in their haste g^ari of 
to conclude peace, the two powers neglected 
to settle properly a question which was becoming one of 
great importance, and likely to embroil them in fresh 



66 The North American Colonies, 1748-54 

hostilities. This question arose out of the relations of 
the English and French colonists in North America. 



CHAPTER VI. 

ENGLAND AND FRANCE. 

\\, The North A77ieric an Colonies, 

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the English 
colonists in North America were settled along the Atlan- 
tic seaboard between the thirty-first and for- 
Jo^on?s"tf ^'^^ ty-fourth parallels of north latitude. Some of 
them claimed by their charters a right to 
the whole continent westward as far as the Pacific, their 
boundaries to the north and south being accurately de- 
fined. But in reality they extended no further inland 
than the Alleghany Mountains. 

The French settlers, insignificant in numbers com- 
pared with the English, were scattered over a vast tract 
of territory. They occupied the country 
The French j^orth of the Great Lakes and of the St. Law- 

colonists. 

rence, extending to the south of that river 
over what is now New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, to- 
gether with the adjacent islands. Besides this they had 
settlements in the upper valley of the Mississippi, and at 
its mouth the colony of Louisiana. 

By the Peace of Utrecht, France had ceded to England 
the Hudson's Bay and Straits, Newfoundland and Aca- 
dia, or, as it is now called, Nova Scotia. 
Frontier Unfortunately the boundary of Acadia was 

disputes. ^ ^ 

not accurately defined. Its limits had al- 
ways been very vague, and the French asserted that 
they included only the peninsula between the Bay of 



1 7 5 4~5 5 Braddock. 6 7 

Fundy and the ocean. The question was still pending 
when the Austrian Succession War broke out, and it was 
left unsettled by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which 
merely stipulated that the boundaries of the two nations 
should be as they had been before the war. Commis- 
sioners were to be appointed to settle the matter, but be- 
fore anything could be done hostilities broke out between 
the French and the English on the isthmus connecting 
the peninsula with the Continent. Nor was this the only 
cause of hostility subsisting at the time of the peace. 
The whole frontier line was almost as vague as that of 
Acadia, and about this period the French set up a claim 
to the entire basins of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi, 
thus uniting their own colonies to Canada and Louisiana, 
and cooping up the English in the narrow strip of land 
between the Alleghanies and the ocean. 

This was of course more than could be endured by the 
English, and, to resist the encroaching spirit of the 
French, a company was formed in Virginia 
for the purpose of colonizincr the Ohio val- 9^^° 

^ ^ ^ Company. 

ley. In March, 1749, the Ohio Company, 
as it was called, received a grant of 500,000 acres from 
the crown. The French soon heard of the scheme, and 
La Gallisonere, the governor of Canada, promptly de- 
spatched 300 men to trace and occupy the valleys of the 
Ohio and St. Lawrence. Plates of lead were buried in 
various places with inscriptions signifying that from the 
farthest ridge whence water trickled toward the Ohio, 
the country belonged to France, and the lilies of the 
Bourbons were nailed to a forest tree in token of pos- 
session. 

No active steps were taken by the Ohio Company till 
the beginning of 1754, when a party of thirty three men 
was sent to build a fort at the point w^here the Alleghany 



6S The North American Colonies. ^755 

and Monongahela unite to form the Ohio. A reinforce- 
^ ment of 1 50 Virginian troops, under George 

pany begins Washington, was shortly afterwards de- 
forron the spatched, but before its arrival the first party 
Ohio- was driven back by the French, who ap- 

peared in great force, and themselves erected a fort on 
the same spot, and called it Fort Duquesne, after the 
then governor of Canada. On July 3, the French at- 
tacked and defeated Washington at a place 
Defeat of called Great Meadows. This skirmish, un- 

Washington. ' 

important in itself, is memorable not only as 
being one of the main causes of the war which resulted 
in the expulsion of the French from North America, but 
also as the first appearance in history of George Wash- 
ington. 

The home government was at last roused into activity. 
Early in 1755 two regiments of the line sailed for Amer- 
ica, under General Braddock. Braddock, personally 

brave but a harsh ignorant man and a strict 

disciplinarian, was altogether unsuited for 
the irregular warfare of America, and his expedition was 
badly planned and badly executed. His contemptuous 
treatment of the friendly Indians, whose warnings he 
neglected and whose assistance he despised, caused 
most of them to quit his banner in disgust. The result 
was that, when within ten miles of Fort Duquesne, the 
English blundered into an ambuscade and were defeated 

with terrible slaughter, Braddock himselt 
His defeat, being mortally wounded. Farther north on 

the frontiers of Nova Scotia and New Eng- 
land the English were more successful, but their victo- 
ries in this quarter were overshadowed by Braddock's 
disaster, and consternation prevailed through the colo- 
nies. 



1 754 Newcastle and Pitt, 69 

g 2. Newcastle and Pitt. 

The government of England was at this juncture in 
the incompetent hands of Thomas Pelham, Duke of 
Newcastle, who after being Secretary of State for thirty 
years had become First Lord of the Treasury and Prime 
Minister upon the death of his brother Henry in March 
1754. Newcastle had none of the qualities of a states- 
man ; he owed his position to his immense 
wealth, his high connexions, and his great ewcaste. 
parliamentary influence, supplemented by a love of power 
seldom equalled in its intensity. He was a master of 
all the little arts by which it could be gained and pre- 
served ; there was nothing he would not stoop to in 
order to secure it, and his great skill in discerning the 
winning side, and in attaching himself to it, was hamper- 
ed by no scruples. Sir Robert Walpole, his colleague 
for eighteen years, said of him, *' his name is perfidy." 

But it was only in the tenacity with which he pursued 
and clung to power that Newcastle showed strength or 
determination. In the actual exercise of it he was weak 
and vacillating, fussy and pretentious, jealous of every- 
body, and while peevish and irritable to his friends and 
dependents, timid and obsequious towards those whose 
influence or abilities he dreaded. Indefatigable in the 
transaction of business, he was, as Horace Walpole 
says, only always doing it, never did it. Always in a 
hurry but seldom punctual, he seemed, as one of his 
friends observed, to have lost half an hour in the morji- 
ing, and to be continually pursuing without ever over- 
taking it. His quick shuffling gait, and the rapid stutter 
in which he poured forth his confused ideas, were the 
laughing-stock of his contemporaries. Of his ignorance 
many anecdotes are told. Thus, when it was suggested 



yo Newcastle and Pitt. ^754 

to him that something ought to be done for the defence 
of Annapohs, " Annapohs," he rephed, " Annapohs ! 
oh ! yes, Annapohs must be defended ; to be sure, An- 
napohs should be defended — pray where is Annapohs ?" 
The following is even more ludicrous. " Cape Breton 
an island, wonderful ! — show it me in the map. So it 
is, sure enough. My dear sir, you always bring us good 
news. I must go and tell the king that Cape Breton is 
an island ! *' 

Yet in his favour it must be said that in private life 
he bore a high character, and was generally regarded 
with affection ; also that his ambition was pecuniarily 
disinterested. His life was spent in corrupting others, 
but he himself remained incorrupt, and after forty years 
of office he quitted public life considerably poorer than 
he entered it. 

When Henry Pelham died, after a premiership of 
eleven years, George II. said, "Now I shall have no 
more peace,'* and the events of the next three years fully 
justified his fear. Pelham was no genius, but he man- 
aged the House of Commons with great 
^^' adroitness, and by his conciliatory disposi- 

tion induced men of the most divergent views to serve 
under him. During the latter part of his administration 
there had been no opposition whatever, because every 
one who could possibly be dangerous to the Government 
was taken into it. There was little chance that the tur- 
bulent spirits who had yielded to the tact of Pelham 
would submit to the control of his feeble brother. 

But the experiment had to be tried. Newcastle's posi- 
tion and parliamentary influence made him master of the 
situation, for he could have brought the Government to 
a standstill if he had been thrown into opposition. 
Though the recognised head of the Whig aristocracy, he 



1754 JV/itg Opposition to Walpole, 71 

had been content with a subordinate position during the 
lifetime of his brother, whose superior sense and abihty 
he acknowledged ; but even of him he had been bitterly- 
jealous, and there was no one else to whom he would 
concede the patronage and influence of the 
Treasury. A leader of the Commons had Firrt^Lord 
then to be appointed, for this post also be- Trealut 
came vacant by Pelham's death, but it was 
doubtful whether Newcastle could bring himself to give 
up enough power to induce any first-rate man to accept 
it. There were three men in the House any one of whom 
might fairly aspire to it — Pitt, Fox, and Murray — and be- 
sides them none. 

William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham, was at this 
period in the forty-sixth year of his age. He was born 
in November, 1708, the second son of a 

Pitt 

gentleman of old and respectable family. 
He was educated at Eton and Oxford, but left the uni- 
versity without taking a degree, because of the gout, 
from which even at that early age he suffered severely. 
After spending some time in foreign travel, he obtained 
on his return home a cornetcy in the Blues, and in 1735 
entered Parliament ^s member for the family borough of 
Old Sarum. 

Walpole was then at the zenith of his power, though 
the forces which eventually overthrew him were gather- 
ing strength. The Tories, strong in the country, were 
insignificant in Parliament, but a formidable opposition 
to the great Whig minister was growing up within the 
ranks of his own followers, of whom many were discon- 
tented with his measures, or disgusted with ^|^jg ^pp^. 
his monopoly of power. Outside Parliament ^^^°^ofe 
this party was supported by the favour of Fre- 
derick, Prince of Wales, who, after the manner of heirs- 



72 Newcastle and Pitt. ^754 

apparent in the House of Hanover, had quarrelled with 
his father, and was then raising the standard of opposi- 
tion to the Court. Pitt threw in his lot with the discon- 
tented Whigs, and soon made himself conspicuous by 
the violence of his invectives. Walpole is reported to 
have said, ^* We must at all events muzzle this terrible 
cornet of horse,'' and he deprived him of his commis- 
sion. 

In the factious proceedings which led to the Spanish 
War and to the downfall of Walpole (1742), Pitt took a 
prominent part, but as he was not included in the new 
administration formed under the leadership of Lord 
Carteret, he remained in opposition till November, 1744, 
when the Pelham party in the cabinet obtained the 
mastery, and succeeded in driving Carteret from office. 
After securing the victory the Pelhams proceeded to 
form a government on what was called the " Broad 
Bottom " principle of selecting men from all parties 
alike. High office would then have been offered to Pitt 
but for the extreme dislike which Geore^e H. 

The king's ..... ^ , ^ , 

dislike for entertamed for hnn on account of the vehe- 
mence with which he had declaimed against 
Hanover during Carteret's ministry. In the early part 
of the Austrian Succession War there was a very 
general feeling that the policy of the country was being 
made subservient to Hanoverian interests. The feeling 
was in the main a just one, but Pitt, while constituting 
himself its mouthpiece, had allowed himself to make use 
of expressions unjustifiable in themselves, and most dis- 
respectful to the king. He was, however, too formidable 
to be left in opposition by ministers like the Pelhams, so 
they pacified him with promises until, by the discredit- 
able manoeuvre of resigning their places in the middle 
of the Stuart Rebellion, they forced the king to take him. 



1754 Pitfs Career. 73 

Pitt wanted to be Secretary at War, but George stipulated 
that he should receive no office which would bring him 
into personal communication with himself, 
and he was made Vice-Treasurer of Ireland. ^^^'^^^ster 
Soon afterwards he was appointed to the of the 

\ ^ Forces, 1746. 

lucrative post of Paymaster of the Forces. 

This office gave Pitt an opportunity for displaying in 
a remarkable manner the disinterestedness of his cha- 
racter. It was customary for the paymaster 
to retain at his own disposal the floating ^.'^stedn'ess. 
balance, which was seldom less than 100,000/. 
The practice was considered dishonourable, and there 
was nothing underhand about it, for though it migTit 
occasionally cause great inconvenience, it was done 
openly by every one who held the office. Pitt, however, 
poor though he was, placed the balance at the Bank of 
England, and refused to take a farthing beyond his 
regular salary. Nor would he consent to accept the 
commission of one-half per cent, which foreign princes 
who received subsidies from England were in the habit 
of remitting to the Paymaster of the Forces. 

It was as an orator that Pitt first attracted the atten- 
tion of the House of Commons, and, judging by the 
effect which his eloquence produced, as well 
as by the frao^ments which are all that re- ^^" ^ ^" 

, , orator. 

mains of it now, he may without fear of ex- 
aggeration be pronounced the greatest ever heard within 
its walls. Many men have surpassed him in lucid expo- 
sition or in subtle and profound reasoning ; many have 
been more brilliant in debate ; but no one ever moved 
the House so deeply, or obtained so complete an ascen- 
dency over it. His sarcasm and invective were un- 
rivalled, his bursts of eloquence magnificent, especially 
when he spoke without any premeditation on the spur of 



74 Newcastle and Pitt, ^754 

the moment. On such occasions he was wont to be car- 
ried away by the torrent of his emotions to such an ex- 
tent that he had to refrain from speaking when he was 
in possession of a secret that must not be disclosed. *' I 
must not speak to-night," he once said, '' for when once 
I am up everything that is in my mind comes out.'* 
Pitt's speeches owed a great deal to the personal advan- 
tages and rhetorical skill of the speaker. He was a' tall 
handsome man, graceful in figure, and of a 
appe^^ran*ce^^ vcry noblc and commanding aspect. When 
he spoke, his voice, at once majestic and 
melodious, riveted the attention of his hearers, and the 
fiery glance of his eye struck terror into the hearts of his 
opponents ; he is known to have disconcerted a hostile 
speaker by a single look. He was a great master of all 
the artifices which could enhance the effect of a speech, 
and although his happiest hits were struck off in the 
heat of de"bate, his eloquence was in reality the fruit of 
long and elaborate training. The charge brought against 
him of introducing the manners of the stage into public 
life, is as deserved as the compliment from an unfriendly 
critic, that his acting was equal to Garrick's. 

Oratory was the weapon with which Pitt gained and 
maintained his position in the House; but his greatness 
is built up on a more substantial foundation than parlia- 
mentary eloquence. Those who listened to 

The true , . , r i i i 

source of his his speeches felt that they were more than 
greatness. nicre words, felt them to be the impassioned 

utterance of a man who would do great things if he could 
obtain the opportunity. The uprightness and vehement 
earnestness of his character, his pure and lofty patriot- 
ism, his nobleness of soul, his splendid imagination, and 
his power of animating others with his own enthusiasm 
— these were the source of his strength and greatness. 



1754 Character of Fitt, 75 

and the marks that distinguished him from the herd of 
his contemporaries. In an age of corruption, so degra- 
ding and universal that members of Parhament were 
not ashamed to take money for their votes, Pitt's stain- 
less honesty stood out in sharp rehef, and won him the 
confidence of the nation, which, though once or twice it 
wavered, never really deserted him as long as he lived. 
This public confidence was the basis of the "Great Com- 
moner's " power, for he had no parliamentary interest, 
and he was far from being a royal favourite. Yet he was 
no seeker after popularity, and although his power rested 
on popular favour, he never shrank from risking it by 
setting himself in opposition to the popular will if he 
thought it wrong, no matter how strongly the current 
was running. He was intensely ambitious ; but if, like 
every politician of his day, he employed factious means 
to obtain office, it was for no mean or personal ends that 
he sought it. He sought it that he might raise the na- 
tion from the despondency in which it was 
sunk, and restore to it the spirit w^hich it ?^^ patnot- 

^ ism. 

seemed to have lost. ** I want," he said, 
*' to call England out of that enervate state in which 
20,000 men from France can shake her." And on ano- 
ther occasion, " My Lord," he said to the Duke of De- 
vonshire, *' I am sure I can save this country, and nobody 
else can." 

With great virtues, Pitt had great faults. His career 
was marred by gross inconsistency, and, though this 
inconsistency was largely due to his earnest- 
ness and to the facility with which he was ^}^^^ '« l^is 

'' character. 

constantly carried away by the impulse of 
the moment, it is impossible to acquit him of subordi- 
nating his principles to ambition and resentment. More- 
over, he was arrogant, self-confident, and of so over- 



76 Newcastle and Fitt, ^754 

bearing a temper that it was very difficult for any one to 
act with him. The ascendency which he maintained in 
his cabinet and in Parhament was not due to any tact in 
concihating- opposition, for of that he was wholly desti- 
tute, but simply to the fury with which he beat it down. 
What is more remarkable is that this proud haughty 
man was absurdly affected. As in public, so in private 
life and in the most ordinary affairs, he was always act- 
ing a part, always studying effects. Grotesquely theatri- 
cal and pompous even in the bosom of his family, he 
never allowed himself to descend from the lofty pedestal 
of his dignity. 

Next to Pitt the foremost men in the House of Com- 
mons were Fox and Murray. Intellectually Henry Fox 
was fully the equal of Pitt. Without a spark 
of his impassioned eloquence, he was the 
best debater in the House, where he had attracted to 
himself a considerable personal following, and was 
looked upon by many as the natural leader of the old 
Walpolian party. Where he fell immeasurably below 
his great rival was in political morality. Pitt never had 
many parliamentary adherents, but his patriotism and 
integrity made him the idol of the nation. Fox, on the 
other hand, according to Chesterfield, "had not the 
least notion of, or regard for, the public good, but de- 
spised these cares as the objects of narrow minds or the 
pretences of interested ones." 

William Murray, better known as Lord Mansfield, 
was Solicitor-General under Henry Pelham. His silvery 
eloquence and his clear, calm intelligence 
"^^^^* would have fitted him to be leader of the 

Commons; but he was not ambitious of the post, and he 
let it be understood that his hopes of advancement were 
purely professional. 



1754 Fox and Murray. 77 

Murray being thus out of the question, there remained 
Pitt and Fox. Pitt was at Bath ill with the gout, and, 
moreover, the king hated and Newcastle dreaded him. 
Newcastle accordine^ly applied to Fox, offer- _ . , 

° "^ -^^ Fruitless 

ing him the seals of Secretary of State and negotiations 
the leadership of the Commons. He, how- is^ewcastle 
ever, reserved to himself the disposal of the ^"^ ^^^• 
secret service money, and after a good deal of prevarica- 
tion refused to disclose to Fox the manner in which it 
was employed. As this fund was used for the purpose 
of bribing members of Parliament, Fox very naturally 
observed that it was impossible to lead the House on such 
terms. "If I am kept in ignorance of this,'' he said, 
*' how shall I be able to talk to members, when some 
may have received gratifications and others npt?'* In 
other matters, too, such as the filling up of ministerial 
boroughs. Fox found that the duke intended to keep all 
the power in his own hands. He therefore broke off the 
negotiation, and Newcastle, half glad to have escaped so 
powerful a colleague, at once conferred the seals and the 
leadership of the Commons on Sir Thomas Robinson. 

Robinson was a dull man, of moderate abilities and 
no parliamentary experience. He had spent most of his 
life as a diplomatist at German Courts, and 
was utterly unfit for the office with which he Sir Thomas 

^ Robinson. 

was entrusted. *' The Duke might as well 

send his jackboot to lead us," Pitt exclaimed to Fox in 

contemptuous indignation. When Parliament met, the 

rivals, united by a common feeling of resentment, joined 

in attacking the unhappy secretary, and 

covered him with ridicule nis^ht after night. Contumelious 

o ^ bet^aviour 

On one occasion, Pitt, aiming at Newcastle of Pitt 

himself, bid the House beware lest it should 

** degenerate into a little assembly, serving no other 



78 Breaking out of Naval War. 1755- 

purpose than'to register the arbitrary edicts of one too 
powerful subjects He and Fox both held office under 
Newcastle, but the timidity of the minister prevented 
their receiving the dismissal they so richly deserved. 

In January, 1755, Newcastle again opened negotiations 
with Fox. The terms offered were less favourable than 
those which he had already rejected. Fox was to have 
a seat in the cabinet, and to give a general support to 
Newcastle's measures, but he was not to be Secretary of 
State or leader of the Commons. Yet, to the surprise of 
his friends, and to the indignation of Pitt, who con- 
sidered himself deserted, Fox accepted the 
Sewiastle o^^r. In the following November he was 
made Secretary of State. At the same time 
Pitt was dismissed from his paymastership in conse- 
quence of a violent attack upon the Govern- 
Dismissalof mcnt. Of his speech only a fragment is 
preserved, in which he thus alluded to the 
coalition of Fox and Newcastle : '* I remember at Lyons 
to have been carried to see the conflux of the Rhone and 
Saone ; this a gentle, feeble, languid stream, and though 
languid of no depth — the other a boisterous and impetu- 
ous torrent — but they meet at last ; and long may they 
continue united to the comfort of each other, and to the 
glory, honour, and security of the nation."" His coalition 
with Fox propped up a while the tottering fabric of New- 
castle's government, but events were approaching which 
required statesmen of a very different calibre. 

\ 3. Breaking out of the Naval War, 

In the spring of 1755 it became evident that war with 

France could not be avoided. The nation was eager 

for it, but the king was hampered by fear for Hanover. 

The English navies might sweep the French from the 



-T7SS Dissolution of Austrian Alliance. 79 

seas, but the enemy would wreak his vengeance on the 
defenceless electorate. England was alto- 
gether unprepared for a continental war. "^r e^^^^" d fo r 
There were positively only three regiments a continental 
in the country, and Newcastle would not 
have any more raised from jealousy of the Duke of Cum- 
berland, who, as Commander-in-Chief, would have the 
nomination of the colonels. The prospect abroad was 
equally cheerless. The foreign policy of George II. and 
of Newcastle since the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had 
consisted chiefly in subsidizing German electors to vote 
with Hanover in all affairs of the Empire, and to fight 
for her if required. But now, just at the time when they 
might have been of some use, the subsidiary treaties with 
Saxony and Bavaria were on the point of expiring, 
Austria, too, showed an inclination to desert her old ally. 
On being asked what she would do for the defence of 
Hanover and the Netherlands should they be attacked 
by France, she made all sorts of difficulties, and threw 
the whole burden of the war on England, whom she 
recommended to contract subsidiary treaties with Rus- 
sia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hesse, &c. It soon appeared 
what the meaning of it all was. Austria would support 
England cordially on one condition, namely, that she 
should join with her in attacking Prussia. Now, though 
George II. hated his nephew, and dreaded him almost 
as much as he dreaded France, he was not prepared to 
go so far as that ; and even if he had been, he knew 
very well that the nation would never consent to such a 
war. As, however, Austria's determination _. , . 

, . . /- , Dissolution 

on this point was final, negotiations were ofheralii- 

broken off, and thus ended an alliance on lu^strTL^, 

which for three-quarters of a century the ^""^ ^755- 

balance of power had been supposed to rest. Yet in this 



8o I^aval War. 1756 

breakdown of the old system neither George nor his 
ministers were capable of devising a fresh 
character of One ; they went mechanically on with the 
foreign measures that Austria had recommended, 

policy. ^ treaty with Hesse had already been 

signed; another was being negotiated with Russia, in 
virtue of which the Czarina was to furnish 55,000 troops 
for the defence of Hanover, and receive in return 500.- 
000/. a year. The helpless hand-to-mouth character of 
the English foreign policy is conspicuously displayed by 
this Russian treaty. The rock on which the Austrian 
alliance had been wrecked was Prussia, and it was 
against this very Prussia that the Czarina's troops were 
destined to act. The treaty was signed on September 
30, and the year was hardly out before it became worse 
than superfluous. Frederick the Great heard of it and 
took the alarm. He had for some time been aware, as 
will presently be shown, that Austria, Russia, and per- 
haps Saxony, were leagued together for the purpose of 
partitioning his dominions on the first opportunity, and 
he foresaw the possibility of the English subsidy setting 
the combination in motion. He therefore determined to 
draw closer to England, so that he might either avert the 
threatened attack, or at any rate have Russia for him 
_ , , and not aeainst him when war came. This 

Frederick 

drew closer was the less difficult since the English Court, 
ng an . ^.^^^ ^ curious inconsistency, had made ten- 
tative overtures to him during the summer at the very 
time when the Russian treaty was being negotiated. As 
the two powers were equally desirous of 

Convention ^ r /-^ i 

of West- keepmg the war out of Germany, there was 

Janul'i^ 16, little difficulty in coming to terms. On Jan- 
^756. uary 16, 1756, a Convention of Neutrali- 

ity was signed at Westminster, by which England and 



-1756 Panic in England, 81 

Prussia bound themselves to unite their forces to prevent 
all foreign troops from entering Germany during the 
expected war with France. The true interests of England 
were served by this measure, which brought her into 
union with the power that more than any other was 
marked out on both religious and political grounds as 
her natural ally. The connection was as yet slight, but 
tiie course of events soon drew it closer. 

All through the winter England was harassed by fear 
of a French invasion ; so great was the panic that Hes- 
sian and Hanoverian troops were brought 
over for the defence of the country. But EngilLd 
the invasion never came ; the ostentatious winter, 1755- 
preparations made by the French all along 
their northern coasts were intended to cover a totally 
different design. On April 10, 1756, a large armament 
with 16,000 troops on board sailed from Toulon for the 
conquest of Minorca. Though the English 
ministers had received intimation of the atta^ck^^"^ 
preparation of this expedition months before, Minorca, 
they persisted in regarding it as a mere feint, and did 
nothing to strengthen the garrison of Port Mahon, which 
was far too weak for the defence of the island. It was 
not till three days before the French fleet set sail that a 
squadron of ten ill-equipped ships was despatched to the 
Mediterranean under Admiral Byng. There is much 
justice in the bitter complaint of Horace Walpole, ** this 
was the year of the worst administration that I have seen 
in England ; for now Newcastle's incapacity was left to 
its full play." 

The feebleness and indecision of the Prime Minister 
were reflected in his officers. When Byng 
arrived off Port Mahon, the Castle of St. ^^^'^• 

Philip was still holding out against a vastly superior 



82 Naval War. 1756 

besieging force. On May 20, a partial and indecisive 
engagement was fought by the two fleets, which were 
nearly equal in strength. The next morning the French 
were out of sight, but Byng, alleging their superiority in 
weight of metal and in men, sailed away and left Mi- 
norca to its fate. He seems to have de- 
M^norca to^ spaircd of relieving the island even before 
Its fate. Yiis arrival, and to have thought that any re- 

inforcements which he might succeed in throwing into 
St. Philip's would only serve to swell the number of 
prisoners that would eventually fall into the hands of the 
French. Under these circumstances, he conceived it -his 
duty to return and cover Gibraltar, which also was in a 
very defenceless state. There is no reason for charging 
Byng with cowardice, and on this count he was acquit- 
ted by the court-martial by which he was tried and con- 
demned to death for neglect of duty ; but he was certain- 
ly a weak, irresolute man, incapable of sound judgment 
and afraid of responsibility. 

Left to its own resources, St. Philip's was, after a stub- 
born resistance, obliged to capitulate, and the best port 
in the Mediterranean passed into the keep- 
Capitulation, ing of France. War had already been for- 
Philip's, mally declared by England on May 17, by 

France on June 9. Another and greater 
war was on the eve of breaking out in the centre of Eu- 
rope. Frederick of Prussia, satisfied that he was about 
to be attacked by a coalition, saw his only 
^war^^'^^'^ hope of safety in anticipating his foes, 
and towards the end of August he burst into 
Saxony at the head of 75,000 men. These two wars, 
^^ ^ separate at the outset, soon became blended 

The Seven , 

Years' War. m onc, which is known in history by the 
name of the Seven Years' War. 



174S-56 opinion of the Council, 83 

CHAPTER VII. 

POLICY OF AUSTRIA DURING THE PEACE. 

I I. Kaunitz. 

The occasion of the Seven Years' War was the Ameri- 
can quarrel of England and France ; its cause was the 
determination of Maria Theresa to repossess causeof the 
herself of Silesia. But for this the traditional Se^^n Years 

War. Deter- 

policy of Austria would doubtless have been mination of 
maintained, and a great alliance might have to recover 
been formed between England, -Austria, and S^^^^^^- 
Prussia, which would have put an effectual curb on the 
power of France. For this, however, Maria Theresa 
cared comparatively nothing. As Mary of England 
said of Calais, so might she have said of Silesia, that the 
word was written on her heart. It is related that when 
she saw a native of the province she burst into tears. 
Its recovery was the cardinal point to which her whole 
policy after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was directed. 

Soon after the signing of the peace, Maria Theresa 
held a meeting of her secret council to discuss the future 
policy of Austria, the members of the council 
having previously been commanded to send ^^^n^'^ °V 
in their opinions in writing. The general 
sense of the council was in favour of adhering to the 
traditional system of the monarchy, alliance with the 
sea-powers, England and Holland ; and this course was 
warmly advocated by the Emperor, who 
thought it advisable to acquiesce finally in ^^^^^ 

° T. y Emperor; 

the loss of Silesia, and to seek to enter into 

more friendly relations with Prussia. Very different was 



84 Kaunitz. 1749 

the opinion of Kaunitz, the youngest member of the 
council, who, in a masterly paper, maintained 
of Kaunitz. that whercas Austria had hitherto had two 
great enemies to deal with, France and the 
Porte, she now had three, and that of these the King of 
Prussia was by far the most dangerous and irrecon- 
cilable ; that Austria would never be safe until he was 
crushed, and therefore that the recovery of Silesia was 
an object never to be lost sight of. At the same time, 
he added, it must not be attempted until Austria had 
formed an alliance so powerful that, humanly speaking, 
there would be no possibility of failure. Russia and 
Saxony would probably join with her, but that would not 
be enough, especially as Russian policy was too incon- 
stant to be depended on. As it was hopeless to think of 
inducing England to concur in such an undertaking, he 
recommended that every effort should be made to obtain 
the alliance of France, which might perhaps be secured 
by cessions in Italy or in the Netherlands. The idea 
was not a new one, but Kaunitz was the first statesman 
who ventured to put it definitely forward as the guiding 
principle of Austria's foreign policy, and it was Kaunitz 
who ultimately succeeded in carrying it out. 

Wenzel Anton, Count, and afterwards Prince, of 

Kaunitz Riethberg, was at the accession of Maria 

Theresa a young diplomatist in his thirtieth 

Kaunitz's year. He soon attracted the attention of his 

career. ^ ^ 

sovereign by the clearness of his views and 
the lucidity of his statements, and, after being employed 
in various offices of importance, he was sent to Aix-la- 
Chapelle as plenipotentiary for Austria. On his return 
thence he obtained the complete confidence of Maria 
Theresa, and in the autumn of 1750 he went as Austrian 
ambassador to Paris, whence he was recalled two years 



r 



1749 Character of Kaunitz, 85 

afterwards to be placed at the head of affairs at Vienna. 
In April, 1753, he was appointed Chancellor of State, and 
for the next forty years he directed the foreign policy of 
Austria. 

The character of Kaunitz presents a strange mixture 
of noble and petty qualities. He was haughty and 
supercilious, vain and ludicrously affected, 
foppish in dress, indolent and luxurious ^'^ , 

^^ ' character. 

even to effeminacy. Yet the outward mask 
of a Sybarite concealed a remarkably keen-witted states- 
man, a man of marvellous discretion and great pertina- 
city, full of resources, and a master of his craft, subtle, 
wary, and deeply versed in the arts of dissimulation. A 
perfect if somewhat exaggerated type of the formal and 
pedantic, but refined, courteous and highly polished, 
diplomatists of the eighteenth century, his chief intel- 
lectual defects were his overweening conceit and vanity, 
which on one celebrated occasion, at any rate, betrayed 
him into an obtuseness contrasting strangely with his 
knowledge and powers. 

The policy recommended by Kaunitz was cordially 
approved of by Maria Theresa, who was animated by 
intense hatred of Frederick the Great. Her- ^, 

Kaunitz s 

self profoundly religious, she detested the policy 
heretical king for his well-known scepticism Maria^^ ^ 
no less than for the wrong he had done her, Theresa, 
and regarded it as a duty to bring back Silesia into the 
fold of the Catholic Church. But much as Kaunitz 
wished it, it was not possible to put his views at once 
into execution. The political revolution he advocated 
could only be gradually effected ; nor was 
Austria prepared for immediate war. In the Reforms in 

, ^ . Austria. 

meantime searching reforms were instituted 
in every branch of the public service. The various 

G 



86 Kdunitz. 



1750- 



provinces forming the Hapsburg monarchy were brought 
under a more uniform system of administration ; the 
army was reorganized on the Prussian model, and the 
finances rearranged with such effect that Maria Theresa 
drew from her dominions a revenue considerably larger 
than her father had enjoyed when in the possession of 
Naples, Parma, Silesia, and Servia. 

The first step towards the realization of Kaunitz's 
scheme was taken when he was sent to Paris, with 
instruction to seek to establish more friend- 
Parir'^ ^^ ^y relations between the Courts of Vienna 
and Versailles, and to loosen the ties that 
bound France and Prussia together. In this he made 
very little direct progress. An enmity of more than two 
centuries' standing was not easy to remove, and Prussia 
was manifestly the best ally that France could have, 
though it might be urged with plausibility that the long 
rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg had served only to 
promote the aggrandizement of minor states like Savoy 
and Brandenburg, and that France and Austria united 
might dispose of the rest of Europe as they pleased. In- 
directly, however, Kaunitz did a good deal. He saw the 
immense influence which Madame de Pompadour, the 
mistress of Louis XV., exercised over that indolent and 
enervated monarch, and he took great pains to gain 
her good will. 

At no distant date the friendship of the favourite 
proved of great service to Austria (though not quite to 
the extent commonly supposed), but at that period 
Madame de Pompadour meddled very little in politics, 
and Kaunitz returned to Vienna dispirited and half in- 
chned to abandon his project. Wavering between fear 
of losing England and hope of gaining France, he seems 
to have been really in great perplexity. There is little 



-1 755 The English Alliance. 87 

doubt that he would have preferred the English alliance 
to the French if he could have brought Eng- 
land round to his way of thinking about the English 
Prussia ; but of that he knew there was little ^^^^^"c«- 
chance, and before long he reverted to his original plan. 
Thus it happened that, when England, in expectation of 
war with France, appealed to her old ally for assistance, 
Austria showed little disposition to afford it. The rela-. 
tions of the Courts of London and Vienna had been 
somewhat strained during the years that followed the 
peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, but harmony might easily 
have been restored if the interests of the two powers had 
been really identical, as they were in the days of the 
Grand Alliance, when both were equally concerned to 
resist the encroachments of Louis XIV. This, however, 
was no longer the case. England, as of old, wished to 
make use of Austria against France, while Austria wanted 
to employ all her forces against Prussia, who had been 
allied with France in the late war, and would probably 
be so still. Therefore as soon as it became certain that 
England would in no case join her in a war against 
Frederick, Austria ceased to strive for an alliance which 
no longer had any value for her. 

\ 2. Negotiations with France, 

Immediately upon the rupture of negotiations with 
England, Kaunitz renewed his efforts to obtain a French 
alliance. Count Stahremberg, the Austrian 
ambassador at Paris, was furnished with a Negotiations 

* ^ with France. 

sketch of the proposals that his Court had to 
make, and with a letter from the chancellor to Madame 
de Pompadour, couched in the most flattering terms, 
and requesting her intercession on behalf of Austria. It 



88 Negotiations with France. 1755 

has frequently been asserted that Maria Theresa herself 
condescended to address the favourite in a letter, begin- 
ning with the words *' Ma cousine/* or even " Madame 
ma tres chere soeur," but it is now tolerably 
Madame de certain that this story, thoug^h vouched for 

Pompadour •' . ° , 

and Marii by Contemporary authority, is utterly un- 
true. Nor indeed was such a letter in any 
way needed. The Pompadour was easily induced to 
espouse the cause of Austria, not only for the sake of her 
friendship with Kaunitz, but also, and perhaps chiefly, 
out of spite against Frederick, who had mortally offended 
her by some satirical verses reflecting on her frailty, and 
by the contemptuous tone in, which he habitually spoke 
of her. One of his sayings in particular had 
Her hatred ^ut her to the quick. In the summer of 1750, 

ofFredenck. ^ ' -^ ' 

when Voltaire was starting on a visit to 
Berlin, she had charged him with a polite message to 
the king, for whom she entertained a great admiration. 
Frederick, however, instead of receiving it in the man- 
ner anticipated, curtly replied, "I do not know her" 
("Je ne la connais pas"). Voltaire at the time sup- 
pressed the ungracious reply, but three years after- 
wards, when he had left Berlin in disgrace, and with feel- 
ings of bitter disappointment and rage against Frederick, 
this and other delinquencies were faithfully reported. 

Madame de Pompadour was therefore well disposed 
to further a scheme which would enable her to revenge 
herself on a prince who had treated her with contempt, 
and Louis XV. himself was inclined to look upon it 
favourably. He also had been wounded by the shafts ©f 
Louis XV. in- Frederick's wit, and he had, moreover, pri- 
from^reiigiou"^ ^^^c rcasous for desinug the Austrian alli- 
motives. ance. Sunk though he was in the lowest 

depths of debauchery, he was preyed upon inces- 



1755""^ ^^^;2/i". 89 

santly by religious terrors, and he believed that an 
alliance with Catholic Austria, formed for the purpose of 
warring against heretics, might atone for the evil deeds 
of a life of which he well knew the infamy, without hav- 
ing the resolution to am.end it. This is no matter of 
conjecture; he actually told the Duke of Choiseul, that 
he believed that God would not damn him, if he, as 
king, upheld the Catholic religion, and that it was solely 
for the purpose of destroying Protestantism that he had 
allied himself with Austria. 

On receipt of the Austrian proposals the King ap- 
pointed to confer with Stahremberg the Abbe de Bernis, 
an early friend of Madame de Pompadour's, 
a man of considerable accomplishments but 
of no great abilities, and, except as ambassador at minor 
courts, without experience in the conduct of affairs. For 
some time communications were carried on without the 
knowledge of any of the Ministers of State, but there is 
no foundation for the common belief that the secret was 
withheld from them altogether, and that the treaty was 
concluded by Louis, the Pompadour, Bernis, and Stah- 
remberg. Bernis was the principal agent throughout, 
and Madame de Pompadour had a great deal to say in 
the matter, but three at least of the four chief ministers 
were cognizant of the negotiations before any decided 
step was taken, and all were responsible for the result. 
During the winter the Austrian proposals were frequently 
canvassed, but no great progress was made towards a 
definite agreement till the desire of the French Court for 
an accommodation was quickened by the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Westminster between England and Prus- 
sia. 

Even in their altered state of things it proved impossi- 
ble to draw France into active hostility against Frederick. 



90 Austria and Russia. 1756 

The Treaty of Versailles, signed on May i, 1756, was 
Treaty of purely defensive ; but Kaunitz was satisfied 

mT^^i^^i^' 6 ^^^^ having obtained so much, and regarded 
it as a stepping-stone to a closer union. 
Madame de Pompadour also expressed her delight at 
the settlement of an affair which she regarded as her 
own work, and assured Stahremberg that she would do 
her utmost to prevent an undertaking which had com- 
menced so well from stopping half way. The expecta- 
tion of Kaunitz was justified, and the promise of Madame 
de Pompadour redeemed, by the event. A year after- 
wards France was involved in a great alliance which had 
for its object the partition of Prussia. 

\ 3. Austria and Russia^ 
If France was as yet indisposed for an offensive alli- 
ance with Austria, this was far from being the case with 
Russia. For some time past the Czarina 
Austria and ]^a.d been prepared to go all lengths with 
Maria Theresa. As far back as the year 
1746, only six months after the Peace of Dresden, a treaty 
of alliance was signed at St. Petersburg- by 

TreatyofSt. ^ . , ^ .,.-,, ^ ^ ^ . 

Petersburg, Austria and Russia which, though defensive 
June 2, 174 . .^ .^^ general tenor, evidently contemplated 
a renewal of the war against Prussia. Seven years after- 
wards, a resolution was passed at a meeting 
Resolution of Qf ^^ Russian Senate at Moscow, to the 

the Senate at • i j 

Moscow, May, effect that it should henceforth be considered 
^^^^' a fundamental maxim of the Russian Em- 

pire, not only to resist all further aggrandizement of the 
King of Prussia, but also to seize the first opportunity of 
overwhelming the House of Brandenburg by superior 
force. 

The virulent animosity against Frederick which was 



1756 The Czarina Elizabeth. 91 

felt at St. Petersburg rested on personal as well as on 
political grounds. The Czarina Elizabeth 
was a handsome, indolent voluptuary, Rli^^^th^^ 
grossly superstitious, and though by no 
means destitute of abilities, governed by the most un- 
worthy favourites. Her life was only too open to satire, 
and Frederick unhappily was restrained by no motives 
of prudence in the exercise of his wit. His sharp sayings 
on Elizabeth and her favourites were reported by tale- 
bearers whose interest it was to sow dissensions between 
the two sovereigns, and the agents of the Austrian and 
Saxon Courts omitted nothing that could widen the 
breach. All sorts of stories, some true, some false, were 
told to the Czarina ; she was even made to believe that 
Frederick sought to have her assassinated. But it would 
be a mistake to suppose that Elizabeth was solely actu- 
ated by personal considerations. She was a daughter of 
Peter the Great, and ambitious of pursuing her father's 
policy of introducing Russia into the affairs of Europe as 
much as possible. She could not, therefore, look with 
indifference on the growth of a strong power on her 
western frontier, especially when its resources were 
wielded by a man so able and, as she thought, so un- 
scrupulous as Frederick the Great. She had neither 
forgiven nor forgotten his invasion of Saxony in 1745, 
though the rapidity of the Prussian successes had pre- 
vented her interference. 

Of Elizabeth's will to co-operate with Maria Theresa 
there could be no doubt after the Moscow resolution ; 
the question was whether it was really in her power to 
render any material assistance. The sums of money 
which she squandered on her lovers were so immense 
that it was doubtful whether Russia could send any con- 
siderable army into the field. It was, therefore, neces- 



92 Austria and Russia, i7S6 

sary to procure an English subsidy for her if possible, 
and after repeated solicitations on the part 
Russian of Austria, this object was attained by the 

tembe^'so^r Anglo-Russian Treaty of September 30, 1 7 5 5. 
1755- But the treaty was hardly signed before 

it lost its meaning by reason of the defensive alliance 
between England and Prussia. The English Govern- 
ment, ignorant of almost everything on the Continent, 
was totally unaware of the Czarina's hatred of Frederick, 
and believed that, although the treaty was originally 
pointed against Prussia, it could use the Russian troops 
against the French in Hanover, or anywhere it pleased ; 
indeed, it was by positive assurances to this effect that 
it had induced Frederick to sign the Convention of West- 
minster. It was, therefore, greatly confounded when 
Elizabeth absolutely refused to let her army act against 
any enemy but Prussia. The treaty was, of course, never 
put into execution ; in fact, it was never ratified. But 
the mischief had been done already. Without waiting 
for the ratification, the Czarina had begun to assemble 
troops in Livonia, and she declined to be baulked of her 
revenge, merely because England had changed her mind. 
In the spring of 1756 Russia proposed to Austria a 
plan for the partition of the Prussian monarchy. Silesia 
and Glatz were to be reconquered for Aus- 
prcfposes \x\?iy East Prussia to be conquered by Rus- 

Prussia" °^ ^^^' ^^^ givcn Up to Poland in exchange for 
April 22, Courland and other Polish territory on the 

I7"6 

Russian frontier. Hostilities were to begin 
in August, and as soon as they had commenced. Saxony 
and Sweden were to be invited to join the allies, Magde- 
burg being offered as a bait to the one, and Prussian 
Pomerania to the other. Austria, however, was not yet 
ready; she said that she must first make sure of France, 



r 



1746-56 Frederick's Reasons for War, 93 

and even after the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles 
she gave the same answer. Negotiations for an offensive 
alliance were going on, and she had good hopes of 
gaining Louis by the promise of cessions in the Nether- 
lands ; but by the time all that was settled, it would be 
too late for military operations. It was, however, defi- 
nitely understood that hostilities should commence early 
in 1757. Such was the state of affairs when Frederick, 
aware of what was passing, determined to precipitate 
the crisis and attack his enemies while they were still 
unprepared. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR. 

\ I . Frederick' s reasons for War. 

After concluding the Peace of Dresden, Frederick re- 
turned to Berlin in the full hope of enjoying, at least for 
some time, the tranquillity which his country 
mreatly needed, after its efforts in the Sile- Frederick 

^ •' ^ during the 

sian wars. He was, no doubt, sincere in his peace, 1746- 
desire for peace, for he had much to lose, 
little to gain by a renewal of the war. For the next few 
years he was busy with law reform and other useful pro- 
jects ; but at the same time he went on continually 
strengthening his army, and laying up treasure year by 
year, for he knew well that, however peaceful his own 
intentions might be, Maria Theresa would never forgive 
the conqueror of Silesia. 

It was during this period that ** autumn manoeuvres '* 



94 Frederick^ s Reasons for War, i7S3- 

were introduced. Frederick devoted himself with great 

assiduity to the study of tactical problems, 

Autumn ^^^ ih^xi causcd them to be worked out in 

manoeuvres. 

practice by his troops. In 1753, 36,000 
troops were collected at Spandau for this purpose, and 
the manoeuvres lasted twelve days. Prussian officers 
were brought from all parts of the kingdom to witness 
them, but great care was taken to prevent the presence 
of any unauthorized person. A cordon of sentries was 
drawn round the manoeuvring ground, and the chief 
magistrate of Spandau was even ordered to permit no 
one to ascend the church tower. After the Seven Years' 
War the manoeuvres were not shrouded in such myste- 
rious secresy, and foreign officers were permitted to be 
present at them. 

It was not till 1753 that Frederick became actually 
aware of the designs that were being formed against 
him. Towards the end of the previous year his suspi- 
cions were aroused by information which reached him 
from Saxony, through the Prussian General Winterfeldt, 
whereupon he charged Maltzahn, his minister at Dres- 
den, to investigate the matter by all possible means. 
Maltzahn succeeded in corrupting a Government clerk, 

named Menzel, who from Easter 1753 on- 
Fredenck's wards fumishcd him with copies of various 

secret ^ 

sources of important papers in the Saxon archives, and 
of all the despatches that came from Vienna 
and St. Petersburg, together with Brlihrs answers. 
Frederick thus became acquainted with the 
Treaty of Warsaw (p. 61,) the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg (p. 90,) and other documents, which con- 
vinced him that Austria and Russia harboured designs 
against him of a serious nature, and further, that Saxony, 
though she shrank from definitely committing herself, 



-1756 Perplexity of Frederick, 95 

was nevertheless actively engaged in hounding Russia 
on. Additional information was derived from Maximi- 
lian Weingarten, a secretary in the Austrian 
embassy in Berlin, who was corrupted by eingar en. 

Winterfeldt some time in the year 1754. 

It is manifest that it behooved Frederick, knowing 
what he did, to act with circumspection, so as to avoid 
giving Austria a pretext for attacking him. It was, 
therefore, with great apprehension that he perceived, in 
1755, that the American quarrel of England and France 
was likely to be fought out in Europe, and that the 
French would seek to recoup their losses on 
the sea by attacking Hanover. This would sitk)n°of^° 
bring the war to his own doors ; his prov- Prussia. 
inces on the Rhine and in Westphalia would probably 
become the seat of military occupations, and, worst of 
all, he himself would most hkely be compelled to take 
part in it. His alliance with France was near expiring, 
and though it was purely defensive, the French would 
almost certainly insist on his joining their attack on 
Hanover as a condition of its renewal. Indeed, it was 
not long before he received a hint to that effect. But 
this would give Austria the opportunity she wanted ; if 
he attacked the electorate he would draw upon himself 
the whole power of Hanover, Austria, and Russia. Was 
he justified in running the risk ? The conduct of the 
French in the late war showed how little reliance could 
be placed on them, and the hopeless imbecility into 
which the Government of Louis XV. had since sunk 
made them still less trustworthy allies for the future. 
Nor, indeed, did France seem to set much store by his 
alliance, or to pay much regard to his interests ; while 
urging him to attack Hanover, she offered not the slight- 
est guarantee against the probable consequences of such 



g6 Frederick^ s Reasons for War, I7S6 

a measure. He began to suspect that France and Aus- 
tria were secretly coming to an understanding, and 
therefore, as the best chance of preserving the peace of 
Europe, he concluded with England the Convention of 
Neutrality already mentioned. 

Frederick's main object in concluding the convention 
was to prevent the invasion of his dominions by Russia, 
and he was careful to assure France that it was in no 
spirit of hostility to her that he had signed it, that he 
^ , . , still hoped for a renewal of the defensive alli- 

tredenck *■ 

tries to renew ance, and that though he could not join her 

his alliance . ^^ - , 

with agamst Hanover, there were many other ser- 

France. vices which he might be able to render. But 

his representations were without effect ; probably Louis 
had already decided in favour of Austria. Anyhow, the 
Convention of Westminster was followed by the Treaty 
of Versailles. 

The relations of the great powers to one another at 
this period was curiously complex. It was a time of 
transition from one system to another, and almost every 
. one of them was in alliance with tw^o others 

of the that were mutually hostile. Prussia had allied 

oahi°"^ herself with England, but without abandon- 

great Powers, jj^^ -^^j. aUiance with France. Similarly, 
Austria was in league with France, but had not yet defi- 
nitely separated from England. Nor, again, had Eussia, 
up to this time, broken with England, though she was 
meditating accession to the treaty of Versailles, and was 
urging Austria to an immediate declaration against 
Prussia, the King of England's ally. The course of 
events soon tore asunder the old ties, and ranged the 
powers afresh in two hostile camps. On the one side 
stood England and Prussia ; on the other, France, Aus- 
tria, and Russia, with several of the minor states. 



1 75 6 Frederick decidts on War, 97 

The plot rapidly began to thicken. Frederick had 
not been immediately alarmed by the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles ; underrating the Power of Madame de Pompa- 
dour, and knowing that the best French statesmen still 
wished to renew the Prussian alliance, he believed that 
the connexion of France and Austria would be of short 
duration. He was, however, soon undeceived. In June, 
his ambassador at Paris informed him that the influence 
of the mistress grew daily, and that she and the king 
were meditating a closer alliance with Austria. At the 
same time he heard from Silesia that the Austrians were 
forming great camps in Bohemia and Mora- 
via, while from various quarters there came War seen to 

' ^ be imminent. 

news of the preparations of Russia. The 
Czarina made no secret of her intentions. 
While deliberating on the best course to „ , . , 

* . . Frederick 

pursue under these alarmmg circumstances, receives a 
Frederick received from St. Petersburg two from sf. 
anonymous letters purporting to come '' in P^^^rst)urg. 
the strictest confidence from a very trustworthy source," 
which informed him that the threatened attack was de- 
ferred because the Russian army was not ready, but that 
it would certainly be made in the following spring. 
There is little doubt that the writer was the Grand-duke 
Peter, the acknowledged heir to the Russian throne, a 
devoted admirer of Frederick, and consequently a strong, 
though secret, opponent of the Czarina's policy. These 
letters turned the scale in favour of imme- 
diate war. Frederick saw his opportunity, dedd^s'^o^n 
and determined to draw the sword while he ^^^• 
had only Austria to deal with. It was a momentous de- 
cision, but it was just and wise. It was a just decision 
because, although apparently the aggressor, he was in 
reality acting in self-defence. There was no longer the 



98 Frederick^ s Reasons if or War, 1756 

faintest hope of preserving peace. The first Silesian war 
, . , was voluntary on his part, but this time war 

Justice and 

wisdom of was forced upon him. It was a wise deci- 
sion, because his best chance of escaping 
destruction lay in anticipating the attack of his enemies. 
It was just possible that he might crush Austria in a sin- 
gle campaign, and nip the coalition in the bud. It is 
true that he was playing Austria's game by attacking 
her, for he thus enabled her to represent herself as the 
injured party, and so to call upon France for the suc- 
cours stipulated for in the Treaty of Versailles. But he 
had reason to believe that delay would merely serve to 
give her time to draw France into an offensive alliance, 
and. therefore, this consideration was outweighed by the 
certain advantages of prompt action. 

Still, in deference to the wishes of England, Frederick 
consented to make a final effort for peace before proceed- 
ing to extremities. Klinggraff, his ambas- 
makeTaiast sador at Vienna, was instructed to demand 
^eace^^'^ a private audience of the Empress-Queen, 

and to ask her whether her camps on the 
Silesian frontier were formed for the purpose of attack- 
ing Prussia. The answer was evasive. Klinggraff was 
ordered to press for a less oracular reply, and especially 
to ask Maria Theresa for a definite assurance that she 
would not attack Prussia that year or the next. Again 
the answer was evasive. Frederick had expected nothing 
else, and had made his preparations while awaiting it; 
It reached him on August 25, and four days afterwards 

he crossed the Saxon frontier. 

reaso^nTfor Frederick had two reasons for invading 

Saxon"^ Saxony, one military, the other political. 

His experience in the second Silesian war 

had shown him the danger of leavincr the electorate 



1756 Frederick^ s Plan of Operations, 99 

hostile in his rear. In 1744, after he had passed 
through it into Bohemia, beheving it to be friendly, 
it had^ risen against him, cut off his communications, 
and placed him in great peril. He was not going to 
commit the same mistake twice. In the second place, 
the originals of the Menzel documents were in the Dres- 
den archives ; if he could obtain and publish these, he 
would be able to prove to Europe that he was not the 
aggressor. It is sometimes maintained that while he 
had good ground for making war on Austria, he was not 
justified in attacking Saxony. This view is hardly tena- 
ble. Saxony, it is true, had not definitely committed 
herself by signing any treaties hostile to Prussia (at any 
rate since the partitioning treaty of Warsaw), but of the 
hostility of her intentions there was not the smallest 
doubt. 

I 2. The Invasion of Saxony, 

Frederick expected no resistance from the Saxon army, 
and thought that he would be able in a few days either 
to disarm it, or, as he hoped, to compel the t, , . , , 

' ^ ^ Fredenck s 

King of Poland (Elector of Saxony) to yield plan of 

,.-,-. '^1 operations. 

It up to him and make common cause with 
Prussia. When this had been done and his route se- 
cured, he intended to pass into Bohemia and strike a 
blow at the Austrians in combination with Marshal 
Schwerin, who was to invade the country with a second 
army from Glatz. It was not improbable that a great 
victory might be won and Prague captured before the 
winter. The plan was well conceived, but it was foiled 
by an unexpected difficulty on the threshold. 

The Saxon army, numbering no more than 17,000 
men, was far too weak to resist the Prussians in the open 
field, but on the first news of their approach it retired, 



loo The Invasion of Saxony, 175^ 

at the instigation of the French ambassador, into a camp 

of great natural strength. At Pirna, a few 

The Saxon miles above Dresden, the low hills on each 

camp at Pirna. 

side of the Elbe rise into lofty and precipi- 
tous rocks intersected by chasms and covered with pine 
woods. Into this natural stronghold Augustus retreated 
with his army when he heard of Frederick's advance. 
The Saxons took up a position on the hills south of the 
Elbe, their right resting on Pirna, their left on the Ko- 
nigstein, an impregnable fortress built on a high rock 
overlooking the river. As the position was too strong to 

be forced, Frederick was reduced to the 
Se^nissfans i^^ccssity of blockading it. He was in- " 

formed that the Saxons had provisions only 
for a fortnight, but, as it turned out, they were able, by 
means of short allowances, to eke them out for a much 
longer time. The King of Poland steadily refused to 
disband his army or to suffer it to take an oath of fideli- 
ty to the King of Prussia ; he hoped that before he was 
starved out relief would come from Austria. 

From the moment when war became inevitable, the 

Austrians had pushed on their preparations 
donsa^nd ^^^^ vigour. In the last days of August, 

plan of the Marshal Browne began to assemble an army 

in the neighbourhood of Kollin, while Prince 
Piccolomini collected a second out of Moravia,, and took 
post near Koniggratz, to resist an invasion of Bohemia 
from the side of Glatz. Their plan was to remain strictly 
on the defensive until the spring, to avoid pitched bat- 
tles, and rather to suffer Frederick to occupy a portion 
of their territory than to run the risk of encountering him 
with inferior forces. They were therefore greatly discon- 
certed when they heard that Augustus had shut himself 
up at Pirna, instead of retreating on Bohemia, as had 



1756 Battle of Lobositz. i o i 

been arranged. They even suspected him of meditating 
an accommodation with Prussia, httle guessing what a 
service he was really rendering them. 

It was of course impossible to abandon the Saxons to 
their fate, and Browne was ordered to march to their 
relief with part of his army, and open out a line of 
retreat if it were still possible. This, how- 
ever, was easier said than done. On the ^^°^^j 

orderecl to 

left bank of the Elbe the way was barred relieve the 
by the Prussians, and Browne's only chance 
was to work round by a circuitous route on the right 
bank of the river, to the rear of the Saxon position at 
Schandau. Closely blockaded as the Saxons were, 
messengers could pass to and from their camps by 
mountain paths, and Browne was able to inform them 
that he would reach Schandau on October 11. On the 
same day they were to effect the passage of the Elbe 
under cover of the guns of the Konigstein, and on the 
following morning to attack the Prussian posts in front 
while the Austria ns assailed their rear. 

The intentions of the Austrians were not unperceived 
by Frederick. He therefore left one half of his army to 
blockade the Saxons, and advanced into Bohemia with 
the other. At Lobositz he fell in with 
Browne, and a well-contested but inde- Lobositz, 
cisive battle ensued. The Austrians fought October i. 
far better than they had ever fought in the Silesian wars. 
Both sides claimed the victory, but not with equal justice. 
The loss of the Prussians was greater than that of the 
enemy, but they drove the Austrians out of Lobositz, and 
kept possession of the battle-field. To them, therefore, 
the honour of the day must be ascribed, although the 
Austrians retreated in good order and unmolested, and, 
what was of more importance, Browne was able to carry 

H 



1 o 2 The Invasion of Saxony. 1756 

out his plan of marching to the relief of the Saxons, just 
as if nothing had happened. His expedition was, how- 
ever, a failure. From the first it had been little more 
than a forlorn hope ; the ground was too difficult, and 
the Prussians too strongly posted, for the Saxons ever to 
have had much chance of cutting^ their way 

Browne at- r 

tenipis to through. As a matter of fact, they hardly 

Saxons, but made the attempt. On the appointed day, 
^^'^^- Browne, with 8,000 picked men, reached 

Lichtenhayn, a few miles from Schandau, but the 
Saxons were not ready. Their pontoons had not been 
forthcoming at the proper time ; the narrow mountain 
roads were choked by their artillery, and the Prussians 
harassed their retreat. They were two days late in get- 
ting across the Elbe, and then, wearied, half-starved, 
and drenched with rain, they were too dispirited to be 
led to the attack. Meanwhile, the Prussians had strength- 
ened their posts on the north side of the river ; Browne 
himself was in danger of being cut off, and had to retreat. 
Nothing remained for the Saxons but to capitulate at 
discretion. The terms of the capitulation were severe. 
The officers were dismissed on giving their 

Capitulation • t-, • • i 

of Pirna, word not to servc agamst Prussia m the pre- 

Ociober 16. ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^g^ ^£ ^^ troops were 

compelled to enlist in the Prussian army — a measure 
hardly justifiable and anything but successful, for most 
of them deserted on the first opportunity. Thus misera- 
bly for Saxony ended the first campaign of the Seven 
Years' War. But her sufferings had not been in vain. 
Fatal as it proved to her own interests, her stubborn re- 
sistance had saved Austria. By the time the capitula- 
tion was signed the season was too far advanced for 
military operations, and the Prussians were obliged to 
withdraw from Bohemia. Frederick had not come to 



1756 The Emperor passes sentence on Frederick, 103 

Saxony as a conqueror, but from this time forth he 
treated the electorate as a conquered coun- Frederick 
try. He took its g^overnment entirely into ^^^^ P^f" 

J ^ J session oi 

his own hands, and made it subservient Saxony. 
to his own policy. Its finances were administered with 
Prussian economy, and during the whole of the war it 
afforded him a considerable revenue. 

§3. The War becomes general, 
Frederick's first campaign was undoubtedly a failure. 
The possession of Saxony was very important from a 
military point of view, but he had not sue- ^ , 

, / - . . . . Results ot 

ceeded m makmg any impression on Aus- the first 
tria, while the violence of his proceedings campaign, 
gave his enemies a handle which they were not slow to 
make use of. The papers found in the Dresden archives 
enabled him to publish a justification of his conduct, but 
this had no practical result. It produced a considerable 
impression in France, but upon the French Court it had 
no effect whatever. The king was completely fascinated 
by Austria, and the intrigues of Madame de Pompadour 
were now seconded by the prayers of the Dauphiness, 
the daughter of the King of Poland, who implored Louis 
to fly to the rescue of her parents. 

All through the winter Austria strained every nerve to 
consolidate her alliances, and she did not scruple to use 
her position at the head of the Empire, in order to drag 
that body into the quarrel that had arisen between two 
of its members. On its own responsibility, without con- 
sulting the electors, princes, and cities, the 

Emperor passed sentence on Frederick, and "^^^ Emperor 

^ ^ ' passes sen- 

condemned him, unheard, as a disturber of tepee on Fred- 

the peace. Many of the great cities alto- 
gether refused to publish the Emperor's decree^ and even 



104 The War becomes general, 175^- 

among the states generally subservient to Austria there 
were some that were alarmed at so flagrant a disregard 
of law and precedent. It may have seemed a sign of 
what was to be expected should Prussia be annihilated, 
and no state remain in Germany that dared to lift up its 
voice against Austria. Nevertheless, in spite of this feel- 
ing, and in spite of the opposition of nearly all the Pro- 
testant states, Austria succeeded in inducing the Empire 
to espouse her cause. In all three colleges of electors, 
princes, and cities she obtained a majority, and at a diet, 
held on Jan. 17, 1757, it was resolved that 
deda^es wa^r ^^ army of the Empire should be set on foot 
on Prussia, fQj- ^]^g puroose of making- war on Prussia. 

January 17, r r o 

1757. Freder- Some months later Frederick was put to the 
ban of the ban of the Empire. But the use of this an- 

Empire. tiquated weapon served rather to throw 

ridicule on those who employed it than to injure him 
against whom it was launched. 

While all this was in progress the Court of Vienna was 
busily concerting measures with the Courts of St. Peters- 
burg and Versailles. A new treaty was 
aiiTa^nce with concludcd with the former, on the base of 
Sy 2^17^^^^"" ^^ Russian proposals of the preceding 
spring (p. 90), and Austria bound herself to 
pay the Cazarina one million roubles (about 180,000/.) 
a year during the continuance of war. 

Last of all, after long haggling on both sides, there 
was signed at Versailles a second treaty between France 
and Austria, a treaty* for the partition of Prussia. Silesia 
and Glatz, and a certain small portion of 
^fat^^'of Ver- Brandenburg, were to be conquered for Aus- 
sailies, May, tria. Saxony was to get Magdeburg, Halle, 
and the adjacent districts, as well as the 
Duchy of Halberstadt, for which, however, she was to 



-1757 Partition Treaty of Versailles. 105 

surrender part of Lusatia to Austria. The Prussian lands 
on the Rhine were to be given to the Elector Palatine, 
while Sweden, with whom France had already concluded 
an alliance, was to receive part of Pomerania. France 
and Austria reciprocally bound themselves not to make 
peace until these objects had been attained, and France 
undertook to pay Austria 12,000,000 florins (960,000/.) a 
year as long as the war lasted. Qn the other hand, 
Austria promised that as soon as she had received her 
share of the spoil she would cede to France a portion of 
the Netherlands, including the seaport towns of Ostend 
and Nieuport, and give the remainder to Don Philip of 
Spain, Louis's son-in-law, in exchange for his duchies of 
Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. 

Such were the main articles of a treaty that was un- 
doubtedly a great triumph for the diplomacy of Kaunitz 
and Stahremberg. Almost all the advantage 
was on the side of Austria. Not only were the Y^ advantages 

•' for Austria. 

territorial acquisitions which the treaty se- 
cured to her far more considerable than those which were 
to fall to the share of France, but the latter were contin- 
gent on the success of the whole undertaking. The loss 
of the Netherlands was no great matter for Austria ; their 
remoteness and the conditions under which they were 
held made them rather a burden than a source of 
strength, and their fortifications had become so dilapi- 
dated as to be hardly defensible. And it was only a 
small portion of these Netherlands that France was to 
obtain ; the greater part was assigned to a foreign prince, 
and it made little difference to France whether that prince 
were a Bourbon or a Hapsburg. The indirect advan- 
tages of the treaty to Austria were greater still. If the 
war should be successful, the only German power that 
could offer any resistance to her would be annihilated, 



io6 The War becomes general. ^75 6" 

and she would able to extend her influence in Germany 
to almost any extent ; nor would she any longer, as 
heretofore, be met by French intrigues at every turn. 
Yet it was for this that France was to spend her blood 
and treasure ; for this that she was to neglect her war 
with England, to abandon her traditional policy, and to 
join with her hereditary enemy in destroying a power 
with which she had no cause of quarrel, and from which 
she had nothing to fear. 

The adhesion of Sweden brought little material 
strength to the allies ; but as Sweden was a Protestant 
power, it had some effect in discountenancing the ru- 
mour that Austria, France, and the Catholic part of the 
Empire were combining to put down Protestantism. The 
rumour had, nevertheless, some foundation in fact. 
Though nothing was said about it in the treaties, it is 

certain that both Maria Theresa and Louis 
religious war looked upon their war against the heretical 
to some ex- kings of England and Prussia as a religious 

war; it is little less certain that if it had 
succeeded, continental Protestantism would have existed 
only on sufferance. 

It has been calculated that the population of the States 
arrayed against Frederick the Great amounted to 90,- 
Th dd 000,000, and that they put 430,000 men into 

against the field in the year 1757. The population 

Prussia. c -r\ ' i 

of Prussia was 4,500,000, her army 200,000 
strong; but, after deducting the garrisons of the for- 
tresses, there remained little over 150,000 men avai-able 
for service in the field. The odds against Frederick 
were great ; but they were not absolutely overwhelming. 
His territories were scattered and difficult of defence, 
the extremities hardly defensible at all ; but he occupied 
a central position from which he might, by rapidity of 



—1757 '^^^^ English Alliance, 107 

movement, be able to take his assailants in detail, unless 

their plans were distinguished by a harmony 

unusual in the efforts of a coalition. His Advantages 

on her side. 

country was poor ; but so far was it from 
being burdened with debt, that treasure to the amount 
of 2,750,000/. had been amassed during the peace. If 
his troops were few in numbers compared with the hosts 
of the enemy, they were in quality inferior to none in 
Europe, and they were commanded by the first general 
of the age. Nor was it a slight advantage for Prussia 
that the commander-in-chief of her forces was at the 
same time the absolute ruler of the country, and able to 
dispose of its resources as he v/ould. As such Frederick 
could run risks and endure defeats that no responsible 
general could have dared to incur, or have been able to 
surmount. Something, too, must be allowed for the 
enthusiasm likely to be called forth by the spectacle of 
a king leading his own armies to the battle-field, endu- 
ring the same hardships, exposed to the same dangers, 
as the meanest of his followers. 

In addition to these resources, there was the English 
alliance ; but for the first year of the war, at any rate, 
there seemed little chance of Frederick's 
obtaining much help from England. Later ^^^ English 
on, when Pitt was firmly established in 
power, she came nobly forward ; but at the opening of 
the campaign of 1757, it looked as if England was likely 
to lean on Prussia rather than Prussia on England. 

§ 4. English Affairs during the Wiiiter z/j^j/. 

During the autumn of 1756 the English Government 

was too weak and distracted to be able to pay much heed 

to the great war on which it had embarked. The news 

of Byng's retreat from Port Mahon, and of the consequent 



io8 English Affairs during the Winter, 1756- 

loss of Minorca, raised a tempest of indignation through- 
out the country. Newcastle bent before the 

^^r G3.1cncss 01 

the English storm, and characteristically sought to divert 
Government, resentment from himself by stimulating the 
popular fury against the unfortunate admiral. When a 
deputation of the city had made representations to him 
against Byng, he blurted out, " Oh ! indeed he shall be 
tried immediately — he shall be hanged directly !'* But 

it was of no avail. The unpopularity of his 
Newcastle's administration grew daily, and when Fox re- 
No^vember^ * signed the seals, weary at last of the position 
", 1756. Q^ ^ minister without influence, and of being 

held responsible for measures about which he had not 
been consulted, no one could be found to take his place, 
and Newcastle reluctantly made up his mind to resign. 

Pitt's opportunity had at length arrived. A new ad- 
ministration was formed, of which the nominal head was 

the Duke of Devonshire, a nobleman of high 
Administra- character, but in no way remarkable for his 

tionofPitt ^ * ^ 

and Devon- abilities. Pitt received the seals of Secretary 
of State, and Earl Temple, whose sister. Lady 
Hester Grenville, Pitt had recently married, was appointed 
First Lord of the Admiralty. Henry Legge became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was felt from the first 
that the new ministry would be shortlived. Strong in 
talent and in the public confidence, it lacked two essen- 
tial elements of permanence — royal favour and parlia- 
mentary influence. The King's aversion to Pitt con- 
tinued, and Newcastle, out of office, retained great 
power in both Houses. 

If, however, Pitt's tenure of office was 
rous m^?-^ insecure, he, at any rate, made his weight 
sures. ^^1^ while it lasted, though disabled by the 

gout during the greater part of the winter. The King's 



-1757 Pitfs Continental Policy, 109 

speech, delivered at the opening of Parliament (Decem- 
ber 2), was couched in a tone very different from what 
had been customary of late, and the actions of the min- 
istry were in harmony with the policy it enunciated. 
55,000 men were voted for the navy, 45,000 for the 
army ; the Hanoverian troops were sent back to the 
Continent, and Pitt adopted the bold idea of raising two 
regiments from the Highland clans which had lately been 
engaged in rebellion against the Crown, a measure which 
more than anything else contributed to change the dis- 
affection of the Highlanders into loyalty. A bill for the 
organization of a militia was passed through both Houses 
of Parliament, though opposed by the Lords, who im- 
paired its efficiency by reducing the number of men to 
be raised to 32,340, one-half of what had been originally 
proposed. Reinforcements were despatched to America, 
and a daring and comprehensive plan was formed for 
the prosecution of the war in that quarter. 

Nor was Pitt less determined to carry on the war on 
the Continent with vigour. Regardless of his former 
Philippics against Hanover, he now loudly 
proclaimed the necessity of defending the tinLtar" 
electorate, and asserted that Hanover ought policy. 
to be as dear to Englishmen as Hampshire. He was 
equally resolved on cordial co-operation with Frederick 
the Great, whom he described, somewhat rhetorically, as 
standing " the unshaken bulwark of Europe against the 
most powerful and malignant confederacy that ever yet 
has threatened the independence of mankind." Unfor- 
tunately, Pitt's power was not equal to his will. His 
gout was a great obstacle to the transaction of business, 
and the king disliked him too strongly to be much in- 
fluenced by his opinion in what he considered his own 
special department — the management of foreign affairs. 



no English Affairs during the Winter, 1756- 

The measures for the defence of Hanover were con- 
certed by the electoral ministers of George II., men 
without military knowledge, and animated by the tradi- 
tional Hanoverian jealousy of Prussia. Frederick had 

suggested that an army should be assembled 
Frederick's behind the river Lippe, using the strong Prus- 
defence of sian fortrcss of Wesel as a place of arms, so 

as to cover both Westphalia and Hanover 
against a French invasion. His plan was, however, too 
extensive for the Hanoverians, who alleged against it 
that it would necessitate their entering the territories of 
the Elector of Cologne, who would then declare against 
them, and announced their intention of merely defend- 
ing the Weser, thus abandoning Westphalia to the 
enemy. It was in vain that Frederick urged that the 
W^eser was not defensible, as it was fordable in several 
places, and its right bank, which would have to be main- 
tained, was everywhere commanded by the left. When 

he found his arguments to be without effect, 
the fortifica- he Ordered the fortifications of Wesel to be 
tions of Wesel. destroyed, its stores and artillery to be 
brought home, and its garrison of 4,500 men to join 
the Hanoverian army whenever it should be assem- 
bled. 

The Hanoverian ministers were incapable of appreci- 
ating the military side of the question ; but the chief 

cause of their want of enterprise was a ne- 
"h^^ano^ gotiation which they were all the time car- 
verian Tying on with Austria, by which they hoped 

to secure the neutrality of the electorate by 
allowing the French troops to pass through it to attack 
Prussia. George II. never altogether approved of this 
perfidious scheme, but he allowed himself to dally with 
it till it was too late to do anything more than make a 



-1 75 7 Dismissal of Pitt. 1 1 1 

stand on the Weser. For this purpose an army was 
collected of about 50,000 men, including the 
contingents of some small German princes assembled 
which were taken into the pay of Hanover, beiiind the 

Weser. 

and of this force the Duke of Cumber- 
land took the command soon after the middle of April, 
1757. About three weeks previously a French army, 
over 100,000 strong, had crossed the frontiers of Ger- 
many. 

The departure of the duke from England was the 
signal for important ministerial changes. The king had 
for some time wished to get rid of Pitt and 
Temple. Of the former he complained that T^f.,^^"C^ 

\ dislike of 

he made him long speeches, which possibly Pitt and 
might be very fine, but were greatly beyond ^^^ ^' 
his comprehension, and that his letters were affected, 
formal and pedantic. As for Temple, he was so disa- 
greeable a fellow that there was no bearing him. *' I do 
not look upon myself as king," he said, "whilst I am in 
the hands of these scoundrels." The Duke of Cumber- 
land, who had great influence with his father, and fully 
shared his dislike of Pitt, refused to quit England, leav- 
ing the king in the hands of a ministry he could not 
trust. Pitt's ill health was therefore made use of as a 
pretext for di,smissing him, and the duke 
went forth with a light heart to a campaign Dismissal of 
which was to blast his own reputation and 
bring disgrace on his country. 



112 Invasion of Bohemia, 1 75 7 



CHAPTER IX. 

1757. 
2 I. Invasion of Boheinia, 

The year 1757 was the most brilliant of Frederick's life. 
The later years of the war were perhaps more glorious, 
the years in which, with dwindling resources, he stood 
on the defensive against a host of enemies, keeping 
them at bay by consummate strategy. But the events of 
1757 strike the imagination most forcibly ; in no other 
year did the king gain such great victories, in no other 
did he experience so sharply the vicissitudes of fortune. 
^ . ^ The campaisrn opened for him with the 

Epitome of ^,, ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^, 

the year brightest prospects. Entermg Bohemia at 

^^^^' the head of a vast army, he won a great 

battle which seemed to lay Austria prostrate at his feet, 
yet six weeks later he met with a disaster so crushing, as 
to appear the certain forerunner of his ruin. He was 
compelled to evacuate Bohemia, while his enemies, en- 
couraged by the defeat of the hitherto resistless con- 
queror, closed in upon him from every side. Austrians, 
French, Russians, Swedes, and Imperialists, all fell upon 
him at once. His position seemed desperate, when sud- 
denly rising like a lion from his lair, he scattered his 
foes by two great victories, each of which resulted in the 
total rout of the beaten army. 

Unable to provide adequate means of defence at all 
points where attack was threatened, Frederick resolved 

to concentrate his forces against his principal 
BafTemia °^ antagonist, and to strike a severe blow at 

Austria as early in the year as possible. 
As soon as the snow was melted, and the roads had be- 
come practicable, an immense Prussian army poured 



1757 -^^^^ Prussians before Prague, 113 

into Bohemia through the passes of the Metal and Giant 
Mountains. As in 1744, it marched in three columns 
converging on Prague ; two came from Saxony led by 
the king and the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, the third 
from Silesia, under the command of Marshal Schwerin, 
who, at the advanced age of seventy-two, retained the 
vigour and energy of youth. The Austrians never 
divined Frederick's design until it was almost ripe for 
execution. Affecting great trepidation, he had masked 
his real intentions, and lulled the suspicions of the 
enemy to rest, by putting Dresden in a state of defence, 
marking out camps in its vicinity, and erecting palisades 
and abattis on the roads from Bohemia. Concluding 
that he meant to content himself with main- ^, , 
tammg Saxony, the Austrians on their side trians, taken 
made preparations for an invasion of the retrTaTon^' 
electorate later on in the year when their Prague, 
allies had taken the field. The news of the Prussian ad- 
vance came on them like a thunderclap. Their troops, 
scattered through Bohemia, had to fall back on Prague 
in such haste that they were unable to carry off or de- 
stroy their magazines. In the first days of May, the bulk 
of their army was collected on the Ziscaberg, a hill to the 
east of the city. It was no longer commanded by the 
skilful and experienced Browne. The partiality of Maria 
Theresa for her brother-in-law had placed the incompetent 
Prince Charles at its head, and Browne, who was really a 
great commander, was subordinated to the court favourite. 
Meanwhile the Prussian columns were rapidly closing 
in on Prague. Frederick had appointed May 4 as the 
day on which all were to assemble before 

,. i/'i«r-iA • 1 The Prus- 

the City ; on the 6th, if the Austrians stood sians before 
their ground, they were to be attacked and rague. 

(such was his self-confidence !) beaten. Schwerin was a. 



114 The Invasion of Bohemia, 1 7 5 7 

day behind the time, and, on uniting his column with a 
portion of the king's early on the morning of the 6th, 
begged that his soldiers might be allowed a day's rest, 
as they had been on foot since midnight, and had made 
forced marches for three days. Frederick, however, re- 
fused to be diverted from his intention of attacking that 
very day, influenced, there is little doubt, not only by 
the knowledge that a second Austrian army, under 
Count Leopold Daun, was hovering in the neighbour- 
hood, and might at any time effect a junction with 
Prince Charles, but perhaps still more by an obstinate 
determination to carry out his programme to the letter. 

The Austrian position was very strong. On the north, 

where Frederick and Schwerin were, the Ziscaberg was 

unassailed from its steepness. The eastern 

The Austrian slope was much more g-entle, but its brow 

position. ^ ^ ' 

was well defended by redoubts, and its base 
protected by marshy ground intersected by rivulets and 
by a string of fishponds, from which the water had been 
drawn off, and which from a distance looked like green 
pasturage, but were really a treacherous quagmire. 
Frederick determined, after reconnoitring, to attempt 
the Ziscaberg on this side, and brought his troops round 
accordingly. The Austrians, who were originally posted 
along the crest of the hill facing northwards, shifted 
their ground on perceiving his design, and wheeled their 
right wing round, until it was at right angles to the first 
position, so as to front the attack instead of being taken 
in flank, as would otherwise have happened. 

The battle began at lo A. M., and for three hours raged 

with the utmost fury round Sterbohol, a 

Prague, farmstead on the lower slopes of the Zis- 

^^ ' caberg. The Prussian infantry pressed in- 

petuously forward, toiling through the marshy ground. 



1757 ^^ Battle of Prague. 115 

and mowed down by the well- served Austrian artillery. 
Again and again they charged, and were as often re- 
pulsed, till Schwerin, maddened by the sight of his own 
regiment in retreat, snatched the colours from the en- 
sign and rushed forward crying, ^'This way, my child- 
ren." Almost immediately he fell, struck by five case- 
shot balls. The king himself brought up the second line, 
and, after strenuous efforts, Sterbohol was carried. At 
the same time the Austrian centre was pierced by a bold 
attack of General Mannstein up the steep hillside, at the 
point where their right wing made an angle with the 
main body, while the cavalry on their extreme right was 
routed by Ziethen's hussars. Their ranks were thrown 
into utter confusion. Prince Charles, while endeavouring 
to rally his flying squadrons, was seized with a spasm of 
the heart, which rendered him unconscious ; Browne 
had already been carried mortally wounded from the 
field. The battle was lost to the Austrians, and, though 
the fresh troops of the left wing still made a gallant 
resistance, they were gradually forced back into Prague. 
It was not till eight o'clock that the fighting was all over 
on the bloodiest day that had been seen in Europe since 
Malplaquet. The Prussians had purchased their victo- 
ry dearly, with the loss of at least 12,500 of their finest 
troops, besides old Schwerin, who, as Frederick said, 
alone was worth above 10,000. The Austrians lost 
13,000, including prisoners. The numbers engaged on 
each side were about equal, the Austrians being 65,000, 
the Prussians 64,000. The victory might have been 
more complete but for an unlucky accident. A 
considerable portion of the Prussian army had been left 
on the west bank of the Moldau to guard the line of 
communications, and prevent an outbreak of the Prague 
garrison on that side. 15,000 of these, under Prince 



ii6 The Invasion of Bohe7nia, 1757 

Maurice of Dessau, were to have crossed the Moldau, 
above Prague, in order to fall upon the Austrian rear, 
and intercept the fugitives ; but Maurice's pontoon- 
bridge proved too short, and he was unable to get over 
the river. Consequently the beaten army made good 
its retreat into the city, with the exception of 13,000, who 
escaped southwards, and eventually joined Daun. If 
Frederick had taken the advice of Schwerin, the miscar- 
riage might probably have been avoided ; he would not 
have had to fight with tired troops, and the nature of 
the ground would have been better understood; in short, 
the victory would probably have been more decisive. 

The immediate result of the battle was the invest- 
ment of Prague, where 46,000 Austrian troops were 
cooped up with little hope of escape unless relieved by 
Daun. Prague was not a strong fortress, but the pre- 
sence of so large a force within its walls 

Blockade of j i • i i. • -ui j 

Prague. made a regular siege almost impossible, and 

compelled Frederick to have recourse to 
the slower mode of reduction by famine. The severe 
cannonade to which the city was subjected was ordered 
with the view of accelerating the process by destroying 
its magazines. All over Europe the blockade was 
watched with intense interest ; events seemed to pause 
in expectation of the result, on which it was everywhere 
felt that the issue of the war depended. Frederick at 
first had little doubt that Prague would speedily fall, and 
intended as soon as it was captured to detach 30,000 
troops to march through Germany, disperse 
^f^F ^d^r^"k ^^^ army of the Empire, and unite with the 
Hanoverians against the French. Then, 
after despatching reinforcements to East Prussia, he pro- 
posed to advance through Moravia, fight Daun, and, if 
all went well, put an end to the war before the year was 



175 7 Movements of the Prussians, 117 

over. Except Daun's army there was nothing between 
him and Vienna. 

The actual course of events was very different. Week 
after week Prague held out, giving Daun time to march 
to its rehef. On the day of the battle he was only 
twenty-five miles off, but on hearing of the Austrian 
defeat he fell back in the direction of Iglau, 
followed by Bevern, whom Frederick de- Movements 
tached with 20,000 men to watch his move- 
ments. Every step that he took backwards brought him 
reinforcements, until at last he felt strong enough to re- 
commence his advance. Bevern reported the altered 
state of affairs at headquarters, and the king hastened 
to his support with 12,000 or 14,000 men. More could 
not well have been spared from the blockade, nor did 
Frederick think that more were required. Unbroken 
success had inspired him with too great confidence in 
himself, and too great contempt for the enemy, till he 
thought that he could prevail against any odds. 

On June 18 was fought the battle which wrecked the 
plans of Frederick the Great, and first taught him that 
he was not invincible. The Austrians, 54,000 strong, 
were drawn up in a well-chosen position on a low 
range of hills to the west of the little town of Kollin, 
and a mile or so south of the great Prague Austrian 
and Vienna high-road, along which the position at 
Prussians were advancing. Their left and 
centre were too strong to be attacked, but Frederick saw 
that an impression might be produced by throwing his 
whole force on their right wing. For this it was neces- 
sary for the Prussian army to pass in front 
of the Austrian lines, until it was opposite or'aTe^^^ 
to their right, its march being not parallel Prussians. 
to the enemy's position, but converging on it by 

I 



ii8 The Invasion of Bohemia. i7S7 

means of a movement called the "oblique order/' of 
which Frederick was very fond, and which he employed 
with signal success at Leuthen six months later. 

The battle at first went entirely in favour of the Prus- 
sians. Ziethen's horse and seven infantry battalions 

under General Hulsen (which formed their 
Koiiin, advance guard when marching into position, 

their extreme left when in order of battle) 
attacked the Austrian right wing at Kreczor. After some 
hard fighting they repulsed the enemy, and carried two 
heights defended by batteries, when they found them- 
selves confronted by fresh troops, which Daun had 
brought up by the rear from his left. If at this time 
they had been properly supported the battle would have 
been won ; it was said that four fresh battalions would 
have done the work. But no reinforcements were at 
hand. By some strange mistake, which, notwithstand- 
ing all that has been written about it, has never been 
explained. Prince Maurice, who commanded the Prus- 
sian left wing, had directed its attack upon the wrong 
point. Instead of marching up till he was opposite 
Kreczor, and then fronting to the right and commencing 
his attack, he halted and fronted some i,ooo paces too 
soon, and assailed the Austrians at a point where they 
never ought to have been assailed, and where he could 
be of no use to Hulsen. Nor was this all. Frederick 
had given the most distinct orders that the right wing 
should not engage at all, but remain on the high road as 
a reserve to be called up in case of need. But when the 
need came it was not to be had ; the impetuosity of 
General Mannstein, who commanded a brigade in it, 
had involved it in a general engagement with the Aus- 
trian left, and it could not be recalled. These two mis- 
takes lost the day. Instead of the whole Prussian force 



1757 Defeat of the Prussians, 119 

being massed on the point where most impression could 
be made, it was broken up into detachments, attacking 
disjointedly all along the Austrian line. 

The Prussian soldiers fought splendidly, but they 
were overpowered by numbers, and by the well-sustained 
fire of the Austrian artillery. Several regi- 
ments were almost annihilated. Yet the Un- Defeat of the 

ir'russians. 

equal contest was long maintained ; and at 
one time the issue seemed so doubtful that Daun had 
actually given the order to retreat, when a brilliant epi- 
sode turned the scale in his favour. In the Austrian 
army that day there were three Saxon cavalry regiments 
which had been in Poland at the time of Pirna. The 
commander of one of these regiments, Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Benkendorf, saw his opportunity, and, without wait- 
ing for orders, made a furious onslaught on the shattered 
Prussian battalions. The Saxons charged through their 
broken ranks, and, as they sabred them down, cried out, 
''This is for Striegau !" Striegau being the name they 
gave to the battle of Hohenfriedberg. Benkendorf s 
attack was followed up by the other Saxon, and by some 
Austrian, cavalry regiments, and the rout became gene- 
ral. Frederick strove in vain to stem the tide and rally 
the fugitives, until his aide-de-camp was obliged to re- 
monstrate with him, and ask, '' Does your Majesty mean 
to take the battery alone ?" The king made no answer, 
but paused and surveyed the battery with his field-glass, 
then turned away, and, seeing that the battle was irre- 
trievably lost, drew off the wreck of his army. The car- 
nage had been frightful. Out of 32,000, the Prussians 
had nearly 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and 
the loss had fallen almost entirely on their matchless 
infantry. During the night they retired towards Nim- 
burg, with little molestation from the Austrians, who also 



I20 The French in North Germany. 1757 

had suffered severely. The next day, at evening, the 
king rejoined the blockading force before Prague. News 
of the disaster had preceded him, but his soldiers would 
hardly believe it till they saw him ride into the camp 
with downcast eyes, followed only by a page. 

The loss of the battle carried with it the loss of the 

campaign. Frederick was obliged to raise the blockade 

of Prague immediately, and to retreat from 

Retreat from Bohemia, The retreat was attended with 

Bohemia. 

fresh losses from desertion, and from the 
unskilful tactics of his brother, the Prince of Prussia, to 
whom the command of a corps was entrusted ; and when 
the king got back to Saxony, shortly before the end of 
July, barely 70,000 remained under his banner out of 
1 17,000 who had entered Bohemia three months before. 
The Austrians followed him and took up a stronger po- 
sition at Zittau, just across their own frontier, resisting 

all his efforts to entice them into giving bat- 
Frederick in tie A Yind. of deadlock ensued. During 

Lusatia. o 

the greater part of August, Frederick sat 
confronting the Austrians in the Lusatian hills, barring 
their way, though unable to dislodge them. But he had 
other enemies to attend to, and could not sit watching 
the Austrians forever, so on August 25th he resigned the 
command in Lusatia to Bevern, in order that he might 
march in person into Thuringia, where his presence was 
urgently needed to check the advance of the French and 
Imperialists. 

? 2. The French in North Germany. 
While the events just recorded were in progress the 

French were making themselves masters 
The French in- Qf nearly all North Germany west of the 

vade Germany. ^ ^ ^ 

Elbe. Their principal army, 1 10,000 strong, 
took the field before the end of March, crossed the Rhine 



1757 '^^^ French in North Ger?nany, 121 

without hindrance, and occupied the Prussian territories 
in that quarter. The command was then assumed by 
Marshal D'Estrees, a soldier who had gained some repu- 
tation in the Austrian Succession War, but with small 
military capacity. Upon the arrival of D'Estrees maga- 
zines were formed, and the army began to advance 
towards Hanover, plundering and destroying the pro- 
perty of friend and foe alike. Its discipline was very 
slack ; many of the officers owed their appointments 
merely to rank and court favour ; the common soldiers 
were badly paid, and sought to supply the deficiency by 
pillage. 

To resist the invasion the Duke of Cumberland had 
been placed at the head of 50,000 men, of whom the 
bulk were Hanoverians and Hessians, the ^, 

The army of 

remainder being made up by contingents the Duke of 
from Brunswick, Saxe-Gotha, and Lippe 
Biickeburg, with the garrison of the now abandoned 
fortress of Wesel, which, however, was before long re- 
called by Frederick, in disgust at the pitiful strategy of 
the general. It was a mixed assemblage, but the troops 
were brave and well-trained, and under a skilful com- 
mander might have offered a successful resistance to the 
great but badly organized French army. Such, however, 
the Duke was far from being. At the ap- 
proach of the enemy he fell back behind the 
Weser, abandoning Hesse without a blow; and when, 
after long delay caused by want of supplies, bad roads, 
and the irresolution of their general, the French at last 
reached that river, he made not the slightest attempt to 
dispute its passage. ^^^^^^^^ 

D'Estrees, impelled by urgent despatches Hastenbeck, 
from home, had at length made up his mind -^^ '' ^ ' 
to fight, and after crossing the Weser, attacked the 



122 



The French in North Germany. 1757 



allied army at Hastenbeck. The battle resulted in 
a victory for D'Estrees, not a very decisive one 
in itself, for both armies quitted the field under the im- 
pression that they had been defeated ; but the French 
reaped as much benefit from it as though it had been a 
complete success. 

Cumberland lost his head, and instead of faUing back 
slowly on Magdeburg, where he might have acted in 
combination with Frederick, he hurried off 
mr'ats on^ northwards through Minden and Verdun, 
^^^"^^^ and hardly paused till he had reached the 

fortress of Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe. Thus 
Hanover and Brijnswick were abandoned to the invader, 
and the road was left open to the central Prussian do- 
minions, while the Enghsh commander ran blindly into a 
cul-de-sac, whence he could only hope to escape by an 
ignominious capitulation. The French, however, con- 
tented themselves with detaching a small body of troops 
to follow his movements, and then settled down to the 
more congenial occupation of gathering in the fruits of 
their victory. D'Estrees was no longer in command. An 
order for his recall had arrived a few days after the bat- 
tle, and with it his successor Marshal Richelieu, an old 
courtier who had displayed much courage 
Sp^rse^ed, and some skill when in command of the 
ceeded'^by forcc which conqucrcd Minorca, but wholly 

Richelieu. ^^i^^ ^^ \^^ placed at the head of a great 

army. 
Bad as the discipline had been under D'Estrees, it 
was far worse under Richeheu. D'Estrees had at any 
rate done what he could to preserve it, but 

Richelieu , . , ,. i • -i 

plunders Richelicu sct his soldiers an example m pil- 

Hanover; ^^^^^ ^^ notorious was his rapacity that 

when he returned to Paris and built a palace it was nick- 



1757 ^^^^ Convention of Kloster-Seven. 123 

named by the Parisians the Pavihon of Hanover. After 
sating himself with plunder, the French general turned 
northward in pursuit of the allied army, and the Duke 
of Cuniberland began to apprehend that he 
mis^ht be forced to surrender his whole force ^"^^ ^°^^ ^^ 

^ ^ ^ pursuit ot 

prisoners of war. Richelieu, on the other the allied 
hand, feared to drive him to desperation, ^^"^^' 
and doubted whether he could undertake the siege of 
Stade so late in the year ; above all he was anxious to 
secure peaceful winter quarters for his army. Both com- 
manders were therefore willing to accept the mediation 
of the King of Denmark, by whose instrumentality a 
truce was concluded. 

The convention of Kloster-Seven, signed on Septem- 
ber 10, provided that the auxiharies in Cumberland's 
army should be sent home, and that the 
Hanoverians should be allowed to winter in Convention 

of Kluster- 

and around Stade. The convention was, to Seven, Sep- 

,, . , .... tember lo. 

all mtents and purposes, a capitulation, but 
Cumberland protested so strongly against the use of the 
latter word, that Richelieu gave in, without considering 
the possible consequences of his concession. The differ- 
ence between a capitulation and a convention is that the 
one is a purely military act complete in itself, while the 
other needs to be ratified by the respective governments. 
Cumberland had no idea that his father was likely to 
disavow his act, but he shrank from the ignominy of 
signing a capitulation ; Richelieu considered the matter 
to be of no great importance, as he expected that the 
convention would be merely a preliminary to a treaty 
for the neutrality of Hanover, about which negotiations 
had for some time been going on at Vienna. The con- 
vention excited great indignation in England. George 
n. recalled his son, and treated him on his arrival with 



124 Rossbach, 1 7 5 7 

marked coldness. In France also it was viewed with 
disfavour. Certainly, more rigid conditions might have 
been imposed, but even as it was, North Germany was 
placed completely prostrate at Richelieu's feet. The 
convention left him at liberty either to proceed against 
the Prussian territories of Halberstadt and Magdeburg 
or to co-operate with Prince Soubise, who with a second 
French army was about to attempt the deliverance of 
Saxony in conjunction with the troops of the Empire. 
He did both, but ineffectually. Some of his troops oc- 
cupied the Halberstadt country, but in a desultory man- 
ner, with an eye to pillage rather than to military opera- 
tions. He also sent a reinforcement to Soubise, but 
that did not prevent Soubise from being beaten. 

? 3. Ross bach. 
The army of the Empire was very slow in assembling, 
and if Frederick had conquered at Kollin, it would 
^ ^,. probably never have assembled at all. Pub- 

Pubhc ^ ... 1-11. 

opinion in lic Opinion in Germany was decidedly in 

favour of ^^ favour of Prussia, and in the Protestant 
Prussia. States, at any rate, there was a widespread 

conviction that the Franco-Austrian alliance would be 
destructive of the freedom of the Empire and of the Pro- 
testant religion. The troops of Wiirtemburg, who had 
been taken into French pay, mutinied, and declared 
that they would rather be shot than fight for France 
against Prussia. Nor was this feeling confined to the 
Protestant States. After the battle of Prague, some even 
of the great Catholic Princes, such as the Elector of Ba- 
varia, and the Elector Palatine, showed a disposition to 
withdraw from their connexion with Austria, and to con- 
clude treaties of neutrality with Frederick. But the 
King's defeat at Kollin restored Austria's influence, and 



1757 The Army of the Empire, 125 

this influence was still further strengthened when Sou- 
bise's army issued from Alsace, overawing disaffection. 

From the end of June onwards, contingents from the 
various States kept coming in to the rendezvous at Fiirth, 
where they were drilled into something like 
discipline. Most of them were short of their The army of 

^ the Empire 

numbers, and in many cases half the men 
deserted on the way. An army of some sort was, how- 
ever, collected, and early in August it set out from Fiirth 
under the Prince of Hildburghausen, and 

-r^ /- r- 1 • • 1 1 joins Soubise 

marched to Erfurt, where Soubise, with the at Erfurt, 
French vanguard, had already arrived. The ^^^"^^ ^^' 
junction had not long been effected when the allied com- 
manders received the alarming intelligence 
that the Prussian king was marching against r^.treats to 
them in person, and Soubise insisted on 
falling back to Eisenach to concentrate his army. 

Their retreat into the hilly and impenetrable country 
about Eisenach was a serious inconvenience to Frede- 
rick, as it was of vital importance to him to get a battle 
from them as soon as possible, in order that ^ 

1 -1 1 r 1 r^-i • • Prussia at- 

he might return to defend Silesia against tacked on all 
the Austrians. His situation was becoming 
almost hopeless. From every quarter the tide of inva- 
sion came rolling in on the Prussian dominions. In the 
north-west the French were in possession of the Prussian 
territories on the Rhine and in Westphalia; and now 
that they had beaten down the resistance of 

TT .1 • 1-. -u . A ^ The French. 

Hanover, they might be expected at any 

moment to turn their victorious arms against the central 

provinces of the monarchy. Further south 

there were the combined French and Im- t^fa^nf "^' 

perialist forces, against which Frederick 

was then marching. In Lusatia he had left the great 



126 Ross bach, 1757 

Austrian army ready, as soon as his back was turned, to 
advance into Silesia, or even into Brandenburg itself. 
In the extreme east the province of East Prussia was 
overwhelmed by more than 100,000 Rus- 
The Rus- sians, who desolated the country, and com- 

mitted atrocities too frightful for description. 
The circle of enemies was completed by Sweden, who, 
when roused into activity by the news of 
The Swedes. KoUin, began to ship troops over to Stral- 
sund for an invasion of Prussian Pomerania. 

Hemmed in by foes on every side, it seemed as if the 
fate of Prussia was sealed already. Yet, with nearly a 
continent in arms against him, Frederick's 
Frederick's couragc and composure never forsook him. 
Resolved not to survive the overthrow of 
his house, he always carried poison about his person to 
be used in the last extremity; but in the meanwhile, 
until that extremity should arrive, he went on without 
once relaxing his efforts, manfully struggling against 
ever-increasing difficulties. He never gave way to de- 
spair, and if death was constantly in his thoughts, he, at 
any rate, meant to die hard. His burden of cares was 
aggravated by the loss of his favorite general Winter- 
feldt, and by domestic troubles, by the death of a mother 
whom he dearly loved, and by the ill-concealed dissatis- 
faction with which his brothers viewed his policy ; but, 
strangely enough, in the midst of it all, he was able to 
find relief and distraction in the composition 
his verses. ^^ eudless stanzas of indifferent French 

verses. At no time in his hfe was he more prolific than 
in the unhappy months that followed Kollin and pre- 
ceded Rossbach. 

After more than two months of anxious waiting, of 
marching to and fro, of sending out detachments 



1757 Situation of Rossbach, 127 

this side and that, Frederick succeeded in bringing 
matters to an issue with the French and ^^^ months 
Imperiahsts. About the middle of Oc- of anxiety, 
tober he had been obhged to hurry off homewards on 
hearing that the Austrians were making a 
dash at Berhn. The affair turned out to be Austrians 

in Isenin. 

merely a raid of 3,000 or 4,000 light troops, 
who no sooner heard that the king was marching against 
them than they departed within twenty-four hours of 
their arrival, with an installment of the ransom they had 
demanded, amounting to 28,000/. In effect it proved 
useful to Frederick, as his retreat emboldened Soubise 
to come out from the Thuringian hills, and thus gave him 
the lonor-soug-ht opportunity for a battle. ^ , 

° ^ . . Soubise 

The enemy had got as far as Leipzig, and comes out of 
were preparing to besiege it, when they 
heard that the king was coming back after them, where- 
upon they fell back behind the Saale, and awaited his 
approach. Frederick followed, and took up a position a 
couple of miles to the east of the combined army with 
his right wing resting on Bedra, his left on Rossbach. 

The little village of Rossbach, so soon about to be- 
come a memorable name in German history, lies in a 
country rich in historical associations. A 
few miles to the eastward, just across the Situation of 

, ^ -^ Rossbach. 

I Saale, is Liitzen, where Gustavus Adolphus 
' fell in the hour of victory. Not much further off to the 
south is the fatal field of Jena, where, half a century 
after Rossbach, Frederick's work seemed all undone in 
a single day. Rossbach itself stands on an undulating 
plain, sloping gently down to the river Saale, which 
sweeps round it in a semicircle on the south and east at 
a few miles' distance from the village. On the south- 
west the plain is bounded by the Unstrut, which falls 



12 8 Rossbach. 1 75 7 

into the Saale at Naumburg, and is crossed by a bridge 
at Freiburg, a mile or two above the junction of the 
rivers. Immediately to the west of Rossbach there is a 
hollow, through which a small stream winds away north- 
wards to join the Saale at Merseberg, and beyond the 
hollow, on rising ground which commanded a view of 
the Prussian position, was the camp of the French and 
Imperialists. 

The two armies were very unequal in numbers. 

Frederick had only 22,000 men with him ; the hostile 

army was nearly 50,000 strong. Of these 

str^en* tlTof two-thirds wcrc French, the remainder being 

the two made up of the troops of the Empire and of 

armies. . , . ^,7,. 

a few Austrian regiments. Soubise himself 
was not over-anxious to measure his strength with the 
great commander, but his officers were eager for battle 
^ , and confident of success. Their only doubt 

Eagerness of i • -i 

the French was whether they could win any glory by 
destroying so small a force as Frederick's; 
their only fear lest he should retreat and escape them. 
They had never met him in the field, and they talked 
contemptuously of doing great honour to this Marquis of 
Brandenburg by condescending to make a kind of war 
with him. 

Early in the morning of November 5 a great stir was 

observed in the French and Imperialist camp, and soon 

afterwards a single division, under the Count 

Movements ^ ^ ^ . , i i . i 

of the com- of St. Germain, advanced and occupied a 
me army. i^gig]-^^ opposite to the Prussian position and 
began cannonading. By 11 o'clock the whole army 
was seen to be on the march southwards, apparently 
making for Freiburg and Unstrut bridge. Frederick 
believing it to be in full retreat, resolved to fall on its 
rear later on in the day. But it was not retreat that Sou- 



1757 



Rossbach. 



129 



bise and Hildburghausen were meditating. What they 
really intended was to work round to the left, or even 
to the rear of the Prussian position, and then commence 




BATTLE OF ROSSBACH 

November 5, 1757. 
a,a. Position of Combined Army. 
b.b. Position of Prussian Army. 
c.c. March of Combined Army to attack Prussians. 

d, St. Germain. 

e. Prussian Cavalry about to charge. 
f, Prussian battery of 22 guns. 

an attack in conjunction with St. Germain. A glance at 
the map wilfshow the danger of this manoeuvre, espe- 



130 Rossbach. 1757 

cially when practised against an enemy famed for the 
rapidity of his movements. The combined army had to 
move in a great circuit round the Prussian position, ex- 
posing itself to be taken in flank while attempting to 
outflank the enemy. This was, in fact, exactly what 
happened. 

By half-past two Frederick knew what they were aim- 
ing at. They had passed through Schevenroda ; the 
heads of their columns had reached Pettstadt and were 
turning to the left towards Lunstadt. The order to 
march was given, and in half an hour tents were struck 
and the whole Prussian army was in marching order. 
Seidlitz, with the cavalry, was off first, and hastened to 
gain a position in advance — that is, to the 
Movements of east— of the French columne. Frederick 

the Prussians. 

followed with the rest of his forces, leav- 
ing a detachment to watch St. Germain The move- 
ments of the Prussians were masked by two low hills, the 
Janusberg and Polzenberg, so that the French could see 
that they were doing something, without being able to tell 
what it was. Fancying them to be in flight to Merse- 
berg, and fearing lest the prey should escape when almost 
within their grasp, they rushed forward in disorderly 
haste. The cavalry advanced at a sharp trot, and 
though the infantry followed at the double, they were 
soon left several hundred paces behind. 

At half-past three the French, Austrian, and Imperi- 
alist cavalry, 7,000 strong, were mounting the lower 
slopes of the Janusberg, when suddenly Seid- 
Kossbach, litz's hussars appeared over the crest of the 
November 5, Polzenberg, and swept down on them, " com- 
pact as a wall and with an incredible velocity." The attack 
was utterly unexpected, and only four regiments were 
able to form in order of battle before the Prussians were 



1 7 S 7 Victory of the Frussians, 131 

upon them. In half an hour they were flying in wild 
disorder. By this time Frederick had got his guns into 
position^ and from the top of the Janusberg twenty-two 
pieces of artillery opened fire upon the front of the French 
infantry, while seven battalions fell upon their right 
flank, marching straight up till they were within forty 
paces, and then delivering their fire. The French regi- 
ments, huddled together and unable to form properly, 
soon began to waver. Then Seidlitz, who had reformed 
his squadrons at Reichartswerben, broke in upon them, 
and completed the confusion. At half-past four the 
battle was over. The Imperialist foot never cam^e into 
action at all ; they were swept away by the retreat of the 
French. Nor did the bulk of the Prussian infantry ; the 
battle was over before they could get up. The French 
3.nd Imperialists lost near 3,000 killed and wounded, be- 
sides 5,000 prisoners, and the greater part of their artil- 
lery and baggage ; the loss would have been greater still 
if night coming on had not put an end to the pursuit. 
On the Prussian side there were 165 killed and 376 
vv^ounded. There was no sort of order in the enemy's 
retreat. No rallying-place had been appointed, pre- 
sumably because defeat was a contingency that had 
never been contemplated. Very few regiments kept to- 
gether, and the greater part of the army was scattered 
broadcast all over the country. 

The effect of the battle of Rossbach was marvellous. 
Not only in Prussia but in every German land there was 
great joy at the victory over the enemy of the whole 
German race. Never before had the French been de- 
feated in a great battle by a purely German ^ 
army, com.manded by a leader of German siasm at the 
blood. The rejoicings were intensified by ^^^^°^- 
the universal disgust v/hich had been excited by the in- 



132 Silesia Regained. i757 

Solent and outrageous conduct of the French in countries 
to which they were supposed to have come as friends and 
dehverers. The army of Soubise was more disorderly 
and licentious than the army of Richelieu. Wherever 
it went there was the same tale of extortion, plunder, 
and violence ; the doings of the French in Germany were 
compared with the doings of the Cossacks in East Prus- 
sia. Even the fact. that troops of the Empire had fought 
side by side with the soldiers of Soubise in no way di- 
minished the general satisfaction of Frederick's victory. 
The German people were altogether opposed to the war 
with Prussia. Feeling that they were not adequately re- 
presented in the Diet, they were rather pleased than 
otherwise at the discomfiture of its army. If it helped to 
overthrow the old order of things in the Empire, so much 
the better. A new and better structure might arise in its 
place. 

\ 4. Silesia Regained, 

Of the remoter consequences of his victory, Frederick 
thought very little. To him it was chiefly valuable be- 
cause it set him at liberty to fight another battle in 
Silesia. It was high time for him to be back there. The 
Austrians had invaded the country in great force, and 
^ , , but for the timidity of Prince Charles and 

Frederick ... - .. _, 

marches for Daun, and their frequent disputes, Bevern 
tnan's'ucces-' must have fared even worse than he did. 
ses mere. Eight days after Rossbach, Frederick started 

from Leipzig with 14,000 picked men, but though he 
made forced marches, a series of disasters occurred be- 
fore he could arrive on the scene. First, the important 
fortress of Schweidnitz capitulated after a disgracefully 
short siege, with a garrison of 6,000 men, and stores of 
all kinds. Then Bevern was defeated in a great battle, 
which opened the gates of Breslau to the Austrians. 



1757 Austrian Successes, 133 

Soon afterwards Liegnitz went too. News of these losses 
kept reaching the king on his march, but nothing 
daunted he pushed on, resolved to stake all on a battle. 
Indeed, without a battle and a victory, everything was 
as good as lost already ; the Austrians would take up 
winter quarters in Silesia, and the southern fortresses 
would certainly fall in the spring, even if want of provi- 
sions did not compel them to surrender sooner. *' I will 
attack them," said Frederick, *'even if they stood on the 
steeples of Breslau." The Austrians played completely 
into his hands. They had a strong intrenched camp 
before Breslau, and if they had stayed in it they could 
hardly have failed to repulse the Prussians, but they 
thought it a shame to sit still and be attacked by Frede- 
rick's little army, his Potsdam Guard-Parade, as they 
called it in derision, so they came out to m^et him — and 
their ruin. 

On November 28 Frederick reached Parchwitz, half- 
way between Glogau and Breslau, on the great road that 
runs through Silesia from end to end, where 
he was shortly afterwards joined by the re- Frederick at 

c T^ 1 Parchwitz. 

mams ot Bevern s army. Bevern himself 
was not with them ; on the morning after his defeat, he 
had ridden out to reconnoitre, and had been made 
prisoner— intentionally, Frederick thought, but perhaps 
with injustice. After this junction the king had some 
34,000 men under his command. The soldiers he had 
brought with him— the victors of Rossbach— were ready 
for anything, but the morale of Bevern's troops had 
been shaken, and until it was restored, there would be 
little use in leading them on what must have seemed, 
even to Frederick himself, almost a forlorn hope. He 
therefore assembled his generals and staff officers, and 
addressed them in a few well-chosen and stirring words, 

K 



134 Silesia Regained. i757 

After recounting his recent misfortunes, he appealed to 
the courage, to the fideUty, and to the patriotism which 
they had so often manifested. " There is hardly one of 
you," he continued, " who has not distinguished himself 
by some honourable action, and I therefore 
His^address ^^^^^^ mysclf that, when the time comes, 
generals. nothing will be wanting which the State has 

a right to expect from your valour. The hour is draw- 
ing near. I should think I had done nothing if I left 
the Austrians in possession of Silesia. Let me tell you, 
then, I intend, against all the rules of war, to attack the 
army of Prince Charles, though it is nearly three times 
our strength, wherever I find it. . . . I must venture 
this- step or all is lost. We must beat the enemy or 
perish all of us before his batteries. . . . Remember 
that you are Prussians, and I am sure you will not act 
unworthily, but if there is any one among you who fears 
to run all risks with me, he can have his discharge to- 
day, and shall not suffer the least reproach from me.'* 
The' king paused, and seeing by the animated faces of 
his hearers the impression he had produced, continued : 
- I was convinced of it beforehand that none of you 
would desert me ; I reckon, then, on your loyal help, 
and on certain victory. Now go into the camp and re- 
peat to your regiments what you have just heard from 
me.'' Then, changing his tone, he announced the pen- 
alties that would be inflicted on any regiment that failed 
to do its duty, and in conclusion, ''Good night, gentle- 
men," he said, " soon we shall have beaten the enemy 
or we never see one another again." 

Later on in the evening the king rode through the 
camp, and, as was his wont, spoke here and there a word 
of encouragement to the common soldiers. The enthu- 
siasm of those who had Ustened to his speech spread like 



1757 Prussian Enthusiasm, 135 

wild-fire through the whole army, and soon officers and 
privates alike were in a state of intense ex- 
citement, ea^er for the moment when they Enthusiasm 

■^ -^01 the army. 

should be led against the foe. Patriotism and 
religion combined with the personal influence of Freder- 
ick to produce this result. Almost all the soldiers who 
were with him were native Prussians, the for- 
eigners, of whom one-third of each regiment ^ ^^° ^^^' 
was usually composed, having for the most part deserted 
during the recent reverses. So, when the king told 
them that without a victory all was lost, he struck a 
chord that would vibrate in all their hearts. They felt 
that they were fighting for their homes, and they felt that 
they were fighting for their religion, too. For though 
the war had never been avowed to be a war of religion, 
a very strong impression prevailed that such was really 
its character ; and among the native Prus- 
sian soldiery there was a deep religious feel- ^ ^^^°"* 
ing, as was shown on the day of the battle when they 
advanced against the enemy singing hymns, and again 
after the glorious victory had been won, when a grena- 
dier struck up Luther's gra.nd hymn, beginning, '^ Nun 
danket alle Gott," and the strain was taken up by regi- 
ment after regiment, till, as daylight died away, its sol- 
emn tones were heard from every quarter of the battle- 
field. 

The Parchwitz speech was delivered on the evening 
of December 3d, and on the following day the Prussians 
advanced upon Neumarkt, where they sur- 

, f. . , . Prussians ad- 

prised a party 01 engmeers markmg out a vance upon 
camp for the Austrian army on the hill be- ^'^umarkt; 
yond, and Frederick learnt, to his intense satisfaction, 
that Prince Charles was coming out from his entrench- 
ments to meet him in the open plain. The next morning 



136 Silesia Regained. 1757 

they were again on the march early, and at daybreak 
their advanced guard came upon a body of the enemy's 
cavalry just before reaching Borne, some seven or eight 
miles from Neumarkt. After this outpost 
and upon had been dispersed, Frederick rode up the 

^°'^''^* Scheuberg, a hill close by, whence he saw 

the whole Austrian army extended before him. 

The great Austrian army, over 80.000 strong, was 
drawn up in a Une five or six miles in length, directly at 
right angles to the high road along which the 
fhe'lus''-^^ Prussians were advancing. Its right wing 
trians. rcstcd on Nypcm and was protected by bogs ; 

its left extended beyond Sagschutz almost to the Schweid- 
nitz' Water, and was bent back at the extremity to 
avoid being outflanked. The bulk of the infantry was in 
the centre with cavalry on each flank, the right wing 
being commanded by Lucchesi, the left by Nadasty. In 
front of the first line were two villages, Frobelwitz and 
Leuthen, which were occupied by infantry and flanked 
by batteries, especially Frobelwitz, where the main attack 
was expected. It was not an ill-chosen position; it 
commanded the two roads to Breslau, and was not easily 
assailable on either flank ; but it had one capital defect 
— its extreme length. 

From his position on the Scheuberg Frederick could 
see the Austrians distinctly, though they were unable to 
get any clear view of him. The country 
onfhe"'^ about was a wide, undulating plain, afford- 

Scheuberg. jj^g y^j-y f^^ points whence an extensive 
prospect could be had, and the movements of the Prus- 
sians were in a great measure concealed by a low chain 
of hills, of which the Scheuberg was the highest. It was ; 
a great advantage to Frederick that he knew every inch » 
of the ground ; his Silesian reviews had made it famihar. 



1757 



Battle of Leuthen, 



137 



to him. An amusing story is told of how Daun, that 
morning, when out reconnoitering, asked a peasant the 
name of some distant object, and how the peasant re- 
plied, " That is the hill our king chases the Austrians 
over when he is reviewing here.'' 




BATTLE OF LEUTHEN 
Dec. 5, 1757. 



a.a» Austrian Army. 
h,b, Austrian outpost at Borne. 
cxx. Advance of Prussian Army. 
d.d. Prussian Army about to attack. 

After a considerable time spent in surveying the Aus- 
trian lines, Frederick decided to mass his whole force on 
their left by means of his favorite movement, the " oblique 
order." Sheltered at first by the Scheuberg hills, the Prus- 
sian columns marched some distance southwards from 
Borne in a course parallel to the enemy's position. On 



13S Silesia Regained, ^757 

reaching Lobetintz they formed in ** obhque order," and 
so advanced diagonally against the Austrian 
dans'^T" -^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ arrived opposite to its ex- 
vancetothe treme left. Having gained this position, 
they swiftly wheeled into battle order. The 
*' oblique order" of attack was a manoeuvre invented 
by Frederick and frequently used by him. 
order'"°^^^^^^ Its advantage consisted in enabhng a gene- 
ral to mass his troops on a given point 
more rapidly than was possible by any other method, and 
outflank the enemy without running the risk of being 
outflanked himself ; but it was a manoeuvre difficult to 
execute, and only to be practised with perfectly disci- 
plined troops. 

It may excite some surprise that the Austrians allowed 
Frederick to execute this manoeuvre under their eyes in 
broad daylight. The fact was that, since the loss of 
their outpost in Borne, they had been very much in the 
dark about his intentions, and what they did see only 
misled them. The movements of the Prussians about 
Borne and on the Scheuberg were visible, though indis- 
tinctly, to Lucchesi on their extreme right, and convinced 
him that the wing he commanded was about to be at- 
tacked. Upon this he demanded reinforcements urgent- 
ly, and though Prince Charles and Daun for some time 
refused to accede to his request, they yielded 
Movements of ^^ j^gt when he declared that unless rein- 

the Austrians. 

forced he would not answer for the conse- 
quences. Then Daun himself rode to the right with the 
reserves of the centre, and a large body of cavalry was 
ordered up from the left, which was thus weakened just 
when it ought to have been strengthened. Nadasty took 
a juster view of the situation. When the Prussians be- 
gan to emerge from behind the hills, he saw clearly that it 



1757 Battle of Leuthen, 139 

was he and not Lucchesi on whom the attack would fall. 
But it was in vain that he sent messenger after messen- 
ger imploring succour. Prince Charles was miles away 
in Frobelwitz, whence only a very imperfect view of the 
Prussian movements could be had. He and all the gene- 
rals with him believed that the Prussians were retreat- 
ing, so he turned a deaf ear to Nadasty's messages. 

It was about one o'clock when the battle began. The 
Prussians advanced under cover of a well-sustained 
fire from their artillery, and especially from ten heavy 
guns taken from the walls of Glogau, and brought up 
with immense labour. Nadasty made a gallant but inef- 
fectual resistance. The Prussians pushed 
on and captured a battery of fourteen pieces Austrian 
on a hill behind Sagschlitz. When it was *^^^ ^^"^• 
too late, Prince Charles saw the error he had made in 
massing troops on his right wing, and sent battalion 
upon battalion to the succour of his left. But from the 
distance they had to traverse before reaching the scene 
of action, they arrived breathless and in disorder, and 
were swept back with Nadasty's infantry upon Leuthen. 

This village now became the key of the Austrian po- 
sition, and the battle raged about it for an hour or so 
with great fury. By strenuous efforts Prince 
Charles had succeeded in wheeling his cen- Leuthen, 
tre and right round into a fresh position, Deceinbers. 
nearly at right angles to the first, and fronting the Prus- 
sian attack. The hottest of the fight was in Leuthen it- 
self, v/here the church, the churchyard, and every en- 
closure was crammed with Austrian soldiers. The Prus- 
sian reserves were brought up, and the enemy were 
driven out of Leuthen ; but still they stood their ground 
behind the village, crowded together in dense masses, 
and kept the Prussians at bay by the fire of their artil- 



140 Silesia Regained. i7S7 

lery. Then from their right Lucchesi came up with his 
cavalry to attack what seemed to him the unguarded left 
flank of the Prussians. But the flank was not unguard- 
ed. In a hollow close by Frederick had stationed Dries- 
en with the cavalry of the left wing, and Driesen, watch- 
ing his opportunity, fell upon the Austrian horse just as 
they were going to charge. Lucchesi was killed, and 
his squadrons fled in confusion. The Austrian flank and 
rear were now exposed, and Driesen plunged into them 
and completed the ruin. A panic ensued. The Aus- 
trians flung away their arms, abandoned 
Austn^a^ s^^ their guns, and thought only of saving them- 
selves by flight. When the twilight of the 
short December day came on, the battle was won. 

As at Rossbach, the approach of night diminished the 
losses of the beaten army, but even as it was they were 
very great. The Austrians left io,oco killed and wound- 
ed on the field, and lost besides 12,000 prisoners, 51 flags 
and standards, and 116 cannon. The Prussian killed 
and wounded amounted to 6,300. But the significance 
of the victory was not to be measured by the number of 
the slain. What was of importance was that the great 
Austrian army was so completely beaten that no thought 
of further resistance entered into the minds of its leaders. 
At noon on the morrow. Prince Charles commenced his 
retreat, after throwing rather unwisely a strong garrison 
into Breslau. The retreat was very disastrous. The 
weather was miserable, and the Austrians 
the Aus- t^3,d lost their tents, and almost all their bag- 

trians. gage. Thousands either deserted, or were 

taken by the Prussian cavalry, and when Prince Charles 
reached Bohemia, he had only 35,000 men under his 
command. Before the battle he had had, including the 
garrisons, close upon 90,000. 



1757 ^^^^ Russians and Swedes, 141 

On the 2 1 St Breslau capitulated, and its garrison of 
17,000 men, with thirteen generals among them, be- 
came prisoners of war. A week afterwards 
Liegnitz surrendered, so that before the year Breslau and 
was out Frederick was again in possession Liegmtz. 
of all Silesia except Schweidnitz. This fortress was block- 
aded through the winter and taken by storm early in the 
spring. 

A few words will suffice to dispose of the king's re- 
maining enemies. After overrunning a large portion of 
East Prussia, the Russian commander Aprax- „ . 

^ Russian 

in defeated in a pitched battle at Gross-Jag- victory at 
ersdorf Marshal Lehwaldt, to whom with gerTdorf,' 
28,000 men the defence of the province had August 30. 
been entrusted. Apraxin might now have advanced to 
Konigsberg and made himself master of the whole pro- 
vince : but instead of doing so he returned home, alleg- 
ing that the country was too exhausted to 

. . . -, Apraxin re- 

support an army. Apraxm was mnuenced turns 
by political motives. The Czarina was dan- °"^^* 
gerously ill, and if she should die, the policy of Russia 
would probably be reversed, as her heir was known to 
be opposed to the war. Even if she recovered, it was by 
no means certain that the Anglo-Prussian party in St. 
Petersburg would not get the upper hand. As it turned 
out the Czarina recovered, dismissed Apraxin from his 
command, and ordered the army to recommence opera- 
tions at once. This, however, was impossible, as Aprax- 
in had brought it back in so wretched a state that months 
were required for its reorganization. Meanwhile the re- 
treat of the Russians enabled Lehwaldt to ,^.1.0^ 

The Swedes. 

march agamst the Swedes, who in Septem- 
ber had invaded Prussian Pomerania with 22,000 men. 
Lehwaldt had little difficulty in dislodging them from 



142 Pitt and the War. i7S7 

the few places which they had taken, and in forcing 
them to seek refuge under the guns of Stralsund. 

Never had Frederick's reputation stood higher than at 
the close of this memorable year ; Leuthen 

General re- ^t i • i -. • 

suits of the alone, as rslapoieon said, was enough to im- 
c.impaign. mortalize and to place him amongst the 

greatest generals. But his position and prospects were 
very different from what they had been after ^the battle 
of Prague. Then he seemed on the point of forcing his 
enemies to submission. Rossbach and Leuthen had 
merely saved him from destruction. 

I 5. Pitt and the War. 

When we left Pitt at the commencement of the cam- 
paign, he had just been dismissed from office at the in- 
stance of the Duke of Cumberland. In less than three 

months he came back almost on his own 
Pkt's^dis- terms. His dismissal spread consternation 

missal from through the country. The stocks fell ; the 

Common Council voted him the freedom of 
the City, and th^ chief towns of the kingdom followed 
the example of London by sending him their freedom in 
gold boxes. " For some weeks," says Horace Walpole, 
" it rained gold boxes." Various attempts were made 
_ to form a new ministry, but it was soon per- 

The country . , , r -, • , ir^, 

without a ceived that a government from which " The 

i inis ry. Great Commoner'' was excluded would 

have little prospect of stability. And Pitt himself had 
learnt something by experience. He had seen that 
great talents and popular support, though they might 
carry him into office, could not keep him there with the 
king and Parliament both against him. The king's 
favour could only be won by degrees, but parliamentary 
influence could be gained at once by a coalition with 



1757 •^^•^- M3 

Newcastle. To this therefore Pitt consented. New- 
castle also was ready to come to terms, having learnt 
that in a time of great public excitement the control of 
votes was insufficient to sustain a minister. 

So the leader of the Whig aristocracy and the great 
representative of the people sank their mutual hatred 
and joined forces. They had little diffi- 
culty in marking out their respective pro- pkt^anT °^ 
vinces. Pitt, as Secretary of State, with Newcastle, 
Holdernesse, a mere cipher, for his col- 
league, took the entire direction of the war and of 
foreign affairs. Newcastle, as First Lord of the Trea- 
sury, had all the patronage of the Government in his 
hands, and was entrusted with the congenial occupation 
of corrupting members of Parliament. Their division of 
authority is well expressed by Walpole in a letter written 
the next year to a friend abroad. " Mr. Pitt does every- 
thing ; the Duke of Newcastle gives everything. As long 
as they can agree in this partition they may do what they 
will." The king consented to the arrangement with re- 
luctance, and complained bitterly of the perfidy of New- 
castle, who seems to have promised him never to 
coalesce with Pitt ; but opposition was useless, as the 
combination of Pitt and Newcastle was irresistible. 

Several of the chief offices were given to friends or 
relations of Pitt, and Fox, who alone in the House dared 
to lift up his voice against him, was silenced 
with the Paymastership of the Forces. That 
Fox, after the prominent part he had taken, should con- 
sent to serve under his rival without even a seat in the 
cabinet, excited great surprise ; but he was doubtless al- 
lured by the lucrativeness of the office, which afforded the 
means of repairing a fortune ruined by gambling and of 
providing for a family to whom he was devotedly attached. 



144 Pitt and the War. 1757 

By the time the ministry was formed, it was too late 
for Pitt to exert much influence on the war during the 
current year. The campaign in Hanover was hastening 
to its inglorious close, and ten weeks after Pitt took 
office, the Convention of Kloster-Seven 
of°Engiand yielded up the electorate to the enemy, 
when Pitt together with the allied states of Hesse and 

took omce. <^ 

Brunswick. French garrisons had already 
been admitted into Ostend and Nieuport as an earnest 
of their cession by Austria, a transfer pregnant with 
danger to English interests. Thus far England had met 
with nothing but disaster. In the Mediterranean, Mi- 
norca was lost, and the prestige, of her navy dimmed. 
In America the war had been no less unfortunate ; and 
to so low an ebb Ijad public spirit sunk that an English 
admiral, cruising off Louisburg with seventeen ships, 
declined to engage the enemy because they had eighteen 
with a greater weight of metal. Newcastle's pusillani- 
mity seemed to be reflected everywhere, and so deep 
was the general despondency that Chesterfield, as calm 
and clear-sighted an observer as ever lived, could write, 
''Whoever is in or whoever is out, I am sure we are 
undone ; ... we are no longer a nation. I never yet 
saw so dreadful a prospect." And yet, before Pht had 
been a year in power, he had roused the country from 
its lethargy, and inspired it so completely with his own 
fiery spirit that the years of his administration may be 
reckoned among the most glorious in its annals. 

Pitt's great triumphs were not due to any pre-eminent 
skill in the formation of his plans. In fact, from a mili- 
tary point of view, they were often faulty. 

The secret 

of Pitt's The secret of his success lay in his all-per- 

success. vading energy, in his skilful choice of com- 

manders, and in his marvellous power of propagating 



1757 Pitt and the War. 145 

his own enthusiasm and inspiring with his own zeal all 
those who were entrusted with the execution of his de- 
signs. As was said long afterwards by one of his bitter- 
est enemies, " No man ever entered his closet who did 
not feel himself, if possible, braver at his return than 
when he went in." 

His scheme of the war was judicious and definite. 
Avoiding the vicious system which in the war of the 
Austrian Succession had squandered the 
resources of England in seeking out France His scheme 

^ ° of the war. 

on continental battle-fields of her own 
choosing, just where she was strongest, and where least 
permanent advantage could be obtained, Pitt concen- 
trated his efforts on the destruction of her naval power, 
and the conquest of her colonies. Descents on the 
French coast were organized from time to time, with the 
object of destroying the enemy's arsenals and distracting 
his attention ; but on the Continent itself, Pitt confined 
himself atoost entirely to the secondary part of support- 
ing Frederick the Great. This support was given directly 
by means of a handsome subsidy, indirectly by re-estab- 
lishing the Hanoverian army under an efficient leader, 
and so covering the king's right flank. Pitt's statesman- 
like grasp of the situation convinced him that cordial 
co-operation with Prussia was the best way of saving 
Hanover; and that, even if Hanover were out of the 
question, it would be a fatal mistake for England to 
allow Frederick to be overwhelmed. He therefore in- 
duced George II. to break off the negotiations of his 
Hanoverian ministers for the neutrality of the electorate, 
to refuse his ratification to the Convention of Kloster- 
Seven, and to request Frederick to allow Duke Ferdi- 
nand of Brunswick to take command of his electoral 
army. 



146 Fitt and the War, ^757 

It may be imagined with what joy Frederick acceded 
to this proposition, which came to him a few days be- 
fore Rossbach, bringing a ray of hope in the gloomiest 
period of his own affairs. No better selection could pos- 
sibly have been made. Ferdinand was an excellent sol- 
dier, formed in the school of Frederick, whose service 
he had entered when a boy of nineteen, just 
ofBruns- before the first Silesian war. With great 

^^^^' steadiness and decision of character he 

combined the tact and temper needed by the command- 
er of an army made up of contingents from a variety of 
states, while his rank and position, as brother of the 
reigning Duke of Brunswick and a connection by mar- 
riage of the royal Houses of England and Prussia, gave 
him peculiar advantages for the difficult post. 

In December the English Parliament met, and before 
the torrent of Pitt's eloquence all opposition died away. 
Rossbach and Leuthen had materially 
Paruimen^ Strengthened his hand. The Enghsh had 
never wavered in their attachment to the 
Protestant hero, as they styled Frederick, with a just ap- 
preciation of his political attitude, and in complete igno- 
rance of his religious sentiments, but they were naturally 
more disposed to go heartily into the war when they 
. found their ally so capable of supporting 

Prussia, himsclf The Hanoverian army was taken 

'^ ' ^^ ' into English pay, and a treaty of alliance, 
closer than that already subsisting, was concluded with 
Prussia, one item of which was the payment to Frederick 
of a subsidy of 670,000/. a year. 



175^ Tlie Last Year of Offensive Warfare. 147 
CHAPTER X. 

FREDERICK REDUCED TO EXTREMITIES. 
1758-9. 

§ I . The last Year of Offensive Warfare, 
The campaign of 1758, if less fertile in striking inci- 
dents than that of the previous year, brings into promi- 
nence the great strategical qualities on which, far more 
than on his battles, the military reputation of Frederick 
is based. Leuthen and Rossbach were masterpieces, 
but in his other battles there is usually 
something: faulty. His marches and manoeu- Frederick's 

^ *' strategy. 

vres, on the other hand, always gave proof 
of consummate skill. The nicety with which his move- 
ments were calculated, the rapidity of their execution, 
and the organization which alone made such rapidity 
possible, are all above praise. 

His plan was still, as of old, to strike swiftly at Aus- 
tria before her allies could reach him. From the French 
he had little to fear now that the Hanoverian 
army was re-established under Ferdinand. -^^^ p^^" ^^^ 

•' _ prospects. 

The Russians threatened to be more trouble- 
some. The Czarina had shown her earnestness and her 
disgust at Apraxin's barren campaign by sending Count 
Fermor in the depth of winter to take possession of East 
Prussia. Her armies might be expected in Brandenburg 
or Silesia as soon as the season was sufficiently ad- 
vanced. 

It was thought by many of the Prussian generals that 
the more prudent course would have been to remain on 
the defensive, but the bolder plan was more congerual to 
Frederick's nature, and preferable on political grounds 
as affording more hope of an early peace. So as soon 
as Schweidnitz was recaptured, he plunged into Moravia, 



148 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare, 1758 

and laid siege to the important fortress of Olmiitz. The 
siege was not a success ; Frederick's sieges 
"^^^^* were seldom well managed, and this one 

presented peculiar difficulties. Olmiitz was a strong 
place, well provisioned and garrisoned, held by a reso- 
lute and experienced commander. It was not easy to 
invest except by a large army, because the Morawa flow- 
ing to the east of it was provided with sluices, by means 
of which the surrounding country could be laid under 
water. Above all it was situated at an immense distance 
from the Prussian base of operations. All supplies and 
munitions of war had to be brought up from Neisse, 
ninety miles off, and the greater part of the road lay 
through a rough and hilly country, infested by the light 
troops of the enemy, and inhabited by a population 
whose devotion to Austria made it very difficult for the 
Prussians to procure intelligence. 

Under these conditions the siege commenced about 
the middle of May. Daun with a large army hung on 
the skirts of the investing army, and, while 
OlmQu carefully avoiding a battle, impeded the op- 

erations of the besiegers, and threw supplies 
and reinforcements into Olmiitz. Time and ammunition 
were wasted at its commencement by a mistake of the 
chief engineer, who opened his trenches at too great a 
distance from the fortress. At length, however, after 
lasting seven weeks, it was approaching completion, 
when it was suddenly brought to an «nd by the loss of a 
great convoy of 3,000 or 4,000 wagons. 

The officer who destroyed the convoy was Major- 
Genial Laudon. Laudon had as yet held only subordi- 
nate commands, but he was by far the 
most capable general in the Austrian army, 
and soon eclipsed the fame of the prudent, timid Daun, 



1758 Frederick Raises the Siege, 149 

the Fabius Cunctator of Austria, as they called him at 
Vienna. With the exception of Eugene he was the 
greatest general the Austrians ever had. In rapidity, 
energy, and inventiveness he was hardly inferior to Fre- 
derick, and if he had had the same control over the 
armies and resources of Austria that Frederick had over 
those of Prussia, the Seven Years' War might not impro- 
bably have ended differently. Like Eugene, and like 
many of the great Austrian soldiers, Laudon was a 
foreigner. He came of an old Scotch family which had 
settled in Livonia in the fourteenth century, and in 1731, 
when in his fifteenth year, he entered the Russian army 
and learned the art of war under the celebrated Marshal 
Miinnich. In 174.2 he quitted the Russian service, and 
in the following year offered his sword to Frederick of 
Prussia. Skilful as Frederick usually was in reading 
character, he failed to discover any merit in Laudon, and 
contemptuously refused his application for a captaincy, 
saying, '' the physiognomy of that man is offensive to 
me." Laudon then repaired to Vienna, obtained a com- 
mission from Maria Theresa, and eventually became the 
most formidable enemy Frederick ever had. In this re- 
spect, again, his fortunes present a parallel with those of 
Eugene, who was refused first a prebend, then a troop of 
dragoons, by Louis XIV., before he entered the service 
of Louis' great enemy. 

The loss of the convoy compelled Frederick to raise 
the siege of Olmiitz, and placed him in considerable peril. 
Want of supplies prevented his remaining where he was, 
and 25,000 Austrians were between him and ^ ^ , 

. -^ . Frederick 

Silesia, while Daun lay ready to fall on his raises the 
rear as soon as he began to retreat. With im^de" 
great intrepidity he abandoned all idea of Bohemia, 
getting straight back to Silesia, and concealing his move- 

L 



150 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare, 1758 

ments with much adroitness, turned his retreat into an 
advance, and marched into Bohemia, where he main- 
tained himself until the news of a Russian advance into 
Brandenburg forced him to evacuate the country. He 
^^ ^ then recrossed the mountains, and with 

Marches • i i 

against the i4,ooo piCKcd men sct out for Frankfort on 
the Oder. Arriving at Frankfort after ten 
days of rapid marching, he united his forces with the 
corps of Count Dohna, and prepared for battle. Fer- 
mor, hearing of his advent, drew up his army in battle 
order at the neighbouring village of Zorndorf. He had 
rather more than 50,000 regular troops, besides a large 
body of Cossack and Calmuck irregular cavalry. The 
Prussians were about 32,000 strong. 

The battle of Zorndorf was the bloodiest in all the 
war. It lasted ten hours, and was contested on both 
_ , ^ sides with savaee fury. The Russians had 

Battle of , ., . ^ -^ , . , , , 

Zorndorf, been guilty of great and mexcusable bar- 

iigust 25. barities on their march through Branden- 
burg, and the Prussian soldiers, many of whom were 
Brandenburg men, were maddened by the tales of cruelty 
that were told them, and by the sight of smouldering 
villages all around ; the king himself, usually so calm 
and passionless, was exasperated into issuing the ruth- 
less order that no quarter was to be given. The Russians 
were badly handled, but they fought with dogged cour- 
age, suffering themselves to be shot and sabred down in 
their ranks sooner than give way, and the day would 
probably have been theirs but for the splendid behaviour 
of the Prussian cavalry, led by the brilliant and dashing 
Seidlitz. Late in the afternoon, when ammunition was 
getting scarce, the battle resolved itself into a hand-to- 
hand struggle, in which the hostile soldiery attacked 
each other with sabres, with bayonets, and with the butt 



1 75^ The Battle of Zorndorf, 151 

ends of their muskets. Men wounded to death employed 
their last moments in butchering one another, and in 
one instance a Russian, himself mortally wounded, was 
found lying on the prostrate body of a Prussian gnawing 
it with his teeth. When the approach of night and the 
exhaustion of the combatants put an end to the slaughter, 
the Prussians had won, but Frederick had purchased the 
victory with the blood of 11,500 of his bravest followers; 
of the Russians, 21,000 had fallen. 

Zorndorf, though not a very complete victory in itself, 
proved decisive of the Russian campaign of that year. 
Durincr the ni^ht of the 25th the Russians 

^ ^ -^ Retreat of 

maintained a portion of the field, but after the Rus- 

hovering in the neighbourhood for some 

days Fermor found it necessary to retreat into Poland. 

As soon as they were fairly off, Frederick was again 
on the march, hurrying towards Saxony to the relief of 
his brother Henry. Daun had taken ad- 
vantage of his absence to invade the elec- Henr^ and 
torate in conjunction with the army of the ?^^^^^ 
Empire, which was now commanded by the 
Duke of Zweibriicken. Prince Henry, with some 30,000 
men, was threatened by two armies, which were collective- 
ly nearly four times his strength, and though he occupied 
an exceedingly well-chosen position, it is obvious that 
Daun and Zweibriicken, if they had acted with vigour, 
might have crushed him before his brother could come 
to the rescue. Great expectations were cherished in 
Vienna of what was to be done during Frederick's 
absence. Rapidity, however, was not Daun's forte, and 
before he had attempted anything against the prince the 
king returned, having traversed 120 miles in seven days, 
a rate of speed that in those days was considered extra- 
ordinary. 



152 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare, 1758 

His return reduced Daun to the defensive and was 

followed by a month of intricate manoeuvring in the 

Saxon hill-country, the king trying all he 

Frederick in could to draw the Austrian commander 

baxony. 

into giving battle, the latter as steadily re- 
fusing it. At last Frederick gave his wary enemy a 
chance. While trying to manoeuvre him into fighting or 
retreating, he recklessly encamped in a position com- 
pletely commanded by the Austrian army of twice his 
strength. He was aware of the insecurity of his en- 
campment at Hochkirch, and intended to move as soon 
as he had received a convoy of provisions, but did not 
think the danger great enough to justify a retreat in the 
face of the enemy ; in fact, he entertained an unmerited 
contempt for his antagonist, and thought he might take 
liberties with him. To Marshal Keith, who said, in re- 
monstrance, " If the Austrians leave us unmolested in 
this camp, they deserve to be hanged," he coolly replied, 
'' It is to be hoped they are more afraid of us than of the 
gallows." 

The Austrians were of Keith^s opinion. Daun saw his 
opportunity, and, while making ostentatious prepara- 
tions for defence, secretly matured an elaborate plan for 
a night attack on the Prussian camp. When the church 

clock of Hochkirch struck five on the morn- 
Battle of 
Hochkirch, mg of October 14, the unsuspectmg Prussians 

^ ^^' were roused from their slumbers by the fire 

of Austrian musketry. Almost any other army would 

have been ruined, but the discipline of the troops and 

the presence of mind of the king and his officers saved 

them from destruction. Notwithstanding the surprise 

arid the darkness, they flew to arms, swiftly but without 

panic, and made so stubborn a resistance, that after a 

terrific struggle of five hours they retired in good order 



1759 ^^^ Results of the Battle. 153 

from the field, beaten but not routed. The calmness 
and precision with which Frederick conducted the 
retreat excited the admiration of his opponents. The 
Prussians, had, however, suffered severely. Their killed, 
wounded, and prisoners amounted to nearly 9,000, and 
they had lost besides, loi guns, 30 flags and standards. 
Among the slain was Marshal Keith, an excellent 
officer, and one of the few real personal friends that 
Frederick had. Francis of Brunswick also perished, and 
Maurice of Dessau fell, severely wounded, into the hands 
of the enemy. The king himself was slightly wounded, 
and had a narrow escape of being made prisoner. 

On the same day died Wilhelmina, Margravine of 
Baireuth, Frederick's favourite sister, the -^ , ^ , 

r 1 • 1 -1 n J 1 Death of the 

companion of his childhood, the sympa- Margravine 
thetic friend of his youth, and his fellow- 
sufferer under paternal tyranny. 

Daun's victory gave occasion to a ludicrous proceed- 
ing on the part of the Pope, who thought fit to present 
the Austrian commander with a conse- ^, _ 

The Pope 

crated hat and sword^ in recognition of his gives Daun 
triumph over the heretical Prussians, and in ?rated hat 
imitation of his predecessors, w^ho had be ^°^ sword. 
stowed similar rewards on the champions of Christendom 
against the heathen. The stroke was not a happy one, 
for the age of Crusades was past, and the Prussians, 
though heretical, were not heathen. The papal gifts 
excited the laughter of Europe instead of its reverence, 
and betrayed the religious character of the war, which 
was just what Frederick always liked to insist on. 

The results of Hochkirch were not a little 
surprising. The Austrians had won a great Jflhe b^attfe 
victory but the Prussians reaped the fruits 
of it. After the battle Daun returned to his old camp, 



154 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare, 1759 

sang a " Te Deum^' for the victory, and then entrenched 
hunself as carefully as if he had been beaten, consider- 
ing that he did enough if he barred the great highway 
to Silesia. Frederick, after retiring two miles from the 
field, called up reinforcements from Dresden, re- 
organized his army, and prepared for a fresh undertak- 
ing, just as if he had been the victor. " Daun has let us 
out of check," he said ; ** the game is not lost. We will 
rest here for a few days, then go to Silesia and 
deliver Neisse.'* Daun had no idea of following up 
an advantage, and Frederick was always greatest 
when he had to extricate himself from an awkward situ- 
ation. 

The situation was indeed awkward. Neisse and Cosel 
were invested by a second Austrian army, 
position^of Under General Harsch, and unless they 
Frederick. were soon relieved they would fall, and all 
Upper Silesia with them, into the hands of the enemy. 
But between the king and his fortresses was Daun's vic- 
torious army, and even if this were evaded, his departure 
would leave Saxony dangerously exposed. So impossi- 
ble did it seem for him to march into Silesia that Daun 
sent word to Harsch that he might go on quietly with his 
sieges since he could answer for the king. 
relieves The apparently impossible, however, hap- 

Neisse. pened. Frederick managed to circumvent 

Daun's great army, set off for Silesia by forced marches, 
relieved Neisse, and returned in time to save Saxony. 

The close of this campaign marks a definite stage in 
the history of the war. To all outward appearance Fre- 
derick's prospects were still fair enough. If 
General aspect Y.2.^\. Prussia had fallen into the hands of the 

of affairs. 

Russians, and Cleves remained in those of 
the French, these were losses that had been foreseen 



1759 Kunersdorf and Max en, 155 

from the first, and they were more than counterbalanced 
by his continued occupation of the rich Saxon electorate. 
On the central provinces of the Prussian monarchy, 
though they had most of them been the seat of military 
operations, the enemy had made no permanent impres- 
sion; the Austrians retained no footing in Silesia; the 
Russians had retired behind the Vistula ; the Swedes, 
after an ill-concerted incursion into the heart of Branden- 
burg, had been chased back to Stralsund. But the ap- 
pearance of strength was in a measure fallacious. The 
protraction of the war was telling far more on the re- 
sources of Prussia than on those of the great powers 
allied against her. Moreover, a new factor had arisen 
which must henceforth always be taken into account, 
Zorndorf was a kind of revelation to Frederick. Previ- 
ously he had thought little of the fighting power of the 
Russians, but their steadfastness on that stricken field 
had shown what they were capable of if properly led. 

§ 2. Kunersdorf and Maxen, 

Three years of the war were gone and the ardour of 
Frederick's enemies showed no signs of abating. The 
war was unpopular in the Russian army, but the Czari- 
na thought no sacrifice too great for the gratification of 
her hatred. France was sick of it too, and tottering on 
the verge of national bankruptcy, but Louis 
was kept true to his engagements by domes- ^^ ^^^^' 
tic influences and by the unbending deter- 
mination of Maria Theresa never to lay down arms until 
Prussia was thoroughly humbled. Undoubtedly Maria 
Theresa was right. Had a peace been concluded at this 
particular juncture, it must have been on the basis of the 
status quo. She had everything to gain by perseverance^ 
as it was probable that the resources of Prussia might 



156 Kunersdorf and Maxen, 1759 

break down altogether under the strain of one or two 
more campaigns. 

Already Frederick was at his wit's end for men and 
money. Of the splendid infantry which had stormed the 
heights at Prague, and stemmed the rout of 
the Prussian Kollin, very little now remained. Nine 
army. pitched battles, endless skirmishes, severe 

marches and constant desertion had made great havoc 
in the Prussian battalions, and the levies from the Prus- 
sian dominions were of course inadequate to fill the 
gaps. Moreover, Austria, relying on her vastly large 
population, had ceased to exchange prisoners, and after 
the end of 1/59, Russia followed her example. The new 
levies consisted largely of deserters, prisoners of war 
pressed into the service, and foreigners enticed or kid- 
napped into it by outrageous devices. Such men could 
not be trusted as Frederick trusted his followers at 
Leuthen. 

On the other hand, the soldiery of Austria steadily 
improved, as is always the case with a power 
ofthe°^^"^^"^ that has plenty of native material to draw 
Austrian on. In artillery she had been superior from 

lery. ^^ ^^^^ ^ ^^^ cavalry was perhaps intrinsi- 

cally as good, and only less effective because it lacked 
leaders like Seidlitz and Ziethen, the former of whom 
was probably the finest cavalry officer the world has ever 
seen. It was in infantry that Prussia had the greatest 
advantage when the war commenced, as she had still 
more markedly in the Silesian wars, but this advantage 
had been diminished by the deterioration of the one and 
the improvement of the other, until by this time it had 
disappeared altogether. 

Frederick's pecuniary difficulties were even greater 
still. But for the English subsidy he could hardly have 



1 759 Battle of Kay, j 5 7 

subsisted at all. The treasure hoarded up in the peace 
had already been expended, and the Prus- 
sian dominions, desolated and partially oc- pecuniary 
cupied by the enemy, could furnish no more ^^^^"^'-^^s- 
than 4,000,000 thalers. England paid the same amount. 
7,000,000 thalers and requisitions in kind were extorted 
from Saxony, and from Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and 
other States of the Empire which had taken a prominent 
part against Prussia, and the rest of the 25,000,000 thalers 
(3,750,000/.) which were needed for the war was made 
up by debasing the coinage, Every penny that could be 
raised went to the army, which even in the worst times 
was tolerably well fed and regularly paid, so that, in 
spite of the fearful severity of Prussian discipline, many 
deserters came over from the enemy to join its ranks. 
No new taxes were imposed, but all civil officers were left 
unpaid, receiving instead of their salaries promises to 
pay on the conclusion of peace. 

The summer was half gone before there was any 
serious fighting. Frederick had got together 
12:;, 000 men of some sort, besides g-arrison Opening of 

-" ' ^ the cam- 

troops, but he no longer felt strong enough paign of 

to take the initiative, and the Austrians were ^^^^' 

equally indisposed to attack without the co-operation of 

their allies. Towards the middle of July the Russians, 

under Count Soltikoff, issued from Posen, advanced to 

the Oder, and after defeating a weak Prussian corps 

near Kay, took possession of Frankfort. It 

now becam.e necessary for the king to march ^^ttle of 

in person against them, the more especially Ziii ichau, 

as Laudon with 18,000 Austrians was on his 

way to join Soltikoff. Before he could reach Frankfort, 

Laudon, eluding with much dexterity the vigilance of 

his enemies, effected his junction, and Frederick wdth 



158 Kunersdorf and Maxen. ^ 7 5 9 

48,000 men found himself confronted by an army 78,000 

strong. The Russians were encamped on the heights of 

Kunersdorf, east of Frankfort, carefully en- 

Russian and trenched and provided with a very nu- 

Austnan ^ ^ •' 

position at mcrous artillery. To the westward, closer 

Kunersdorf. i ^ i i t i • i r 

to the Oder, lay Laudon, m the most fa- 
vourable situation for succouring Soltikoff if he should be 
beaten. 

The necessity under which Frederick always laboured 
of having to deal swiftly with whatever work he had in 
hand, in order that he might hurry off to the protection 
of some other part of his dominions and repair the mis- 
chief which was almost certain to have occurred in his 
absence, compelled him to hazard an immediate battle, 
notwithstanding the strength of the. enemy's position and 

„ , , their g-reat superiority in numbers. Accord- 

Frederick ,. , . r 

resolves to dmgly at noon on August 12, after a long 

^ ^" and toilsome march circling round the Rus- 

sian encampment to reach their most vulnerable point, 
the king led his troops to the attack. 

The attack was at first brilliantly successful. By three 

o'clock the Russian left was routed ; several thousand 

prisoners and 70 g-uns were taken. The 

Battle of K. . , , , , , , . 

Kunersdorf, Prussian generals then besought the kmg 
ugust 12. ^^ ^^^^ content with the advantage he had 
gained. The day was intensely hot; his soldiers had 
been on foot for twelve hours, and were suffering severely 
from thirst and exhaustion ; moreover, if the Russians 
were let alone, they would probably go off quietly in the 
night, as they had done after Zorndorf. Unhappily 
Frederick refused to take counsel. He wanted to de- 
stroy the Russian army, not merely to defeat it ; he had 
seized the Frankfort bridge, and cut off its retreat. So 
confident was he of victory that he despatched a courier 



1 759 Frederick! s Despair, 159 

to Berlin announcing it. His obstinacy cost him dear. 
The Russians, supported by six Austrian infantry regi- 
ments, made a desperate stand on the Spitzberg hill, 
and kept bringing up fresh troops against the jaded 
Prussian battalions. The cavalry was ordered up, but 
Seidhtz, who had saved the day at Zorndorf, was disabled 
by a wound. The king exerted himself to the utmost, 
and exposed his person with unusual recklessness. Two 
horses were shot under him, and a third was hit just as 
he was about to mount. His clothes were riddled, and 
a gold case he carried in his pocket was crushed by a 
bullet. 

By five o'clock the attack was completely beaten off. 
The Prussians were in full retreat when Laudon swept 
down upon them with eighteen fresh squad- 
rons. The retreat became a rout more dis- Rout of the 

Jr'russians. 

orderly than in any battle of the war except 
Rossbach. The king, stupefied with his disaster, could 
hardly be induced to quit the field, and was heard to 
mutter, '* Is there then no cursed bullet that can reach 
me ?" 

The defeat was overwhelming. Had it been properly 
followed up, it must have put an end to the war, and 
Kunersdorf would have ranked among the 
decisive battles of the world. Berhn lay o^J^P^^efeaf 
open to the enemy ; the royal family fled to 
Magdeburg. For the first (and last) time in his life 
Frederick gave way utterly to despair. *' I 
have no resources left," he wrote to the Frederick's 

' despair. 

minister Finckenstein the evening after the 
battle, "and to tell the truth, I hold all for lost. I shall 
not survive the ruin of my country. Farewell for ever." 
The same night he resigned the command of the army 
to General Finck. 18,500 of his soldiers were killed, 



i6o Kiinersdorf and Maxen, ^759 

wounded, or prisoners, and the rest were so scattered 
that no more than 3,000 remained under his command. 
All the artillery was lost, and most of his best generals 
were killed or wounded. The next day he drew up in- 
structions for Finck, pointing out some slight prospect 
of defeating Laudon, should he advance alone on Ber- 
lin ; then after declaring his brother Henry generalissi- 
mo, and directing that the army should swear allegiance 
to his nephew, he concludes thus : " This is the only 
advice I am in a condition to give in these unfortunate 
circumstances. Had I any resources left, I should have 
remained at my post." It is clear that the king contem- 
plated making use of his phiaV of poison. The enemy 
had only to give him the finishing stroke, he afterwards 
said. 

By degrees, however, the prospect brightened. The 

fugitives kept coming in, and the enemy neglected to 

give the finishing stroke. Frederick shook 

Prussian aflfairs off his despair and resumed the command 

mend. ^ 

of his army. Artillery was ordered up from 
Berlin, and the troops serving against the Swedes were 
recalled from Pomerania. Within a week of Kuners- 
dorf he was at the head of 33,000 men, and in a posi- 
tion to send relief to Dresden, which was besieged by an 
Austrian and Imperialist army. The relief, as it hap- 
pened, arrived just too late. On the morrow of Kuners- 
dorf, Frederick had written to Schmettau, the com- 
mandant, bidding him make terms, and Schmettau, 

without waiting to see whether the king's 

Surrender of ^ . n i, i ^\^ 

Dresden, affairs were really as hopeless as they seem- 

September4. ^^ ^^ ^x'eX, entered precipitately into a capit- 
ulation, and surrendered the city when help was actually 
close at hand. 

The rapidity with which Frederick recovered from his 



1759 '^^^ Russia?ts go Home, 1 6 1 

defeat is most surprising, but that he should have been 
allowed time for recovery is more surprising still. It has 
been surmised, with much probability, that Soltikoff had 
no wish to push him too hard. As the life 
of the Czarina drew to a close, the party of the a^us-^ ° 
Peter and his consort Catharine (afterwards Rusi^ails^ 
the celebrated Empress Catharine II.) grew after Kun- 
daily stronger in St. Petersburg, and their surmised 
policy was directly opposed to that of Eliza- Soitikoff. 
beth. But, however this may be, whether 
Soltikoff was or was not a traitor to his mistress, the 
supineness of Daun, who with the main Austrian army 
lay inactive a few marches off, furnished Soltikoff with 
an excellent excuse for doing nothing. The loss of the 
Russians in the battle was hardly less severe than that 
of the Prussians, though Laudon's Austrians had suffered 
comparatively little. No rejoinder was possible when 
Soltikoff angrily complained that he had done enough in 
gaining two battles, which had cost Russia 27,000 men, 
and that before doing anything more, he expected the 
Austrians to win two victories also. Daun's inactivity 
after Kunersdorf (and before it too) was in- 
excusable, and showed plainly that, skilful Supineness 

ir J ^ of Daun. 

as he was in the Fabian tactics of defensive 
warfare, he was wholly incapable of a vigorous initiative. 
Had Laudon held the chief command, the result would 
certainly have been different. 

After a delay which gave the Prussians time to recruit 
their strength, operations were resumed. Upon the fall 
of Dresden, Soltikoff consented to march into Silesia 
and act in concert with the Austrian com- ^, „ 

. The Rus- 

mander-m-chief. Still nothing was done. sians go 
Daun's indecision afforded great scope to the ^^^' 

superior strategy of Frederick and Prince Henry. 



i62 Kunersdorf and Maxen, 1759 

IrTesently Daun moved into Saxony, and the Russians, 
after demonstrations against Glogau and Breslau, re- 
tired into Poland, leaving Laudon to find his way home 
as best he might, by a circuit of 300 miles round Prussian 
Silesia. • 

Maria Theresa, always slow to withdraw her confi- 
dence when once she had given it, as was seen in the 
case of Prince Charles of Lorraine, strove to 
Indignation conccal her mortification at this miserable 

m Vienna. 

fiasco, but the popular indignation in Vienna 
rose to intensity, and vented itself in squibs and lam- 
poons on Daun's dilatoriness. The Countess Daun re- 
ceived a parcel to be forwarded to her husband, and 
found on opening it that it contained a nightcap. 

With the departure of the Russians the campaign 
would probably have ended, had not Frederick's desire 
to close it with a victory led him into a fresh disaster, 
hardly less serious and far more disgraceful than that of 
Kunersdorf. Daun, with the main Austrian 
p^n^e^"^ army, was in Saxony. Dresden was his, but 
Henry in the adroit manceuvrcs of Prince Hen^y, and 

axony. especially a wonderful march of fifty-eight 

miles in fifty hours, had prevented his gaining the whole 
electorate. Winter was coming on, and the Austrians 
were already beginning to retire towards Bohemia for 
winter-quarters, when Dresden, the sole material result 
of their campaign, would have fallen again into the 
hands of the Prussians. 

At this juncture Frederick appeared in his brother's 

camp, just recovered from a bad attack of gout, elated 

with his success in getting rid of the Rus- 

Novem- sians, and panting for fresh action. With 

the view of hastening the retreat of the 

Austrians, and of driving them, if possible, into the diffi- 



1759 Capitulation of Max en. 163 

cult Pirna country, he ordered General Finck to take post 
with his corps at Maxen, to bar their direct ^. , 

Finck takes 

line of communications with Bohemia. The post at 
movement was effected against the advice 
of Prince Henry, and Finck himself, an excellent officer 
whom Frederick had likened to Turenne, remonstrated 
against its riskiness, till Frederick cut him short with 
"You know I can't stand making of difficulties ; contrive 
to get it done.** 

The manoeuvre nearly succeeded. Daun, struck with 
alarm, was on the point of hurrying off homewards, 
when General Lacy showed him how to catch the Prus- 
sians in their own trap. When he perceived his oppor- 
tunity, his dispositions were made with his wonted skill. 
Leaving a portion of his army to hold the camp of 
Dresden against Frederick, he surrounded Finck with 
overwhelming numbers, and compelled his 
whole corps to lay down their arms. 12,000 of^Sl^^n^^^ 
Prussian soldiers, with 9 generals, and over Novem- 
500 officers, thus became prisoners ot war. ^^^* 
Finck saw what was impending, and should have retreated 
while there was yet time, but he preferred to risk his army 
rather than incur the king's displeasure by disobeying 
his orders. Finck behaved like a fool, but the king 
himself was mainly responsible for the catastrophe, not 
so much because of his obstinate refusal to take advice, 
but because his habitual severity in cases of failure para- 
lyzed the wits of his officers, and made them court 
disaster by literal obedience to his orders, rather than 
take the responsibility of acting against them even when 
placed in circumstances which the king could not have 
foreseen. 

The capitulation of Maxen was no less destructive of 
Frederick's plans than galling to his pride. The Aus- 



164 The War in Western Germany, 1757-8 

trians now retained Dresden, a place of great stra- 
tegical importance, though the king, in the 
hope of dislodging them, exposed the wrecks 

of his army to the ruinous hardships of a winter cam- 
paign in weather of unusual severity, and 

January, borrowed 1 2,ooo men of Ferdinand of Bruns- 

1700. 

wick to cover his flank while so engaged. 
The new year had commenced before he allowed his 
harassed troops to go into winter-quarters. 

The downfall of Prussia seemed impending. The 
king's constitution was almost broken down with disease 
and accumulated calamities. Great discontent prevailed 
in his army, and even Prince Henry openly accused him 
of being the cause of all their misfortunes. Unquestion- 
ably he had made great mistakes, but no less certain is 
it that his dauntless demeanour had saved the state after 
Kunersdorf, and that it was nothing but his iron resolu- 
tion that upheld it still. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE WAR IN WESTERN GERMANY. 

That Ferdinand of Brunswick should have been able to 
send 12,000 men to the assistance of Frederick, though 
not a fact of much importance in itself, is nevertheless 
significant as marking the change which had taken place 
since the days of Kloster-Seven, when the French had 
overrun all North Germany, and were threatening the 
^, . central provinces of the Prussian monarchv. 

The services ^ -r^,. i-iiiiii' 

of Ferdinand For two ycars past Ferdmand had held them 
steadily in check, and after Rossbach Fred- 
erick never met them on the field of battle. But for this 



1 75 3 Ferdinand Re-crosses the Rhine, 165 

relief he must have succumbed ; his enemies were almost 
too strong for him as it was. 

Ferdinand had proved himself worthy of the trust re- 
posed in him when he was chosen to command the allied 
army on the eve of Rossbach. After taking part in that 
battle he repaired to Stade, where he assumed the com- 
mand of some 32,000 Hanoverians, Hessians, and Bruns- 
wickers, and though the season was already far ad- 
vanced, forced the French to retire behind the Aller 
before going into winter quarters. In the Ferdinand 
following February he again took the field, ^"^^-^ the 

. French across 

drove them m confusion across the Rhme, the Rhine; 
and on June 23, defeated them at Crefeld on Crefeid,^j^ne 
its right bank. Want of discipline and the ^3, 1758. 
inefficiency of its commanders had reduced the great 
French army to a disorderly mob ; Richelieu had been 
superseded, but his successor, the Count of Clermont, a 
prince of blood, was equally destitute of military capacity. 
After Crefeld, Clermont also was recalled, and replaced 
by a more capable commander in the person of the Mar- 
quis de Contades. At the same time reinforcements 
were sent to the army, and Soubise created a diversion 
in Hesse with 25,000 troops, which had been intended to 
act as auxiharies to the Austrians in Bohe- ^ ^. 

Ferdinand re- 

mia. Ferdinand found himself under the crosses the 
necessity of recrossing the Rhine and re- 
tiring into Westphalia. 

At this moment 8,500 English troops arrived from 
England to reinforce Ferdinand's army. Had they ar- 
rived a little sooner he need not have re- 
passed the Rhine. Had they been more Engiishaux- 

^ '' , ilianes join 

numerous he might have carried the war Ferdinand. 
into the enemy's country, but it can hardly 
be doubted that Pitt exercised a wise discretion in limit- 

M 



1 66 The War in Western Germany. 175^ 

ing himself to a less ambitious part in the Continental 
war. It was enough to defend Hanover and draw off 
thither the strength of France, while England struck a 
decisive blow at her colonies and commerce. 

Before the close of the year new life was infused into 

the French Government by the appointment 

ChoiseiJ Min- ^f ^^ j)^].^ ^f Choiscul, the French ambas- 

ister of Foreign * 

Affairs in sador at Vienna, to the ministry of foreig-n 

France. . y t> 

affairs in the place of the well-meaning and 
sagacious but altogether characterless Abbe de Bernis. 

The Government of'^France had for some time been 

falling more and more into a condition of anarchy. 

, . , After the death of Cardinal Fleury in 1743, 

Anarchy m the ... 

French Gov- the kmg, then close upon thirty-three years 

ernment, and r j i • • ^ i.* r 

weakness of of age, announced his intention ot governing 
the king. ^^ kingdom himself, as his great-grand- 

father, Louis XIV., had done before him. But Louis 
XV. had not inherited his ancestor's energy and strength 
of will. He possessed good abilities, but was too indolent 
to use them, more anxious to conceal his ignorance than 
to acquire information, quick of perception but without 
the persistence and determination needful to make his 
will prevail, timid, irresolute and enervated by the sensu- 
ality of his life. No united action was to be expected 
from a government where the heads of the great depart- 
ments were independent of each other, and often at 
variance, and when the sovereign, to whom they were 
nominally responsible, was too weak to control them, 
and reduced to intriguing against them in secret, satisfied 
if he could prevent any one of them from becoming too 
powerful. The chief power in the realm was engrossed 
by Madame de Pompadour, who, though for some years 
she had ceased to be the king's mistress, retained her 
influence over the bored and listless monarch by her 



1758 ChoiseuL 167 

skill in amusing him and ministering to his pleasures. 
The favourite made and unmade ministers, appointed 
generals to the army, and discussed with the latter the 
plans of their campaigns. 

In this medley of conflicting authorities, Choiseul 
made his weight felt from the first. Proud, resolute, and 
daring, he quickly gained an ascendency . 

over the other ministers, and while stooping obtains the 
to secure hi'sTposition by complaisance to ^^^^'^ ^"^^' 
the.favourite, he knew how to use her influence to secure 
his own ends. For the first time since the death of 
Fleury there was a Prime Minister in France. 

Choiseul's accession to office was signalized by a 
great outburst of energy. The treaties with Austria 
were remodelled on terms more favourable 
to France, especially in the matter of subsi- energetic 
dies. Ships and troops were collected for ^^"^' 
an invasion of the British Isles, while more than 100,000 
men were employed in Germany under Contades and 
the Duke of Broghe, the best generals that France pos- 
sessed. The colonies, indeed, were neglected, but Choi- 
seul proposed to win them back in Hanover and in Eng- 
land itself. Choiseul came too late into power. Pitt's 
eloquence had created in England a spirit that carried all 
before it, and the year 1759 ^^^ ^^^ of the most fatal in the 
annals pf France, as it was one of the most glorious in 
those of England. The great invasion scheme collapsed 
utterly, and in every quarter of the globe the English 
triumphed. 

In Germany the advantage was at first all 
on the side of the French. Soubise got pos- ^^^ ^Yx^^- 

session of the free city of Frankfort by means ^°''^' January 

2, 1759. 
of a stratagem, securing thereby a most ad- 
vantageous base for operations on the Lower Rhine, 



1 68 The War in Western Germany. 1758 

and Ferdinand, while attempting to recover it, was 

beaten by Broglie at Bergen. Contades then advanced 

into Hesse, and pressed forward on Hano- 

Battle of . . . ^ . . ^ .. ^ ,. 

Bergen. vcr in Conjunction with Brogue. Ferdinand, 

^" ^^' disheartened by his defeat, shrank from 

offering battle, frittered away his resources by trying to 
cover too much, and had to fall back on the Weser. On 
_, ^ , July 9 the French surprised Minden. A 

The French , . ^ ^J^ 

take Min- second occupalion of Hanover seemed im- 
minent. The archives were sent to Stade, 
and Frederick expected to see the French once more 
before the gates of Halberstadt. 

At this point Ferdinand made a stand. Nothing but 
a battle could save Hanover, and by some remarkably 
skilful manoeuvres he induced Contades to deliver one 
on very disadvantageous terms. Towards the end of 
July the bulk of the French army was encamped close to 
Minden. Contades, with the main body, 
fhe'armie''/ l^y on the left bank of the Weser, with a 
*"^^^/t ^^^ chain of wooded hills in his rear, and with 

end of July. 

his front covered partly by a morass, partly 
by the Bastau, a little stream falling into the Weser at 
Minden. A large detachment under Broglie was on the 
right bank of the Weser, and the Due de Brissac with 
8,000 men occupied the passes in the rear of Contades, 
and guarded the line of communications with Hesse- 
Cassel. The whole army was about 64,000 strong. The 
allies lay a little to the northward, numbering 54,000, of 
whom 10,000 were English, and nearly 2,000 Prussian. 
The English were commanded by Lord George Sack- 
ville, with the Marquis of Granby as his second. 

On July 23, Mlinster was taken by the French, but 
Contades was desirous of avoiding a battle until he had 
got Lippstadt too, and so secured his communications 



1^59 Battle of Minden, 169 

with Westphalia. Ferdinand's object was to draw him 
from his strong position and make him fight 
at once, and this he accomphshed in a very ^J^jfyJ-pg^^Jf.^" 
masterly manner. Thou!?h on the point of nand to make 

• . -u 1, j^i. u ij Contades fight. 

engagmg a superior enemy, he had the bola- 
ness to weaken himself by detaching 10,000 men, whom 
he placed under the command of his nephew the Heredi- 
tary Prince of Brunswick, and sent round to Gohfeld, in 
the rear of the French, on the line of their communica- 
tions with Cassel. At the same time he pushed forward 
his left wing under General Wangenheim, in such a 
manner that it seemed entirely unsupported by the rest 
of the army. It was, in fact, separated from it by a gap 
of three miles, and the manoeuvre would have been a 
very dangerous one in the presence of an enemy of 
Frederick's rapidity, but Ferdinand judged rightly in 
venturing it against Contades. Indeed, through all the 
movements preceding the battle, and in his dispositions 
for the battle itself, Ferdinand showed that he possessed 
one of the highest qualities of generalship — the power of 
reading the character of an adversary, and judging what 
he is likely to do in any given circumstances. 

Contades acted exactly as Ferdinand expected. Fright- 
ened by the appearance of the Hereditary Prince in his 
rear, and tempted by the prospect of taking 
advantage of what seemed a great blunder Contades re- 
on the part of his adversary, he made up 
his mind to fight. Broglie was recalled from across the 
Weser ; nineteen bridges were thrown across the Bastau, 
and on the night of July 31 the French army came 
forth on to the plain before Minden. 

The nature of the ground, which was rough and bushy 
on the flanks, and smooth between, induced Contades to 
commit a serious error in the disposition of his forces. 



170 



The War in Western Germany, 



1759 




BATTLE OF MINDEN 



August I, 1759. 

a a, French Army behind Minden, July 31. 

b b, Broglie's detachment. 

c c, The AUied Army, July 31. 

d d, Wangenheim. 

<?, The Due de Brissac. 

fj The Hereditary Prince. 

^^, French Army in battle order, August i. 

h h^ AUied Army about to attack, August i. 

iy Cavalry under Sackville. 



1 7 S 9 Battle of Minden . 171 

He placed his infantry in the wings and his cavalry in 
the centre, cutting the line of infantry in two. 
In front of the wings were stationed two of\he"°'^ 
batteries of twenty-four and thirty guns, ^^^"c^- 
respectively ; this was another error, for the cavalry and 
artillery impeded each other's action. Contades' left 
wing was protected by the morass and stream which 
had previously covered its front, and on his extrem.e 
right, resting on the Weser, a separate corps was sta- 
tioned under the command of Broglie. Broglie was to 
commence the battle by attacking the seemingly unpro- 
tected corps under Wangenheim ; and when Wangen- 
heim had been driven in, the whole French army was to 
throw itself on Ferdinand's exposed left flank. 

For the success of this plan it was necessary that Fer- 
dinand should sit still and let himself be attacked. Fer- 
dinand, however, intended to do nothing of the kind. 
Foreseeing Contades' movements, he had made his ar- 
rangements with great precision the day 
before, and at three in the morning of Au- nlnden, 

gust I, as soon as the French were known A^ugust i. 

to be stirring, he set his columns in motion. Thus when 
Broglie began the attack at five o'clock, he not only 
found Wangenheim stronger than he expected, but to 
his surprise saw the whole allied army marching up. 
Half an hour later it was in position, and the gap be- 
tween Ferdinand's left and the corps of Wangenheim, 
into which Contades meant to thrust himself, was filled 
up. 

The brunt of the battle was borne by six English in- 
fantry regiments and three Hanoverian battalions in the 
right centre of the allied army, which found themselves 
opposed to the French cavalry, an immense mass of 
sixty-three squadrons (7,560 sabres), and got engaged by 



172 The War in Western Germany, 1759 

a mistake before the rest of the army was in line. While 
the columns were deploying, an order came down from 
Ferdinand that when the troops advanced it should be 
with drums beating. General Sporcken, who com- 
manded the right centre, fancying that he was ordered 
to advance at once with drums beating, set off straight- 
way with what regiments were formed, leaving the rest 
to follow as best they could. With the ut- 
aUies^^ceive ^ niost Steadfastness these troops advanced 
Recharge of across the plain over an interval of 1,500 
cavalry, and paccs, with the French batteries playing on 

rout them. -i - n i it a ^ - r 

their flanks, delivered their nre at ten paces 
distance, then received the charge of eleven squadrons, 
and beat them off. The second line charged with as 
little success. Then the Carabineers and Gendarmerie 
of the reserve, eighteen squadrons of the choicest troops 
of France, swept down with tremendous fury on the 
unyielding battalions. The first line was broken through 
in several places, but the second received them with so 
hot a fire that they also had to retire. 

Then was the opportunity for the cavalry of the allies 
to dash in and complete the ruin. The French centre 
was in confusion ; their left even yet was not completely 
formed. The charge of a few squadrons must have 
routed them utterly, and, hemmed in as they were, be- 
tween the Weser and the morass, with the Bastau and 
the hills in their rear, very few indeed could have 

escaped. But cavalry was not forthcoming-. 

Sackville ^ i, . i r x- t i 

refuses to On Ferdinand s right were fourteen English 

with"he and 10 Hanoverian squadrons (3,331 sabres), 

cavalry. under Lord George Sackville, but though 

aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp was sent to him, Sack- 
ville could not be induced to advance. At length, Fer- 
dinand, in despair, sent orders to Lord Granby, who 



1759 Victory of the A Hies, 173 

commanded the second line ; but Sackville hindered 
him, and the opportunity passed away. 

Reheved from immediate danger, the French recovered 
themselves somewhat, but after a tough 
struggle they were obliged to give way all are'^bcaten, 
alon^ the line. By ten o'clock they were in P"^ n?^^?^ 

^ -^ J intoMinden. 

full retreat, but the retreat was covered by 
Broglie, the grenadiers of France behaving splendidly, 
and the army of Contades got back into Minden, beaten 
but not annihilated, as it might have been if Sackville 
had obeyed orders. 

The victory would not have been decisive, and the 
French might perhaps have 'returned to their old camp 
behind the Bastau but for Ferdinand's precaution in 
sending his nephew to their rear. While the battle was 
going on before Minden, the Hereditary 
Prince defeated the Due de Brissac and the nSJdi- 
occupied the passes in the hills. At the ^^7 ^/Vi^f 

^ ^ and ct Gilsen. 

same time, General Gilsen with a small de- 
tachment from Liibbecke defeated the Due d' Havre, 
who guarded the interval between the hills and the 
morass. The old camp thus became untenable, and re- 
treat by the left bank of the Weser was cut off. 

The night after the battle Contades withdrew his army 
across the Weser ; the next day Minden was surrendered, 
and the French commenced a hasty and 
disorderly retreat upon Hesse-Cassel. They ^e^ French 
had lost 7,086 killed, wounded and prisoners, 
besides forty-three guns, seventeen flags and standards, 
and the greater part of their baggage. The loss of the 
alhes was 2,762, of which a full half fell on the English, 
and chiefly on the six regiments whose steadfastness had 
won the day. These regiments were the 12th, 20th, 23d, 
25th, 37th, and 51st of the line, and they bear *' Minden" 
on their colours now. 



174 ^^^ War in Western Germany, i7S9 

Great indignation was felt throughout the army at the 
cowardice of Lord George Sackville, by whose disobe- 
dience to reiterated orders the victory was 
s^'^k^r^^^ first jeopardized and ultimately shorn of its 
completeness ; and on the day after the 
battle general orders were issued by Ferdinand in which 
a severe though indirect censure was passed on his con- 
duct. Sackville then wrote home for leave to resign his 
command, and on his arrival in England demanded a 
court martial. When the court met in the following 
February, the fact of his disobedience and of his reluc- 
tance to go into action were clearly established by the 
evidence of several of the aides-de-camp who had 
brought the orders and of other witnesses ; but the most 
damaging testimony of all was that of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sloper, who deposed that he had said to Ligonier (one of 
the aides-de-camp), " For God's sake repeat your orders 
that that man may not pretend he does not understand 
them, for it is now over half an hour since we received 
orders to march, and yet we are still here. For you see, 
sir, the condition he is in." Sloper's testimony was con- 
firmed by Ligonier, who admitted that he had seen the 
confusion of Lord George Sackville to which Sloper 
alluded. Sackville conducted his defence in person with 
great ability and spirit, making the most of a slight dis- 
crepancy between the orders of two of the aides-de- 
camp. The facts of the case were, however, too strong 
for him, and he was pronounced guilty of disobedience 
and •' unfit to serve His Majesty in any military capacity 
whatever." 



1757 Canada. 175 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE CONQUEST OF CANADA, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF 
THE FRENCH NAVAL POWER. 

§ I. Prelimmary Operations, 

In the great continental war of which we have traced 
the course through four campaigns, down to the point at 
which Frederick seemed on the point of succumbing to 
his enemies, the Enghsh have very little part. Their 
energies were employed more profitably in a series of 
enterprizes, which laid the foundations of the present 
maritime greatness of England and of her vast colonial 
empire. The first quarter to which Pitt directed his at- 
tention was North America. During his 
previous administration, he had formed the French as- 

\ cendency m 

idea of conquering Canada, but his tenure America in 
of office was too short to admit of its realiza- ^^^^' 
tion, and things went from bad to worse, until by the 
close of 1757 the French had pretty well made good 
their lofty claim to the entire basins of the Ohio and St. 
Lawrence. Everywhere our colonies were hemmed in 
by a chain of French forts ; everywhere they lay ex- 
posed to incursions from the Indian allies of France. 

Various causes had combined to give the preponder- 
ance to the French, although our colonists outnumbered 
them in the proportion of fifteen to one, and 
far surpassed them in wealth. If the French Reasons 

^ . for It. 

m Canada were few in numbers, they were 
all collected under one authority; while the English 
were divided amongst thirteen colonies, each with its 
own administration, and with scarcely any bond of 
union, except a common jealousy of interference by the 



176 Canada, 1757-8 

home government, which was not altogether unmerited. 
At the same time the French, being less engaged in 
trade, and possessing less realized wealth, were of a 
more martial disposition, and they were far more suc- 
cessful in attaching the natives to their side. Their ad- 
venturous spirit, and their open-hearted genial tempera- 
ment, attracted and harmonized with the simple nature 
of the red-skins, who were repelled by the cold haughti- 
ness and mercantile greed of the English. 

To these influences must be added the incapacity of 
the English generals, and the genius of the French com- 
mander-in-chief, the Marquis of Montcalm, 

Montcalm, c ^^ j j ^i 

a man of restless energy and dauntless 
courage, idolized by his soldiers, and possessed in a re- 
markable degree of the tact indispensable for managing 
the Indians. 

Early in 1758 large reinforcements were sent to Amer- 
ica, and the Earl of Loudoun, the English commander, 
was recalled. General Abercrombie, who then became 
senior officer in America, was, unfortunately as it proved, 
allowed to remain, but Pitt, with a wise discretion, en- 
trusted his principal expedition to younger men, selected 
especially for the purpose, with as little regard to the 
claims of birth and patronage as to those of seniority. 
_ . The chief effort was directed against Louis- 

Preparations ° 

for an attack burg, the bcst harbour the French had on 
the American coast, the seat of their lucra- 
tive cod-fishery, and in every respect a position of great 
importance. Situated on the island of Cape 
oms urg. Breton, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, it 
commanded in a measure the only channel through which 
the French in Europe could communicate with their 
American possessions. 

The reduction of this stronghold was successfully ac- 



1759- Quebec. 177 

complished by General Amherst, but Montcalm, with a 

vastly inferior force, inflicted a severe defeat 

on Abercrombie near Ticondero^a, where Ticonde- 

° roga. 

the French had built a strong fort on the 
narrow neck of land between Lakes George and Cham- 
plain which commanded the route to Montreal, the 
second city of Canada. Among the minor incidents of 
the campaign may be mentioned the taking of Fort Du- 
quesne, the name of which was altered to Pittsburg. 

§ 2. Quebec, 

In the following year, the war in America was prose- 
cuted with equal vigour and greater success. Amherst, 
appointed commander-in-chief in place of 

Abercrombie, was directed to renew the at- ^\-^r^^ for 

1759. 
tack on Ticonderoga, and then, if possible, 

to advance on Quebec, and co-operate with a second 
force approaching the city by the river St. Lawrence, 
while a body of provincials and friendly Indians created 
a diversion by besieging Fort Niagara. The command 
of the second and most hazardous of these enterprises 
was allotted to General Wolfe, on whom the brilliancy 
of its execution, as well as the melancholy but glorious 
circumstances attending its close, have conferred a re- 
nown that will last as long as the English nation endures. 
Wolfe was only thirty-three years old, but most of 
those years had been spent in the service of his country. 
Born in 1726, he had entered the army 
when barely fourteen, and had served 
through the Austrian Succession War with such credit 
as to become lieutenant-colonel at twenty-two. During 
the ensuing peace he devoted himself with much assi- 
duity to the study of his profession, and to perfecting his 
regiment in drill and discipline. When war broke out, 



178 Quebec. 1759- 

he was again employed on active service, and his gal- 
lantry on the occasion of an abortive expedition against 
Rochfort, in the summer of 1757, attracted the ever 
watchful attention ot Pitt, and recommended him for 
employment under Amherst in America. Possessed of 
every virtue and accomplishment befitting a soldier and 
a gentleman, Wolfe was at the same time altogether 
devoid of physical beauty or grace. A lean ungainly 
figure, red hair, which contrary to the custom of the 
period was unconcealed by powder, and a shy and awk- 
ward demeanour, were however counterbalanced by a 
sweetness and gentleness of disposition, which, com- 
bined with great strength of character, high principles, 
and a chivalrous sense of honour, won the love and es- 
teem of all who knew him. Ill-health, and the hope of 
enjoying for a time the pleasures of domestic life, brought 
him home to England after the taking of Louisburg. He 
was in fact engaged to be married, but as soon as he 
heard of the honourable command which w^as destined 
for him, he cheerfully placed himself at the disposal of his 
country, and the solemnization of his marriage was de- 
ferred, as the event proved, for ever. 

In February, 1759, Wolfe embarked on board the 

fleet of Admiral Saunders, consisting of twenty-two ships 

of the line, and about an equal number of frigates and 

smaller vessels of war, besides transports 

\^/oire sails ^^^ store ships. After touchinof at Louis- 

for Quebec. ^ ° 

burg and Halifax, where reinforcements 
were taken in^ the fleet, with 7,000 troops on board, 
sailed up the broad stream of the St. Lawrence as far as 
the Isle of Orleans, a large and fertile island lying just 
below Quebec. Here the troops disembarked, and 
marching to its western extremity, found themselves 
face to face with the beautiful formidable city 



1759 



Quebec, 



179 




SIEGE OF QUEBEC. 



i8o Quebec. ^^759 

Quebec stands on the left bank of the St. Lawrence, 
more than 300 miles from its mouth, on and below a 

rocky promontory formed by the overflow- 
i^ue ec. .^^ ^^ ^^ river St. Charles. Where it flows 

past the city the St. Lawrence is about a mile in breadth, 
but below it rapidly expands, and between the Isle of 
Orleans and the ocean it is nowhere less than fifteen 
miles across. Behind the city are the famous heights of 
Abraham, a continuation of the ridge on which it is 
built, extending for a considerable distance on the stream. 
Twenty mxiles above Quebec Montcalm had stationed 
2,000 men to take in the rear any force approaching it 

on that side, thouerh this dane^er seemed ex- 

Montcalm's ' ^ ... 

disposition cluded by the rugged and precipitous cliffs, 
which must first be surmounted. With the 
remainder of his forces, some 10,000, of whom about 
half were regulars, Montcalm occupied a strong en- 
trenched camp below the city, between the St. Charles 
and Montmorenci Rivers, with the St. Lawrence and its 
sandbanks in front, and an impenetrable forest in his 
rear. A bridge of boats across the St. Charles secured 
his communications with Quebec. It v/as on this side 
that Quebec was thought to be most assailable, but even 
here great obstacles were presented to a besieging army 
by the two broad and rapid rivers, and by the roughness 
of the ground, which, though less precipitous than the 
heights of Abraham, was still very broken and inter- 
sected by deep ravines, besides being strengthened arti- 
ficially at every weak point. 

Wolfe's first care on arriving before Quebec was to 

fortify the west point of the Isle of Orleans, 

Oueb^ec^^"^^^ as a dcpot for stores, and to occupy and erect 

batteries on Point Levy, on the right bank 

of the St. Lawrence, whence a cannonade was opened 



1 759 Desponde7icy of Wolfe, i8i 

upon the city. He then transported his troops across 
the river, and landing below the inlet of the Montmo- 
renci, encamped opposite the enemy. Every stratagem 
was employed to entice the French general from his 
strong position, but Montcalm, though superior in num- 
bers, wisely remained on the defensive. At ^ ^ 

' ^ Ineffectual 

length Wolfe, feeling that the season was attack, 
slipping away without anything being ac- ^^ ^ ^^' 
complished, led his men to the attack, and was repulsed 
with heavy loss. The attack had not been well devised, 
but in any case the obstacles were almost insurmounta- 
ble; it was a serious error to operate by the Montmo- 
renci at all. The English began to lose heart, and 
Wolfe's health, always very delicate, gave way com- 
pletely under the shock. Mortification at the failure, 
and melancholy brooding over the helplessness of the 
situation, brought on a violent fever, and for some weeks 
he lay in a critical condition, during which operations 
were almost suspended. 

As soon as he was partially recovered, Wolfe called 
his principal officers to council, and it was decided to 
renew the attack above Quebec. Small 

^ . . . . Resolves to 

hopes of success were entertained; but it operate above 
was deemed advisable to keep the enemy ^^^ ^^' 
in play, to prevent his detaching fresh troops against 
Amherst, who might be in difficulties, as no communi- 
cation had been received from him, though Wolfe had 
heard from French prisoners of his having taken Ticon- 
deroga and Crown Point. 

Before setting out on his forlorn hope, Wolfe despatched 
a letter to Pitt detailing the progress of the 
siege, couched in the gloomiest tones, and Wolfe's 

concluding with the words : " Happy if our 
efforts here can contribute to the success of His Majesty's 

N 



l82 Quebec. 1759 

arms in any other parts of America.** In a subsequent 
letter to Lord Holdernesse, the last he ever wrote, he 
says : " My constitution is entirely ruined, without the 
consolation of having done any considerable service to 
the state, or without any prospect of it." Three days after 
the first of these letters reached England, an express ar- 
rived announcing that Quebec was taken and Wolfe slain. 
When all was in readiness, the whole available Eng- 
lish force, numbering no more than 3,600 effectives, was 
transported, under the escort of Admiral Holmes's 
squadron, to a point some miles above Quebec, on the 
right bank of the St. Lawrence, where a 
Preparations fl^^^ ^f i^oats was Collected to bear them to 

for the attack. 

the assault. Montcalm detached M. de Bou- 
gainville, with 2,000 men, to watch their movements ; but 
being lured too far up the river by a feint of the admiral's, 
he was out of reach when the decisive moment arrived. 
At one in the morning of September 13, Wolfe em- 
barked on the boats with half his men — all that could 
be taken in a single journey — and, under cover of the 
darkness, steered for a small creek a mile and a half 
above Quebec, known since as Wolfe's cove. As the 
boats dropped silently down the stream on the ebb tide, 

Wolfe, in a low voice, repeated to the offi- 
*^Ek^ „ cers in his boat Gray's "Ele^y in a Country 

Churchyard," and when he had finished 
said, *'Now, gentlemen, I had rather be the author of 
that poem than take Quebec." 

On gaining the shore the troops found themselves at 
the base of a steep and thickly wooded cliff or bank, 

some 250 feet high, up which a winding 
Lfinding of path, SO narrow in places that only two men 

the troops. r » r j ^ 

could go abreast, led to a redoubt with four 
guns, held by a French captain and 150 men. In the 



1759 Battle on the Heights of Abraham, 183 

hurry and darkness the path was difficult to find, and 
the soldiers began scrambling up the face of the cliff as 
best they could, dragging themselves up by stumps and 
boughs of trees, and the light infantry under Colonel 
Howe had nearly gained the summit before the rustling 
of the branches betrayed their approach to the defenders 
of the redoubt. Had these been even moderately vigi- 
lant, they ought to have been able to keep back a host ; 
but the suddenness and strangeness of the attempt filled 
them wdth terror, and, after firing a single volley, they 
took to flight. The remainder of the troops were then 
disembarked, and by daybreak Wolfe had assembled 
his whole force on the heights of Abraham, about three 
quarters of a mile from Quebec. 

Montcalm had, in the meantime, been kept entirely 
in the dark as to Wolfe's intentions by the skilful ma- 
noeuvres of Admiral Saunders, who, as previously ar- 
ranged, had made a feint against the French camp at 
Beauport. All through the night a severe 
cannonade was kept up by the ships, while ^^^"^ against 
the splashing of oars was heard in various 
quarters, especially about the mouth of the Montmo- 
renci, where Wolfe had made his first attack, on July 
30, and Montcalm was in constant expectation of an at- 
tempt to storm his lines, till a horseman from Quebec 
galloped into his camp at daybreak and announced the 
landing of the English. 

Then the French commander hurried across the St. 
Charles and prepared to give battle to the daring inva- 
der. How many men he had with him it is 
impossible to say. He seems to have been ^o^^^f^f^" °^ 
superior to the English in numbers, but 
many of his troops were only Canadian militia. His 
wisdom in fighting at once is very much open to ques- 



184 Quebec. 1759 

tion — had he waited a day Bougainville with his 2,000 
would have been in — but there is no doubt that his dis- 
positions for the battle were worthy of his reputation. 

Advancing under cover of a cloud of skirmishers, the 
French came down upon the English left, drove it in, 
and forced Wolfe to wheel back three bat- 
fh ^French talions cH poteuce to avoid being outflanked. 
Montcalm then massed his troops on his 
own left, and fell with great impetuosity on the English 
right, which was composed chiefly of irregulars. Here 
also the advanced pickets were driven back in confusion, 
and a feeling of discouragement spread through the 
English ranks, till Wolfe restored confidence by riding 
in front of the line and assuring the men that the light 
infantry had retired in obedience to his instructions. 
He then ordered them to reserve their fire till the ene- 
my was within forty yards. His orders were obeyed to 
the letter. The French came on, keeping up an irregular 
fire as they advanced, but our men remained steady, 
shouldering their muskets as if on parade, till the enemy 
was close up, and then a volley was deli- 
P w^!f vered along the whole line. Its effect was 

marvellous. When the smoke cleared 
away huge gaps were seen in the French ranks. The 
enemy began to waver, and Wolfe pressed forward to 
improve his advantage. As he cheered his men to the 
charge a musket ball struck him in the wrist, but, 
wrapping a handkerchief round the wound, he conti- 
nued to advance at the head of the grenadiers, who 
charged the enemy at the point of the bayonet. Pre- 
sently he was hit again in the groin, but, 
Mfe"^'^ °^ regardless of the pain he suffered, he still 
remained on the field, animating his men 
ind giving orders with perfect coolness, till a third ball 
pierced his heart, and he fell to the ground. 



1759 Death of Wolfe and Montcalm, 185 

By this time the French were everywhere in retreat, 
and the victory was as good as won. Wolfe was carried 
dying to the rear, where he lay supported 
by the grenadier who had borne him from Se^Fren^h 
the field, listening to the sounds of the bat- 
tle, as it rolled away towards Quebec, and, till his eye- 
sight began to fail, occasionally raising his head to gaze 
on the spectacle. Suddenly an officer who stood by ex- 
claimed, "See how they run!" "Who run?" asked 
Wolfe, eagerly raising himself on his elbow. ** The 
enemy," replied the officer ; " they give way in all direc- 
tions. '^ " Run, one of you, to Colonel Burton,'' said 
Wolfe, " and tell him to march Webb's re- 
giment down to Charles River with all speed, wotfe °^ 
so as to secure the bridge and cut off the re- 
treat of the fugitives." Then, after a pause, " Now God 
be praised," he added, " I shall die happy," and, falling 
back, he turned on his side and expired. 

Montcalm was slain too. He was mortally wounded 
in the action, and died the morning after. On hearing 
from the surgeon, who attended to his 
wounds, that he had only a few hours to Momcalm 
live, he said, " So much the better ; I shall 
not live to see the English in Quebec.'' 

Five days after the battle Quebec capitulated. The 
garrison obtained honourable terms, with the stipulation, 
that they should be conveyed to the nearest 

rapitulation of 

port or France. The greater part of the Quebec, Sep- 
beaten army had, however, escaped into the ^"^ ^^ ^ • 
interior, and succeeded in making their way to Mont- 
real. 

The rejoicings in England, when the news arrived, 
were heightened by the dismal forebodings which had 
been called forth by Wolfe's gloomy letter received 



1 8 6 Quibtron, ^ 7 5 7 

only three days before. In the words of Horace Wal- 

pole : ^* The incidents of dramatic fiction 

Feeling in could not be conductcd with more address to 

England. 

lead an audience from despondency to sud- 
den exaltation, than accident prepared to excite the pas- 
sions of a whole people. They despaired— they triumphed 
— and they wept — for Wolfe had fallen in the hour of vic- 
tory ! Joy, grief, curiosity, astonishment, were pictured 
in every countenance ; the more they enquired, the 
higher their admiration rose. Not an incident but was 
heroic and affecting ! " 

\ 3. Quiberon, 
The taking of Quebec was the most striking event of 
the wonderful year 1759, ^^^ ^^ ^'^'^ ^^^7 ^^^ ^^ ^ long 
tale of English victories. Early in the year the French 
had begun to make preparations for an invasion of the 
^, J . British Isles on a laree scale. Flat-bottomed 

Threatened in- ° 

vasionof the boats Were built at Havre and other places 
along the coasts of Normandy and Brittany, 
and large fleets were collected at Brest and Toulon, be- 
sides a small squadron at Dunkirk. A considerable 
force was assembled at Vannes in the south of Brittany, 
under the command of the Due d'Aiguillon, which was 
to be convoyed to the Irish coasts by the combined fleets 
of Brest and Toulon, while the flat-bottomed boats trans- 
ported a second army across the channel under cover of 
a dark night. The Dunkirk squadron, under Admiral 
Thurot, a celebrated privateer, was to create a diversion 
by attacking some part of the Scotch coast. 

The design was bold and well contrived, 
of^sSccess!^ and would not improbably have succeeded 
three or even two years before, but the op- 
portunity was gone. England was no longer in "that 
enervate state in which 20,000 men from France could 



1759 ^^^^ Brest Fleet puts to Sea. 187 

shake her." Had a landing been effected, the regular 
troops in the country, with the support of the newly- 
created militia, would probably have been equal to the 
emergency, but a more effectual bulwark was found in 
the fleet, which watched the whole French coast, ready 
to engage the enemy as soon as he ventured out of his 
ports. 

The first attempt to break through the cordon was 
made by M. de la Clue from Toulon. The English 
Mediterranean fleet, under Admiral Boscawen, cruising 
before that port, was compelled early in July to retire to 
Gibraltar to take in water and provisions and to refit 
some of the ships. Hereupon M. de la Clue put to sea, 
and hugging the African coast, passed the straits without 
molestation. Boscawen, however, though his ships were 
not yet refitted, at once gave chase, and came up with 
the enemy off the coast of Portugal, where an engage- 
ment took place, in which three French ships were taken 
and two driven on shore and burnt. The ^ ^ ^ , , 

. ^ ,. Defeat of de la 

remamder took refuge m Cadiz, where they Clue oflf Lagos, 
were blockaded till the winter, when, the ^^^^^ 
English fleet being driven off the coast by a storm, they 
managed to get back to Toulon. 

The discomfiture of the Brest fleet under M. de Con- 
flans was even more complete. On November 9 Ad- 
miral Sir Edward Hawke, who had block- 
aded Brest all the summer and autumn, ^^ pmfto 
was driven from his post by a violent gale, f^^^ Novem- 
and on tlie 14th, Conflans put to sea with 
twenty-one sail of the line, and four frigates. On the 
same day, Hawke, with twenty-two sail of the line, 
stood out from Torbay, where he had taken shelter, and 
made sail for Quiberon Bay, judging that Conflans would 
steer thither to liberate a fleet of transports which were 



1 88 Quiberon, y ^^ 

blocked up in the river Morbihan, by a small squad- 
ron of frigates under Commodore Duff. On 
Sie'^^En'^iish ^^ morning of the 20th, he sighted the 
French fleet chasing Duff in Quiberon Bay. 
Conflans, when he discerned the English, recalled his 
chasing ships and prepared for action, but on their 
nearer approach changed his mind, and ran for shelter 
among the shoals and rocks of the coast. 

The sea was running mountains high and the coast 
was very dangerous and little known to the English, who 
had no pilots, but Hawke, whom no peril 
chases the could daunt, ncvcr hesitated a moment, but 
QulbdroiT crowdcd all sail after them. Without regard 

^^^* to lines of battle, every ship was directed to 

make the best of her way towards the enemy, the 
admiral telling his officers he was for the old way of 
fighting, to make downright wo.rk with them. In con- 
sequence many of the English ships never got into 
action at all, but the short winter day was wearing away 
and all haste was needed if the enemy were not 'to 
escape. 

At 2 p. M. the French fleet, still retiring shorewards, 
began firing on the leading English ships, the Warspite 
74 and the Dorsetshire 70, and by half-past 
Battle of |-^Q ^^ Revenge 64, Magnanime 74, Tor- 

Bay, No- bay 74, Montague 60, Resolution 74, Swift- 

sure 70, and Defiance 60, had also come 
into action. A tremendous cannonading then com- 
menced, and as long as daylight lasted the battle raged 
with great fury, so near the coast that ** 10,000 persons 
on the shore were the sad spectators of the white flag's 
disgrace." 

Hawke himself, on the Royal George of 100 guns and 
880 men, did not get into action till near 4 o'clock. 



1 759 Victory of the English. 189 

When he came up the Formidable hauled down her 
colours to him ; she had been subdued by the Resolu- 
tion, but the French vice-admiral was on board of her, 
and he made it a point of honour to strike to the English 
admiral. The Royal George then held on 
her course, passing through the French ^^^^ Royal 
ships without returning their fire, and going 
straight for the great Soleil Royal of 80 guns and 1,200 
men, on which M. de Conflans hoisted his flag. The 
Soleil Royal was in the midst of the shoals, and the 
master of the Royal George pointed out to Hawke the 
danger he ran in following her. Hawke replied, ** You 
have done your duty in this remonstrance ; you are now 
to obey my orders and lay me alongside of the French 
admiral." After exchanging a few broadsides the Soleil 
Royal sheered off, but other French ships closed round 
the English admiral, and the Royal George was at one 
time engaged with seven ships at once, but the firing was 
so wild that only thirty or forty shots hit her, while she 
sank the French Superb. 

By nightfall two French ships, the Thesee 74, and the 
Superb 70, were sunk, and two, the Formidable 80, and 
the Heros 74, had struck. The Soleil Royal 
afterwards went aground, but her crew es- X^^^SP" ^^^^ 
caped, as did that of the Heros, whose cap- 
tain dishonourably ran her ashore in the night. Of the 
remainder, seven ships of the line and four frigates threw 
their guns overboard, and escaped up the River Vilaine, 
where most of them bumped their bottoms out in the 
shallow water ; the rest got away and took shelter in the 
Charente, all but one, which was wrecked, but very few 
ever got out again. With two hours more of daylight, 
Hawke thought he could have taken or destroyed all, as 
he was almost up with the French van when night over- 



1 90 The Capitulation of Montreal 1759 

took him. Two English ships, the Essex 64, and the 
Resolution 74, went ashore in the night and could not 
be got off, but the crews were saved, and the victory was 
won with the loss of only 40 killed and 200 wounded. 
The great invasion scheme was completely wrecked. 
Thurot had succeeded in getting out from Dunkirk, and 
for some months was a terror to the northern coast-towns, 
but early in the following year an end was put to his 
career. For the rest of the war the French never ven- 
tured to meet the English in battle on the high seas, and 
could only look on helplessly while their 
Results of colonies and commerce fell into the hands 

the victory. 

of their rivals. From the day of the fight 
in Qdib^ron Bay the naval and commercial supremacy 
of England was assured. 

§ 4. The Capitulation of Montreal, 

Wolfe's victory and the destruction of the French 
fleets made the ultimate conquest of Canada a matter 
of certainty, but it was not accomplished until after a 
gallant attempt to plant the standard of France once 
more on the walls of Quebec. After the surrender of the 
city the^ English fleet had sailed away, leaving General 
Murray with 7,000 men to hold it till the 
Oiiebec^" melting of the ice in the spring should 

enable a fresh armament to enter the St. 
Lawrence. Under the impression that they would be 
useless in the winter, no ships were left — a mistake which 
nearly proved serious, owing to the circumstance that 
the upper waters of the St. Lawrence are open for 
navigation long before the Gulf is freed from ice. 

The French after all their losses could still send into 
the field 5,000 regular troops, besides 5,000 militia and a 
few hundred Indians, a mere handful compared with the 



1760 Defeat of the English, 191 

force with which Amherst would surround them in the 
summer, but enough to make a dash at Quebec with 
some prospect of success before the Enghsh commander- 
in-chief could take the field. Accordingly, 
as soon as the frost had given sufficiently make a dash 
to open a passage in the middle of the stream ^^ Quebec. 
for the store-ships and two frigates with them to descend 
the river, the Chevalier de Levis, though 
the snow was still knee-deep on the ground, ^p^^^ ^7, 
set out from Montreal with his whole force. 
On April 26 he arrived before Quebec. Scurvy had 
carried off 1,000 of the garrison, and disabled a much 
larger number, so that Murray had hardly more than 
3,000 effectives. Common prudence would have coun- 
selled his remaining within the walls of Quebec, but pru- 
dence was mastered by ambition. Eager to finish the 
war at one stroke before reinforcements could arrive to 
share the glory, Murray marched out, delivered battle on 
the heights of Abraham, and was defeated 
with the loss of 1,000 men, and most of his ihe ^English, 
field artillery. The loss of the French is ^^"^ ^^' 
variously stated, but the English computed it at 2,000. 

The next day De Levis opened trenches against 
Quebec. All now turned on the arrival of succours. 
Had a French fleet appeared first in the St. 
Lawrence, Quebec would probablv have Quebec 

^ - •' besieged. 

fallen, but such a contingency was rendered 
unlikely by the victories of Hawke and Boscawen. The 
siege was soon over ; on May 9, an English frigate 
anchored in the basin, bringing news that a squadron 
was in the river. On the 15th, a ship e- • a 

•^ ' ^ Siege raised 

of the line and another frigate arrived, and by English 
the next m.orning the two frigates attacked ^ ^^^' 
and destroyed the French ships. De Levis saw at once 



192 The Capitulation of Montreal, 1760 

that his enterprise was hopeless, and, judging from the 
boldness of the English frigates, that they were the van- 
guard of a large reinforcement close at hand, he aban- 
doned the siege with precipitation, and retired, leaving 
behind all his artillery and a great part of his ammuni- 
tion and baggage. 

De Levis's march on Quebec was the last scene in the 
defence of Canada, a defence which had been conducted 
under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, inferiority of 
numbers, neglect of the home government, and a dearth 

of supplies amounting almost to famine, but 
Heroism of maintained to the last with a gallantry and 

devotion worthy of the best days of France. 
Nothing now remained for Amherst but to draw the toils 
^ . , . round his prey. In the face of overwhelm- 

Capitulation . , , , _ , , -, . i 

of Montreal, mg odds, the Frcuch surrendered without 
eptem er . striking a blow, and by the capitulation of 
Montreal, the whole of Canada was yielded up to the 
Enghsh. 

Louisiana alone now remained to France of all her 
vast American possessions. After six years of warfare, 
a definite answer had been given to the question — one of 
the greatest of all that were involved in the Seven Years' 

war — the question whether North America 
Se^war°^ was to be English or French. Perhaps the 

result was inevitable in any case, and was 
only hastened by Pitt's energy and Wolfe's heroism. It 
may be that the greater vitality of the English colonies, 
and their immense superiority in population and wealth, 
would have assured, sooner or later, the absorption of 
their weaker neighbour ; but if the absorption had been 
delayed, even for a generation, the development of 
America might have run in different channels. As it 
was, the conquest of Canada soon bore fruit that was 



1760 Bidia, 193 

little looked for by the conquerors. Within sixteen years 
of the capitulation of Montreal, the celebrated Declara- 
tion of Independence was signed by the thirteen old 
English colonies. 

Montcalm foretold it, if a curiously interesting letter, 
purporting to have been written by him three weeks be- 
fore his death, may be accepted as genuine. 
In this letter he dwells on the independent predicdon.^ 
spirit of the English colonists, and their im- 
patience under restraint, and after observing that 
nothing but their fear of falling under the power of 
France had prevented their throwing off the yoke of the 
mother country long before, predicts that they would 
throw it off within ten years of the conquest of Canada. 
His prediction was almost literally fulfilled, but it is a 
significant fact, and one which Montcalm perhaps did 
not foresee, that all through the struggle for indepen- 
dence, even when France was fighting on the side of the 
revolted colonies, the French Canadians remained, as 
they have remained ever since, unswerving in loyalty to 
their new mistress. 



CHAPTER XIIL 

INDIA. 

\ 1 . DuJ)leix, 

The history of the French in India bears a certain re- 
semblance to the history of their countrymen in North 
America. Of all the European powers who made a seri- 
ous attempt to secure a share of the trade with the East 
Indies, the French were the last in the field, and their 
earliest efforts, restricted by the jealousy of rivals al- 



194 Dupleix, iTS"^- 

ready in possession, and languidly supported by the 

Lome government, were rewarded with scanty success. 

Nevertheless, as in North America, the tact 

The French a.nd skill displayed by the governors of 

in India. ..... , 

their settlements m mgratiatmg themselves 
with the native powers, built up for them a position, in 
some respects far stronger than was enjoyed by their 
commercial rivals, and one which enabled them to take 
advantage of the political situation which arose after the 
break-up of the Mogul Empire in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. 

Aurungzebe, the great Emperor who extended Mogul 
rule over almost the whole of what we call India, died in 
1707, and his successors inherited nothing of his courage 
and capacity. They have been compared not inaptly 
^ , ^ with the successors of Charlemagne. Their 

Dedine of ^ ^ 

the Mogul empire was already crumbling to pieces, 
P°^^^* when the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia 

dealt it a fatal blow (1739). ^^^ viceroys of the great 
provinces threw off their allegiance to the Court of Delhi, 
and the Mahrattas, Sikhs, and Pathans, warlike races 
which had never been really subdued, asserted their in- 
dependence once more. 

In the anarchy which set in from end to end of the 
Peninsula the French settlements throve apace. M. 

Dumas, the governor of Pondichery, min- 
Gov^rnor of ^^^ SO dextcrously in the quarrels of the 
Pondichery, native princes, that, though frequently on 

the losing side, he greatly enlarged his pos- 
sessions, without exciting any suspicions of aggressive- 
ness, and raised the French prestige to a height hitherto 
undreamt of. There can be no doubt, that at this period 
the French were in native eyes by far the most consider- 
able of the European powers that had effected a lodg- 



-174^ La Bourdonnais, 195 

ment on the Indian coasts. The English of Bombay, 
Madras, and Calcutta might drive a m.ore lucrative trade, 
but it was known through all southern India, that the go- 
vernor of Pondichery had successfully defied the dreaded 
Mahrattas, when they swept over the plains of the Car- 
natic, and that the walls of the French city 
had afforded a refugee to the widow of the S^^^??^PP^ 

° Pondichery, 

Nabob, after her husband had been defeated 
and slain. The fame of Dumas reached the Court of 
Delhi, and the Mogul conferred on him the title of 
Nabob, with the command of 4,500 horsemen, honours 
which at the request of the governor, who was then on the 
point of leaving India, were transferred to his successor. 

That successor was Joseph Francois Dupleix, one of 
the most illustrious statesmen of his day, distinguished 
among the many distinguished Europeans 
who have ruled in India. He it was who ^p eix. 

first conceived the magnificent idea of building up an 
European Empire on the ruins of the Mogul, and who 
with the idea perceived also the means of carrying it 
into execution, foreshadowing the policy which has since 
been ours. The son of a director of the French East 
India Company, Dupleix entered its service in 1720, and 
had given proof of remarkable capacity in subordinate 
positions when his appointment to the governorship of 
Pondichery, the chief of the French settlements in In- 
dia, opened out a wider field for the exercise of his genius. 

Dupleix had not long been installed in his governor- 
ship when it became evident that war was imminent be- 
tween England and France, owing to the two nations 
having taken different sides in the war of the Austrian 
succession, an untoward contingency, for, strong as 
Pondichery was against a native enemy, Dupleix knew 
that it was incapable of coping with an European 



196 Dupleix. 1 7 46- 

armament. In direct opposition to the orders of the Di- 
rectors, who enjoined retrenchment and a 
War imimnent suspension of expenditure on fortifications, 

bet^^een Eng- ^ ^ ' 

land and he commcnccd erecting a rampart along the 

undefended sea side of the town/but, though 
workmen laboured at it day and night, the rampart was 
still unfinished, when nev/s arrived that war had been 
declared, and that an English squadron was on its way 
to the Indian seas. Dupleix sought to arrange a treaty 
of neutrality with the English settlement, but the Gover- 
nor of Madras had the same motive for desiring war 
which the Governor of Pondichery had for avoiding it. 
Dupleix's influence with the natives then 
The Nabob of gtood him in good stead. He induced the 

the Carnntic ^ 

protects the Nabob of the Carnatic to forbid the English 
to attack the French possessions on the 
Coromandel coast. Still, the chance that the English 
would respect the Nabob's prohibition was a frail reed to 
trust to, and it must have been with feelings of great re- 
lief that Dupleix learnt that M. de la Bourdonnais, the 
Governor of the Isles of France (Mauritius) and Bourbon, 
was sailing to his rescue. 

La Bourdonnais, on hearing of the danger of Pondi- 
, _ , chery, had, by strenuous exertions, suc- 

LaBonrdon- -, \ . • • n r - 

nais sails to cccded m cquippmg a fleet of nme vessels, 
ry- consisting mostly of merchantmen pressed 
into the service, and with these he appeared off the Coro- 
mandel coast in July, 1746. The English squadron, 
though inferior in numbers, ought to have been more 
than a match for the ill-equipped French ships, but it 
was commanded by a man of feeble character, and after 
an indecisive engagement the English commodore stood 
out to sea, leaving the way to Pondichery open. 

Madras now lay exposed to attack, and was far less 



-1750 Native Quarrels, 197 

capable of defence than Pondichery. Prompt action on 
the part of La Bourdonnais would probably have resulted 
in the capture of all the English settlements on the 
coast. But, with the removal of danger, unforeseen dif- 
ficulties arose. La Bourdonnais, ardent, and enterprising, 
accustomed to command, and conscious of ^ ^ , 

^ . La Bourdon- 

great abilities and great services, could not nais and 

bring himself to submit to the superior "^ ^'^" 
authority of Dupleix, whom, perhaps, he despised as a 
mere trader. Dissensions broke out between these two 
men, which were fatal to the interests of France. Ma- 
dras was taken, but nothing more. The precious time 
was wasted ; the English were reinforced, and in 1748, 
Pondichery itself was besieged by a very large force, 
under Admiral Boscawen. Its capture appeared inevi- 
table, but the marvellous skill and resolution of Dupleix, 
who, though no soldier, was the soul of the defence, 
averted its fall and restored the waning prestige of the 
French. The Governor of Pondichery was meditating 
fresh schemes of aggrandizement when news of the 
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle reached India, and Madras had 
to be restored to the English. 

Peace was re-established, and the two Companies 
hoped that their agents would settle down quietly into 
commercial pursuits; a vain hope, for the passions 
roused by five years of hostilities could not easily be laid 
aside. Moreover, the peace coming at a time when an 
unusual number of European soldiers were present in 
India, there was a strong temptation to provide for their 
maintenance by hiring them out to the native rulers. 
Both nations plunged deeply into the dy- French and 
nastic quarrels of the neighbouring states, JdSln ^Ta^^ 
the English at first with no decided pur- live quarrels. 
pose, and afterwards only with the fixed idea of opposing 

o 



198 Dupleix. 1750- 

the French ; the French, on the other hand, with a definite 
object steadily kept in view by their far-sighted governor. 
The time was peculiarly favourable for his designs. 
In 1748 died Nizam-ool-Moolk, Subadar or Viceroy of 
^, ^ the Deccan, feudal lord of the Carnatic, and 

The Deccan , r 1 • , 

and the ruler of the vast territory between the Ner- 

budda and Kistna with 35,000,000 inhabi- 
tants, the most powerful of all the viceroys who were 
struggling to become independent of the Court of Delhi. 
On the death of the Subadar, Nazir Jung, one of his 
sons, had seized the government, but his title was dis- 
puted by Mozuffer Jung, a grandson of Nizam-ool-Moolk, 
who had been nominated viceroy by the Mogul. At the 
same time Chunda Sahib, son in-law and relative of a 
former Nabob, laid claim to the throne of the Carnatic, 
which had been conferred by the Subadar on Anwaroo- 
deen, a man in no way related to the old family. 
Dupleix adopted the cause of these pretenders, and sup- 
ported it with such address and energy that by the end 
of 1750 both of them were in possession of the govern- 
ment they aspired to. 

The installation of the Subadar was celebrated with 
great pomp at Pondichery, where, in the presence of the 
nobles of the Deccan, Dupleix was loaded with honours 
by Mozuffer Jung, who treated him with the respect due 
to a superior, and promised to be guided in all things by 
his advice. He would even have conferred on him the 
Nabobship of the Carnatic, but this the wary French- 
man, who aimed at ruhng India by means of her rulers, 
declined with politic generosity in favour of Chunda 
Sahib. The Governor of Pondichery, the 
Su^eix^ setter-up of princes, had become the great- 

est man in Southern India. On the spot 
where his most decisive victory had been gained he 



-I7SO Clive, 199 

set up a pillar recording his triumphs in four languages, 
and round the pillar he caused a city to be built bearing 
the high-sounding name Dupleix-Futteh-abad, the city 
of the victory of Dupleix. This was not done from 
vanity, but from a deep insight into the Indian charac- 
ter ; neither was it from unworthy jealousy that Clive 
afterwards razed to the ground the city and pillar which, 
in native eyes, stood for a symbol of the great French- 
man's power. 

But one circumstance marred the completeness of the 
French triumph, and prevented the consolidation of their 
power. Anwaroodeen had been killed in battle, but his 
son, Mahomed Ali, had escaped, and still held out in 
the fortress of Trichinopoly, recognized by the English 
as Nabob of the Carnatic. As long as this 
claimant remained unsubdued Chunda Sa- "^ ^^°^° ^* 
hib sat insecurely on his throne at Arcot. Still the 
chances of Mahomed Ali appeared very slight. A com- 
bined French and native army invested Trichinopoly, 
and an English force sent to relieve it was defeated, and 
driven to seek refuge within the walls of the fortress. Its 
fall seemed only a question of time, when suddenly the 
tide was turned and the growth of the French power ar- 
rested by a young captain in the service of the English 
East India Company. 

I 2. Clive, 

Robert Qive, the founder of the British Empire in 
India, was born in 1725, the son of a Shrop- 
shire country gentleman. He was a wild S"^cHvY^ 
unmanageable boy, fond of adventure, and 
addicted to fighting, averse from book learning, though 
by no means so ignorant as he is sometimes represented. 
At eighteen he was sent out to India as a writer in the 



200 Clive. 1 75 1- 

service of the Company. His first years there were very 
wretched. He had no friends and Uttle money. He 
hated the sedentary occupation in which he was engaged, 
and pined for home. The chmate affected his health, 
and intensified the fits of melancholy which haunted 
him all his life. One day he attempted to destroy him- 
self, but :he pistol missed fire twice ; then, after satisfy- 
ing himself that it was really loaded, he exclaimed that 
he must surely be reserved for something great. Soon 
after this occurrence he found more congenial employ- 
ment as an ensign in the Company's army. At the siege 
of Pondichery and elsewhere he gained experience of 
active service, and had made himself a name for daring 
courage, when the emergency arose which enabled him 
to step forth at once into the foremost rank of the world's 
great captains. 

Like every one else, Clive saw that unless something 
was done, Trichinopoly would fall, and with it the last 
obstacle to French supremacy; he saw, too, with true 
military instinct, that the only way of saving it was to 
^,. carry the war into the enemy's country. 

Clive propo- '' •' •' 

ses to attack He therefore suggested to Mr. Saunders, 
the Governor of Madras, that a dash should 
be made at Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, a large 
open town with 100,000 inhabitants, defended only by a 
ruinous fort, garrisoned by 1,000 natives. Mr. Saunders 
entered heartily into Clive's plan, and placed him with 
unlimited powers at the head of 200 English troops and 
300 Sepoys With this force there were besides Clive 
only eight officers, of whom six had never been in action, 
and four were members of the mercantile service, who 
had volunteered for the occasion. 

On September 11, 175 1, CHve appeared before the 
gates of Arcot, in the midst of a thunderstorm of extra- 



-1 75 1 Clive Refuses to Surrender. 201 



ordinary violence. The garrison, appalled at the bold- 
ness of men who seemed to set the elements at defiance, 
had already evacuated the fort. Clive en- 
tered it without opposition, and set to work Arcot.^^^^^ 
to repair its defences in preparation for the 
siege, which he knew he would have to stand. He ex- 
pected that Chunda Sahib would straightway raise the 
siege of Trichinopoly and march against him with his 
whole force. From this folly Chunda Sahib was re- 
strained by the counsels of Dupleix ; but he insisted on 
detaching some of his best troops for the recovery of his 
capital. 

On October 4, the citadel of Arcot was invested by 
10,000 natives and 100 Frenchmen, under the command 
of Rajah Sahib, son of the Nabob. The siege was 
pressed vigorously, and the fort seemed wholly incapa- 
ble of a prolonged resistance ; but all calculations were 
set at nought by the spirit of enthusiasm and confidence 
with which the little garrison had been in- 
spired by its leader. Clive's biographer has ofArco?^^^ 
recorded a touching story of the devotion 
of his native followers. When provisions had become 
so scarce that there was a fear lest hunger might com- 
pel them to surrender, the Sepoys proposed to Clive that 
he should limit them to the water (or gruel) in which tke 
rice was boiled. ** It is sufficient for our support," they 
said ; "the Europeans require the grain.** 

On the 37th day of the siepfe, a practicable breach 
having been effected, Rajah Sahib sent to Clive a pro- 
posal to surrender, offering honourable terms to the gar- 
rison, and a large sum of money to himself, 
accompanied by a threat to storm the fort ^^^^^ refvises 

^ J to surrender. 

and put the garrison to the sword if his terms 

were refused. The garrison was reduced to 120 Europe- 



202 Clive. 1751- 

ans and 200 Sepoys, but Clive rejected the terms with 
scorn. A fortnight elapsed before Rajah Sahib could 
resolve to execute his threat. Probably he would even 
then have preferred to let famine do his work, but his 
movements were quickened by the approach of another 
enemy. 6,000 Mahrattas, under Morari Rao, were 
hovenng in the neighbourhood, watching the course of 
events, nominally in alliance with Mahomed Ali, but 
not caring to commit themselves while his cause looked 
hopeless. TJie heroic defence of Arcot ended their 
hesitation. 

Rajah Sahib now made preparations to storm the 
fort, and at daybreak, on the morning of November 25, 
his soldiers advanced to the attack. The day was well 
chosen ; it was one of those set apart for the commemo- 
ration of the death of Hosein, days peculiarly sacred to 
Mussulmans, who believe that all who die on them in 
battle against unbelievers go straight to the highest 
Paradise. Wild with religious enthusiasm, and stimu- 
lated by the intoxicating bang of which they eat plenti- 
fully during the festival, the Mussulman soldiery rushed 
upon the fort, driving before them elephants 
iitticks ^ ' with plates of iron on their foreheads, to 
^'"''°^ ' batter down the gates. Clive received them 

with a well-sustained fire of musketry. The elephants, 
galled by the musket-balls, turned and trampled on the 
multitudes behind, and, after three desperate assaults, 
the troops of Rajah Sahib retired, having 
and is re- \^^x. AGO men in an hour. In the ensuing 

pulsed. ^ 

night they raised the siege. 

Clive pressed his advantage with vigour. Reinforced 

by Europeans and Sepoys from Madras, and joined by 

some of Morari Rao's horsemen, he gave chase to the 

enemy and inflicted on them two defeats ; then repaired 



-1 75 1 Success of the English, 203 

to Fort St. David to concert measures for the relief of 
Trichinopoly. While thus engaged he was deprived 
of the chief command by the arrival from England of 
Major Lawrence, an officer of great Indian experience. 
It was feared that the hero of Arcot might not consent 
to serve in a subordinate position, but Clive, 
ereatly to his credit, cheerfully placed him- f ^^^^ ^^^ 

<^ J J ^ L,awrence. 

self under the orders of Major Lawrence, 
while Lawrence, on his part, without any feelings of 
jealousy, warmly acknowledged, and fully availed him- 
self of the genius of the young captain. 

Lawrence and Clive carried everything before them. 
Dupleix's right-hand man, M. de Bussy, the only man 
who might have given them trouble, was far away in the 
Deccan, maintaining French influence at the Court of 
the Subadar. The French were defeated 
under the walls of Trichinopoly, and took ^u"^?.^^^,?^, 

^ •' the English, 

refuge in the island of Seringham, where 
they eventually capitulated. Chunda Sahib surrendered 
to the Tanjorean allies of Mahomed Ali, by whom he 
was put to death. 

Dupleix still struggled bravely on. He spent his own 
fortune freely, and raised fresh levies ; he set up another 
Nabob in the French interest, and by intrigues with the 
native allies of Mahomed AH detached the Mahrattas 
and Mysoreans from his side. The English, however, 
steadily gained ground. Chve's health broke down, 
and necessitated his leaving India ; but the discipline he 
had impressed on his soldiery, and the spirit he had 
kindled, survived his departure. Dupleix saw the neces- 
sity of peace. In the Carnatic the game was played 
out, but his supremacy was unshaken in the far more 
important Deccan. Peace would afford opportunities 
for the exercise of his masterly diplomatic talents, and 



204 Clive in Be7tgaL ""1756 

men like Clive and Lawrence would not always be at 
hand to frustrate his schemes. What he might have 
done no one can say, for he never had the opportunity 
of showing. In the midst of the negotiations there came 
out from France an order for his recall, and with it his 
successor, M. Godeheu, a miserable crea- 
Recaii of ture, whosc sole euidins: ideas were hatred 

Dupleix. * ° ^ 

of Dupleix and his policy, and peace at any 
price with the English. The French Directors were in- 
capable of entering into Dupleix's magnificent plans ; 
they looked for dividends, not for empire. The pro- 
traction of the war alarmed them, and they were simple 
enough to give ear to the complaints of the English 
Company, who represented Dupleix as the sole obstacle 
to tranquillity. So the order was sent forth which re- 
called him home with his great work uncompleted, and 
that order sounded, though no one knew it, the knell of 
French rule in India. 

§ 3. Clive in Bengal. 
Dupleix had not long left India when Clive returned 
to it as Governor of Fort St. David, and with a commis- 
sion as lieutenant-colonel in the English 
?TV^*"*^"* army. His arrival was most opportune. 
Two or three months after he landed at Fort 
St. David, appalling news were received from Bengal. 
The Nabob Surajah Dowlah, a feeble-minded but fero- 
cious boy, had besieged and taken Calcutta, and its cap- 
ture had been followed by a frightful atrocity. All the 
European inhabitants who had not made their escape 
before the place surrendered, 146 in number, were con- 
fined on an unusually sultry night in a dun- 
Hole June geon called the Black Hole, a room eighteen 
19, 1756. fgg^ square, which communicated with the 

air only by two small windows barred with iron and ob- 



-1756 Capture of Chandernagore, 205 

structed by a verandah. The sufferings of the prisoners 
are too horrible for description. Only twenty-three sur- 
vived the night, and these came forth in the morning 
*' the ghastliest forms that were ever seen alive." 

When news of the catastrophe reached Madras, an 
expedition was about to be sent into the Deccan for the 
purpose of expelling the French, whose au- 
thority with the subadar had been shaken ^^"^^ ^^'^f 

•' to Bengal. 

by the timid policy of Dupleix's successors. 
The expedition was of course abandoned, and the troops 
intended to serve on it were placed under the command 
of Clive and despatched to Bengal with a small squadron 
under Admiral Watson, which happened to be lying off 
the coast. 

Early in 1757 Calcutta was recovered, and the native 
town of Hooghly stormed and sacked. This act of defi- 
ance enraged the Nabob, who had retired 
to his capital, Moorshedabad, not imagining recovered. 
that the English would dare to invade his ^^.^^^ , 

° ^ defeated 

dominions. Collecting an army of 40,000 February 4, 
men, Surajah Dowlah marched on Calcutta, 
where he was attacked and defeated by Clive. He now 
became as frightened as he had been arrogant before, 
and was ready to promise anything ; while Clive, hav- 
ing learnt that England and France were at war, and 
fearing lest the French should join the Nabob, as they 
would probably have done had Dupleix been at Pondi- 
chery, deemed it advisable to grant him 
peace in order to gain time to attack the charider° 
French settlement of Chandernagore on the ^live^decides 

HoOSrhlv. to remain in 

^, , r ■,-. /. . Bengal. 

■ Chandernagore fell after a stout resist- 
ance, and Clive was able to prosecute his designs with- 
out fear of interruption from a rival such as had foiled 



2o6 Clive in Bengal. lys^-^ 

Dupl(3ix in the Carnatic. His instructions required him 
to return to Madras in April, but he knew that, if he re- 
tired with his troops, Surajah Dowlah would never ob- 
serve the treaty. Small reliance had been placed on his 
promises at the first, and it had since been discovered that 
he had been imploring Bussy to march from the Deccan 
to his relief. Clive boldly decided to remain in Bengal 
until he had crushed the Nabob. 

Fortune played into his hands. The caprice and 

cruelty of Surajah Dowlah had disgusted even his own 

subjects, and a conspiracy was formed to 

Conspiracy \ - -, tk\ 

j^gainst the dethrone him, with Meer Jarfier, the com- 
joined by the mandcr of the forces, at its head. Meer 
English. Jaffier besought the aid of the EngHsh, and 

after some hesitation the committee which managed 
the affairs of the settlement accepted his proposals. 

When the plot was nearly ripe, Clive learned that one 
of the conspirators was likely to play the traitor. His 
negotiations had been carried on through Mr. Watts, the 
English agent at Moorshedabad, and Mr. Watts had 
employed the services of Omichund, a wealthy Bengalee 
merchant, who had long resided at Calcutta, and had 
suffered severe losses in consequence of its capture by 
the Nabob. Omichund had been promised compensa- 
tion, but mere compensation would not 

OmThund.''^ s^^^sfy ^'^ g^^^^- He demanded 300.000/. 
besides, and threatened to reveal the plot to 
Surajah Dowlah if his terms were not granted ; he further 
required that an article touching his claims should be 
inserted in the treaty between Meer Jaffier and the Eng- 
lish. Clive then stooped to an act of dupli- 
diplfcity. ^^^y which has left a dark stain on his repu- 

tation. He caused two treaties to be drawn 
up, one on white paper, the other on red. The white 



-1757 Council of War, 20 7 

treaty was the real one, and Omichund's name was not 
mentioned in it. The red treaty, which was to be shown 
to Omichund, contained a stipulation in his favour. 
Clive and the committee signed both treaties, but Admi- 
ral Watson refused to put his name to the fictitious one. 
Clive knew that its absence would arouse Omichund's 
suspicions, and he forged Admiral Watson's signature. 
Clive now threw off the mask, wrote a defiant letter to 
Surajah Dowlah reproaching him with his faithlessness, 
and set out for Moorshedabad. The Nabob 
came forth to meet him with his whole army, Chve 

■' ' marches on 

50,000 foot and 18,000 horse, all splendid- Moorsheda- 
ly equipped and accompanied by 50 heavy 
guns, each drawn by 40 or 50 yoke of white oxen, with 
an elephant behind to push and assist it over difficult 
ground. There were also four small field-pieces served 
by 40 Frenchmen in the Nabob's pay. Clive had 3,000 
men, 900 of them Europeans, eight pieces of field artil- 
lery, and two howitzers. The disparity in numbers was 
enormous, and it was then believed that the Bengal troops 
were more formidable than those of the Carnatic. 

For the first time in his life Clive hesitated. A broad 
river lay between him and the enemy, and he knew that 
if he crossed it and was beaten, not a man would return 
to tell the tale. It had been arranged that Meer Jaffier 
should desert and bring his division over, but now that 
the time had come, the conspirator made difficulties 
about fulfilling his engagement. Clive called a council 
of war, and, contrary to usual forms, gave 

^ . . °- . Chve calls a 

his own opinion first. That opinion was in council of 
favour of waiting and summoning the Mah- 
rattas to his aid. Twelve of his officers shared his views, 
seven were for immediate action. After twenty-four 
hours of mature deliberation, or, according to one story, 



2o8 Clive in BengaL ^757 

after an hour of deep meditation in an adjoining grove, 
Clive came over to the opinion of the minority. Long 
afterwards he said that he had only called one council 
of war in his life, and that, if he had taken the opinion 
of that, he would never have conquered Bengal. 

The river was crossed, and after a march of eight 
hours the little army arrived at one in the morning of 
June 23 at the mango grove of Plassey, where the con- 
tinual sound of drums, clarions, and cymbals told them 
that they were within a mile of the Nabob's camp. The 
battle began at 8 o'clock with a cannonade from both 

sides. The heavy guns of the Bengalees 
Battle of were badly served and most of their shots 

June 23, went too high. The English artillery did 

good execution, but several hours passed 
without any advantage being gained. At noon a heavy 
shower wetted a good deal of the enemy's powder, and 
about the same time the most faithful of the Nabob's 
generals was killed. Surajah Dowlah was a miserable 
coward. He had kept all the while in his tent out of 
reach of danger, but he was now over-mastered by ter- 
ror, and when one of the conspirators insidiously recom- 
mended a retreat he readily accepted the advice. Clive 
had made up his mind to keep up the cannonade during 
the day, and attack the Nabob's camp in the night, 
and he had gone to take a few minutes' rest in a hunting- 
house in the grove. Here he heard that the enemy were 
yoking the trains of oxen to the guns. Hurrying to the 
front he ordered an immediate advance. Little resist- 
ance was made except where the forty Frenchmen gal- 
lantly covered the retreat. Meer Jaffier, seeing how the 
day was going, drew off his division, and the Nabob, 
who had suspected him of treachery all along, mounted 
a camel and galloped off at full speeed for Moorsheda- 



1757 C live Defeats the Dutch, 209 

bad. His flight completed the demoralization of his 
troops. They abandoned their artillery and their bag- 
gage and fled in all directions. The loss on each side 
was very slight considering how momentous an issue 
was decided. Of the beaten army about 500 fell, while 
22 killed and 50 wounded was all the loss sustained by 
the English and their sepoys in gaining a victory which 
may rank among the decisive battles of the world. 

For nearly three years after Plassey Clive was the vir- 
tual ruler of Bengal. The terror of his name scattered 
a formidable native confederacy, and his quick resolu- 
tion warded off a more serious danger. Meer Jaffier had 
been made Nabob of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, but he 
was uneasy under the thraldom of the English, and cast 
about for a new protector to deliver him ,, ^ ^ 

^ Meer Jaffier 

from his oppressive friends. The French intrigues 
were no longer a power in Bengal, but the Dutch. 
Dutch held a factory at Chinsurah on the 
Hooghly, while they had a strong force at Java, and in 
days gone by they had been more powerful in the East 
than any other European nation. Meer Jaffier begged 
their help, and it was readily granted by the authorities 
at Batavia. 

The arrival in the Hooghly of seven ships from Java 
with 1,500 troops on board placed Clive in a delicate po- 
sition. Meer Jaffier's intrigues with the Dutch were no 
secret to him, but England was not at war with Hol- 
land. How then could he stop these ships from going 
up to Chinsurah ? He had recently remitted large sums 
of money to Europe by the Dutch Company, but he was 
not a man to be influenced by private considerations 
when the public interest was at stake. He decided to 
prevent the ships from coming up the river. The Dutch 
landed some of their troops and commenced hostilities 



2IO Lally. 1757-61 

by land and by water. Clive ordered them to be at- 
tacked, and every one of their ships were 
Chve defeats captured. The authorities at Chinsurah, 
trembling for their own safety, hastened to 
acknowledge themselves the aggressors, and agreed to 
compensate the English for damage done, and to reim- 
burse their expenses. 

Clive's first administration in Bengal was now drawings 
to a close. His health broke down again, and early in 
1760 he sailed for England. Five years afterwards he 
returned to root up abuses that grew up after his de- 
parture, and to place the government of the three pro- 
vinces more directly under the control of the Company, 
but this portion of his life does not belong to the period 
of the Seven Years' War. It is a curious fact that he 
^, . . , had already foreshadowed the later policy 

Clive's ideas ^ . .^ .. . . ^ .. . -r^. 

on the govern- of the English in India m a letter to Pitt 
memo enga. i^^^^^^ January 7, 1759), ^^ which he sug- 
gested that the Crown should take over absolutely the 
government of the provinces, and indicated the mode in 
which it might be done, and the advantages which would 
result from it. Pitt saw difficulties in the way, and the 
plan was allowed to sleep for 100 years, when Clive's 
policy was embodied in the Queen's proclamation of 
November 5, 1858, assuming the direct government of 
India. 

§ 4. Lally. 

After the fall of Chandernagore the French made no 
attempt to check the victorious career of the English in 
Bengal. It was in the Carnatic, where the struggle for 
empire had originated, that the contest was finally de- 
cided. On the breaking out of war in 1756, the French 
Government announced their intention of making a tre- 
mendous effort to regain their supremacy in the south of 



1758. His Ambitious Schemes. 211 

India, and of sending thither a large force under the 
Comte de Lally, an officer of Irish Jacobite extraction 
and one of the most distinguished soldiers ^^ ^ 

° . The French 

in the service of France. Had this resolve send an expe- 
been promptly translated into action it carnatic 
would have fared ill with the English power ""^^^^ Lally. 
on the Coromandel Coast, for both Madras and Fort St. 
David had been almost denuded of troops to furnish the 
expedition against Bengal. But " to think and act at 
the same time," which, as Lally said, was primarily 
necessary, was not the habit of the government of Louis 
XV. Endless delays retarded the equipping and des- 
patch of the expedition, and Lally never got to Pondi- 
chery till near the end of April, 1758. 

Arrived in India, Lally plunged into his work with 
characteristic energy, and with an impetuosity which, 
though it commanded success for the moment, drew fatal 
results in its train. On the very night of his arrival he 
sent out a detachment to capture the little fort of Cudda- 
lore, and by the time he had been five weeks in India he 
was master of Fort St. David, the second in ^ „ 

111-11 r Lally takes 

importance, and probably the strongest of Fort St. David 
the English settlements on the coast. June 2, 175 . 

Lally was very sanguine of complete success, as is 
shown by his letter to Bussy, whom he recalled from the 
Deccan to assist in the siege of Madras. '' I 
will not conceal from you that, Madras once ^[^ ambitious 

'' ' schemes. 

taken, I am determined to proceed to the 
Ganges either by land or by sea. ... I confine myself 
now to indicate to you my policy in these five words : 
* No Englishman in the Peninsula' ('Plus d' Anglais 
dans la Peninsule * ).'* 

Thus far all had gone well. Lally by sheer energy had 
borne down all obstacles and accomplished half his pro- 



212 Lally, 1758 

gramme ; but he had accomplished it in the teeth of 
growing difficulties, created not by the enemy but by the 
ill-will and indifference of the Pondichery 
dffi^'r authorities and by his own fiery and over- 

bearing temper. He had come out to India 
prepared to find fault. Both the directors of the Company 
and the ministers of the Crown had intimated to him in 
the plainest possible terms that corruption of every kind 
was rampant at Pondichery, and that he was to put an 
end to it. Coming therefore as he did with the belief 
that he had to deal with a nest of robbers, he was not 
likely to put a favourable construction on the acts of the 
Pondichery authorities, and these were of a nature to 
awaken suspicion in the dullest mind. Though the 
governor had known for more than a year that he was 
coming, and though half of his soldiers had arrived 
eight months before him, none of the necessary prepa- 
rations had been made. No transport had been organ- 
ized, no information collected, no resources provided. 
Instead of receiving a zealous support, he met with stolid 
indifference. Lally had an impatient temper and a 
sharp tongue, and vented his indignation in bitter sar- 
casms. No wonder that feelings of mutual distrust and 
hatred sprang up between the commander-in-chief and 
the governor and council. 

Besides all this, Lally knew nothing of India, and his 
ignorance led him into the commission of a fatal blunder 
before he had been many days at Pondichery. To supply 
the want of transport he ordered a conscription of the 
native population without any regard to the distinction 
of castes, and men of all degrees were 
He alienates forced to bear burdens in violation of their 

the natives. 

most sacred feelings. In the same reckless 
spirit, not content with razing the fortifications of Fort 



1753-61 Siege of Madras. 213 

St. David and the dwellings of the English inhabitants, 
he destroyed the native town with a wanton barbarity 
which increased the ahenation of the native population, 
whose co-operation was necessary for any permanent 
success. 

The dissensions of Pondichery saved Madras. Had 
Lally been able to march on it straight after the capture 
of Fort St. David, it must almost certainly _ . 

'' Dissensions 

have fallen. What prevented him from at Pondi- 
doing so was the refusal of D'Ache, the ad- ^ ^^^' 
miral, to convey him there by sea (which indeed would 
have been hazardous with the English fleet on the coast), 
and the inability, real or pretended, of De Leyrit, the 
governor of Pondichery, to find funds to transport his 
troops by land. With a Dupleix at Pondichery, it would 
not have been long before the funds were forthcoming. 
The summer was wasted in a predatory expedition 
against the Rajah of Tanjore, and when Lally at last 
appeared before Madras in December, the English had 
made good use of the respite by collecting provisions 
and calling in their scattered garrisons. 

On January 2, 1759, batteries were opened against 
Fort St. George, and Lally, in spite of disaffection and 
want of money and supplies, conducted the 
siege with great spirit. The opportunity m^?°^ 
had, however, been lost. The English and 
French fleets had both departed because of the danger 
of wintering off the Coromandel Coast ; but, before a 
breach had been made which the French engineers 
would pronounce practicable, the vanguard of the Eng- 
lish squadron returned (February 17, 1759) with rein- 
forcements and stores from Bombay, and Lally had to 
raise the siege. 

For some time after the retreat of the French from 
P 



214 Lally. 1761 

Madras, operations languished. Lally had ill health 
and mutiny to contend with, besides want of money and 
opposition from the civil authorities, and the English 
possessed no commander of more than ordinary capa- 
city till Colonel Eyre Coote arrived from 
yre oo e. England in the autumn with the 84th Regi- 
ment. Coote had seen service in Bengal under Clive, 
and it was he who headed the minority that voted for 
immediate action in the council held on the eve of Plas- 
sey. Early in 1760 a great battle was fought 
Wandewash ^^ Waudcwash, in which the French lost no 
1^60^^^^ *^' ^^^^ ^^*^^ ^^^ Europeans out of 1,500 accord- 
ing to their own computation, or of 2,250 
according to that of the English. Lally was no longer 
able to keep the field. One by one the mi- 
PondkhXyf nor French forts fell, and in September 
January 26, Pondichery itself was closely invested by 
land and sea. On January 26, 1761, it sur- 
rendered at discretion. 

With the surrender of Pondichery French dominion 

in India ended. The city was indeed restored at the 

peace of 1763, but it was restored with its fortifications 

razed, its commerce ruined, and its prestige 

England p;one. Henceforth no European rival dis- 

without a ° . 

rival in putcd with England the supremacy m the 

Peninsula, and the native powers, helpless 
in their isolation, fell one after another under her sway. 
In their struggles against the inevitable doom. French- 
men were often found fighting by their side and striving 
to check the growth of the all-absorbing Power, but it 
was only as auxiliaries that they acted, and after the 
fall of Pondichery, France herself never more appeared 
as a competitor for the splendid empire that once was 
almost hers. 



1 76 1 England in 176 1. 215 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THEFALLOFPITT. 

With the capture of Pondichery the last of the three 
main objects of the war was attained by England. Since 
the battles of Lagos and Quiberon, the position of 
French navy had ceased to be able to keep England in 
the sea ; the subjection of Canada was com- ^^ '* 
pleted by the capitulation of Montreal, and the surrender 
of the famous city in the Carnatic left England without 
a rival in the East. The nation was intoxicated with 
success, and idohzed the minister to whom it was due. 
In the House of Commons Pitt's ascendency was undis- 
puted. Whigs and Tories vied with one another in sup- 
porting him, and for several years there was not a single 
division on a party question. The expenditure grew 
yearly, but the supplies were cheerfully voted, though 
the lavish extravagance appalled the more cautious 
members of the administration. Pitt confessedly knew 
nothing of finance, and as Walpole says, '' he kept aloof 
from all detail, drew magnificent plans, and left others 
to find the magnificent means." He seems even to have 
exulted in the magnitude of the expense. No doubt 
money was wasted, but the magnificent plans could 
hardly have been executed without waste, and, as Pitt 
himself maintained, prompt expenditure is good econo- 
my in war. And the country prospered as it had never 
prospered before. Pitt's conquests opened up markets 
for English commerce all over the world, and the ex- 
ports which as usual declined at the commencement of 
the war recovered with more than the usual rapidity. 
The only dark spot in the brilliant prospect was Prus- 



2i6 The Fall of Flit 1 761 

sia, whose fortunes sank as those of England rose. To- 
wards the end of 1759 the Enghsh Govern- 
ment had joined Frederick in making over- 
tures for peace, but the time had not come yet. Austria 
refused io hear of it, and though France was anxious to 
retire from the war, and make a separate agreement 
with England, Maria Theresa would allow her to do so 
only on condition that England should withdraw her 
support from Frederick. This was impossible, as Pitt, 
with no less politic wisdom than honour, had repeatedly 
declared that he would never abandon his ally. 

Negotiations were therefore dropped till the spring of 
1761, when they were resumed by Choiseul, seconded on 
this occasion by Austria and Russia. The 
proposes English Government sent an envoy to Paris, 

peace. ^^^ ^^iQ French Government sent an envoy 

to London, to discuss a separate arrangement, which, it 
was hoped, might lead to a general pacification ; but 
these negotiations, though protracted through the sum- 
mer, were as fruitless as the last. Pitt had no very 
strong desire for peace, and perhaps showed himself too 
much disposed to press France to the utmost, but the 
real reason of the failure was that Choiseul had two strings 
to his bow. If he could have peace on his own terms, 
well and good ; if not, he had expectations of being able 
to continue the war with a new ally. 

Since the death of Ferdinand VI. of Spain, and the 
_ , - accession of his half-brother, Charles III. 

Death of 

the King of (Charles IV. of Naples, the Don Carlos to 
August 10, whom the kingdom of the Two Sicilies had 
^759- been assigned in 1735), ^^ Courts of Madrid 

and Versailles had been drawing closer together, and on 
August 15, T761, was signed the celebrated Family Com- 
pact, by which the Kings of France and Spain declared 



i 



1 76 1 England a?id Spain, 217 

that each would regard the enemies of the other as his 
own, and guaranteed each other's posses- 
sions in all parts of the world. This guar. Family 

^ ° Compact 

antee was extended to the Bourbon Princes August 15, 
of Naples and Parma (a son and a brother 
of the King of Spain). Subjoined to the compact was a 
very important secret convention, in which the King of 
Spain pledged himself to declare war on England on 
May I, 1762, unless she had concluded peace with France 
by that time, and the King of France promised to restore 
Minorca to Spain as soon as war was declared, and un- 
dertook to conclude no peace until the King of Spain had 
received satisfaction from England with regard to cer- 
tain points that were in dispute. The King of Portugal 
was to be invited to accede to the convention, *' because 
it was not right that he should remain a quiet spectator 
of the war of the two Courts with England, and open 
his ports to the enemy." 

Disputes had arisen between England and Spain on 
several points. Spain complained of the violation of 
her neutrality by English cruisers, claimed the right of 
fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, contested the 
rie^ht of the English to cut logwood in Hon- 

^ ^ ... Matters m 

duras, and demanded the demolition of set- dispute 
tlements they had erected there. All these En^and 
matters were under consideration, except ^""^ ^p^'^- 
the second, which England flatly denied, and in any 
case they were hardly important enough to induce a 
power like Spain, with possessions far larger than the 
means of defending them, to run the risks of a war with 
England at a moment when the latter had become the 
mistress of the seas The proffered restitution of Mi- 
norca, the hope of recovering Gibraltar, sympathy with 
the misfortunes of a near kinsman, and the natural fear 



2i8 The Fall of Pitt, 1761 

lest the aggrandizement of England should prove a per- 
manent danger to his own colonies, must 
Ch^^^r^^iTT undoubtedly have weighed heavily with 
the King of Spain, but it is said that per- 
sonal considerations weighed more heavily still, and that 
he sought war with England in revenge for an insult 
offered to him nearly twenty years before. 

In 1742, Charles, being King of the Two Sicilies, 

joined the coalition against Maria Theresa, whereupon 

an English squadron appeared before Na- 

Commodore pies, and its Commander, Commodore 

Martin. ^ ' ' 

Martin, demanded in peremptory terms 
the withdrawal of the king's troops and his signature to 
a treaty of neutrality. Placing his watch on the table, 
the commodore declared that he would bombard the 
place unless the treaty was signed within an hour. 
Charles had no choice but to comply, but the affront in- 
spired him with a deadly hatred of the English, and it 
is said that that hatred was the cause of the Family 
Compact. 

TRe terms of the treaty were kept studiously secret, 
but the two Courts took no pains to conceal the fact that 
they were acting in concert, and on July 15, a month 
before the Compact was actually signed, the French 

envoy in London presented to the English 
nary de- Government a memorial in which Choiseul 

French ^ demanded that the questions at issue be- 
menr^" tween England and Spain should be settled 

at the same time as the conclusion of the 
treaty between France aad England. Pitt was astounded 
at this extraordinary demand made by a nation with 
which England was at war on behalf of a nation with 
which England was at peace, and instructed the English 
ambassador at Madrid to require the Spanish Govern- 



1 761 Temporizing of Spain. 219 

ment to disavow the action of France, and to give an ex- 
planation of the armaments which were being equipped 
in their harbours. 

The Spanish Government, far from disavowing the 
action of France, avowed and justified it, temporized 
about the armaments, but at the same time 
made professions of friendship which de- Jf^^^^"^^"^ 
ceived the EngHsh ambassador, the fact 
being that, though resolved on war, they wanted to gain 
time to enable their yearly treasure fleet from America 
to reach Cadiz in safety. 

Pitt was not deceived by the protestations, and having 
shortly afterwards received certain information from 
secret sources of the signing of a treaty between France 

and Spain advised that twelve or fourteen ^. 

^ . Pitt pro- 

men-of-war should instantly be sent to poses a de- 
Cadiz, and that our ambassador should be war against 
ordered to demand a sight of the treaty, ^p^^^- 
and to leave Madrid at once if it should be refused. He 
insisted (and subsequent events proved his foresight) 
that war with Spain was inevitable, and that delay would 
only serve to enable her to choose her opportunity. For 
England the war would not be an onerous one. No new 
armaments would be required, and plans were already 
formed for an immediate attack on the Spanish posses- 
sions of Panama, Havana and the Philippine Islands. 
By striking swiftly the American fleet might be seized 
before it could get into Cadiz, and its capture would add 
to the resources of England, while diminishing those of 
the enemy. These wise views failed to meet with the 
approval of the cabinet. Pitt's boldness appeared mad- 
ness to the majority of his colleagues. 

Pitt's influence in his cabinet, which had never been 
so assured as his power over the House of Commons or 



220 The Fall of Pitt, 1761 

his popularity in the country, had waned considerably 
since the death of George II. (October 25, 
Pitt^and 1760). Gcorge had never liked him, and 

had struggled against the necessity of tak- 
ing him as minister, but after once accepting him, and 
especially after he had proved his capacity for conduct- 
ing the war, he had given him staunch support. When 
Pitt took office in 1757, he said to the king, " Give me 
your confidence and I will deserve it." The king re- 
plied, " Deserve my confidence and you shall have it," 
and he kept his word. 

With the accession of George III. a new era in Eng- 
lish politics commenced. George II., though he might 
grumble that '' in this country ministers are king,'' and 
^ ,. . , wonder that the nobles of Eno^land should 

Political ^ 

attitude of clioose to be " footmen of a Duke of New- 
and George castlc when they might be the friends and 
^^^' counsellors of their sovereign," had yet 

never made a serious attempt to shake off the control of 
the great WhiA families to whom the House of Hanover 
owed their crown. George III. came to the throne with 
the full intention of emancipating himself from their in- 
fluence. Pitt was not, properly speaking, a member of 
the Whig aristocracy, but during the last years of George 
II. he had been closely united with its leaders, and by 
reason of his great eminence he was equally obnoxious 
to a king who was determined to be sovereign in reality 
as well as in name. 

The young king started with many points in his favour. 
Contrast be- To the end of his life George II. was a for- 
n.^and^eofge signer ; he never even mastered the Eng- 
i^i- lish language or attempted to conceal his pre- 

ference for his native electorate. With this drawback, 
and with his shy, reserved, ungraceful manners 



1 761 George II. and George III 221 

his avaricious disposition, and his devotion to ugly 
German mistresses, he was little fitted to be an object of 
loyalty to the nation. George III. was young and hand- 
some, agreeable in manners and of dignified deportment, 
truly pious and strictly decorous in his hfe. Above 
all, he was a thorough Englishman. " Born and edu- 
cated in this country," he said in the speech at the open- 
ing of his first Parliament, '' I glory in the name of 
Briton ; and the peculiar happiness of my life will ever 
consist in promoting the welfare of a people whose 
loyalty and warm attachment to me I consider as the 
greatest, and most permanent, security of my power." 
The old Tory families, of whom many at the close of the 
preceding reign were Jacobite at heart, were able without 
too great a shock to transfer their allegiance to the third 
sovereign of the House of Hanover. 

Yet in some respects he was less fitted to make a good 
king than his grandfather. George H., though he hated 
constitutional government, thoroughly understood his 
position and always scrupulously respected the constitu- 
tion, and he possessed a fuller knowledge of foreign 
politics than any of his ministers except Carteret ; George 
HI., moderately intelligent and very well-intentioned, 
was at the same time ignorant, narrow-minded, and in- 
tensely obstinate. His mother, the Princess-Dowager of 
Wales, either with the intention of preserving her in- 
fluence over his mind, or from a desire to shield him 
from the prevailing immorality, had brought him up in 
the strictest seclusion. He had been surrounded by men 
of no political standing or experience, who had carefully 
instilled into his mind the idea that he had only to assert 
himself in order to place himself above all factions and 
govern as he pleased. 

Foremost among these advisers was his Groom of the 



222 The Fall of Pitt, 1761 

Stole, John Stuart, Earl of Bute, his mother's favourite 
as well as his own. Bute was a man without experience 

of public life or capacity to take part in it, 

recommended by a handsome face and 
figure and by a remarkable talent for private theatricals, 
a dabbler in science and literature, enjoying a reputation 
for wisdom above his deserts by reason of his pompous 
sententious manner. Frederick, Prince of Wales, in 
whose household he had a place, described him admira- 
bly as "' a fine showy man who would make an excellent 
ambassador in a court where there was no business." 

For the first two or three years of the reign of George 
III. the influence of Bute was paramount. On the 
second day after the accession he was introduced into 
the cabinet, and, though at first he took no ministerial 
office, he at once gave himself airs as being the sole ex- 
ponent of the king's wishes, the sole channel of royal 
favour. After a few months he came more prominently 

forward. Lord Holdernesse was induced to 
Bute Secre- resign by the promise of a lucrative sinecure, 

and the favourite accepted the seals of Secre- 
tary of State. At the same time Legge was dismissed 
from the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and other less 
important changes were made. A violent war of pam- 
phlets had previously been commenced against Pitt and 
his foreign policy. Bute and his friends wanted peace 

merely that they might get rid of the popu- 
is po icy. j^^ minister, and pursue their policy of break- 
ing up the Whig oligarchy and extending the prerogative; 
but there were influential men in the cabinet as well as 
outside it who objected to the war on public grounds, on 
account of its expense, and from a short-sighted indif- 
ference to the fate of Prussia. Others were willing to 
join with anyone who would put an end to the dictator- 



1 7 6 1 Pitt and the Cabinet, 223 

ship of Pitt, or, like Newcastle, who failed to see that 
when Pitt had been struck down his own turn would 
come next, thought, while gratifying their resentment, to 
serve their interests by devotion to the rising sun. 

Such was the state of the cabinet when, after two in- 
decisive discussions, the Spanish question came before 
it for final decision. Bute and his adhe- 
rents, eagerly desiring to withdraw from the discusfes^"*^^ 
war as soon as possible, no matter on what ^^^ Spanish 

*■ ' question, 

terms, w;ere not likely to approve of a course October 2, 
which would extend its area, and others be- ^^ ^' 
sides Bute welcomed the opportunity for breaking defi- 
nitely with Pitt. 

Pitt repeated his arguments for declaring war, and 
added, in the haughty style he was wont to assume, that 
** if he could not prevail in this instance, he was resolved 
that this was the last time he should sit in 
that council. He thanked the ministers of Pitt's 

speech. 

the late king for their support ; said he was 
himself called to the ministry by the voice of the people, 
to whom he considered himself accountable for his con- 
duct ; and that he would no longer remain in a situation 
which made him responsible for measures he was no 
longer allowed to guide." 

Lord Granville (Carteret), the president of the council, 
then replied: "I find the gentleman is determined to 
leave us, nor can I say I am sorry for it, 
since he would otherwise have compelled ^X^^^^^^ 
us to leave him ; but if he be resolved to as- 
sume the right of advising his Majesty and directing the 
operations of the war, to what purpose are we called to 
this council ? When he talks of being responsible to the 
people, he uses the language of the House of Commons, 
and forgets that at this board he is reponsible only to the 



2 24 The Fall of Pitt 1761 

king. However, though he may possibly have convinced 
himself of his own infallibility, still it remains that we 
should be equally convinced before we can resign our 
understandings to his direction or join with him in the 
measure he proposes.'' 

On the question being put to the vote, only Pitt and 

Temple were in favour of the immediate declaration of 

war. These ministers therefore resigned 

Pitt and Tern- their officcs after delivering- their opinions 

pie resign. ... . 

in writing. The king received Pitt very 
graciously when he waited upon him to give up the seals, 
but made no attempt to induce^him to withdraw his resig- 
nation. 

Pitt on retiring accepted a peerage for his wife and a 
pension of 3,000/. a year for three lives, which for a time 
impaired his popularity ; not that these rewards were 
held to be undeserved, but because his acceptance of 
them seemed a falling off from the high disinterestedness 
which he had always professed and practised. Juster 
views soon prevailed, especially when the course of events 
proved conclusively the soundness of his judgment 
on the point at issue between his cabinet and himself. 

As soon as the treasure-ships were safely anchored in 
Cadiz harbour, the Spanish Government threw off the 

, , mask, and adopted so hauehty a tone that 

England , ^' . , .^ . 1,1 

declares war the English ministry were compelled to de- 
Janiiary4, ihand explanations concerning the treaty 
^7^^- with France. These were contemptuously 

refused, and Bute, after a delay which had enabled her 
to pour troops and stores into her colonies, found himself 
under the necessity of declaring war against Spain. 



^75 9"^ I Precarious Position of Frederick, 225 



CHAPTER XV. 

END OF THE WAR. 

\ I. Prussia, 

Unable to avoid fresh entanglements, Bute was only the 
more determined to withdraw his support from Frederick. 
A clause in the yearly Convention with Prussia forbade 
either party to conclude peace without the knowledge or 
consent of the other, and it was the con- 
straint of this clause rather than the burden ^"'^ avoids 

renewing the 

of the subsidy that he wished to be free Convention 
from. Therefore, without definitely an- 
nouncing that the connexion between England and 
Prussia was at an end, he allowed Parliament to break 
up without renewing the Convention. 

In the extremity to which Frederick had been reduced, 
the defection of the ally, who had poured subsidies into 
his exhausted coffers and kept the whole power of France 
at bay, might well have proved fatal had it not been 
counterbalanced by another occurrence of 

•' Precarious 

even greater significance. For more than position of 

Fredericlc 

two years the king had been maintaining a 
mere struggle for existence, losing ground inch by inch. 
The year which followed Kunersdorf was a year of con- 
tinued disaster. The havoc of that great defeat had 
hardly been repaired when Finck's capitulation at Maxen 
gave the Austrians a firm footing in Saxony and spread 
an unprecedented despondency through the ranks of the 
Prussian army. 

Fresh misfortunes followed, increasing the desponden- 



226 Prussia. 1760 

cy and diminishing the power of resistance. A Prussian 
corps under General Fouquet was annihi- 

Landeshut ^^^^^ ^^ Landeshut— this loss too, like 

June 23, Finck's, being attributable to harsh hasty- 

orders of the king's too literally obeyed by 

the touchy general — and soon afterwards the capture of 
Glatz laid the whole of Upper Silesia open to 

Capture of ^ ^ . ^ , ^^ , f r 

Glatz, July the Austrians. Laudon appeared before 
Breslau, and the Russians advanced unop- 
posed to the Oder. 

The situation was one to call forth all the powers of 
Frederick's genius, which always asserted itself most 
conspicuously when the need was greatest. After a 
series of intricate manoeuvres, the king hurried from 
Saxony to Silesia, followed by two Austrian armies under 
Daun and Lacy, each equal in numbers to his own. 
Laudon with a third awaited his arrival, and Czernitch- 
eff with 24,000 of the Russians, crossed the Oder and 
, , watched the course of events. The three 

Battle of . . 1 1 , -r^ . 

Liegnitz, Austrian armies surrounded the Prussians, 

"^ ^^' but before their generals could execute a 

joint attack, Frederick suddenly pounced on Laudon 
and defeated him with great loss. He then wrote a let- 
ter to Prince Henry, and gave it to a peasant with in- 
structions to let it be intercepted by Czernitcheff. The 
letter contained an exaggerated account of the victory, 
announced the king's intention of marching against the 
Russians, and begged the prince to do what had been 
agreed on. The peasant obeyed his instructions, with 
exactly the effect expected by the king. Czernitcheff 
had already heard a report of Laudon's defeat, and as 
soon as he got the letter he recrossed the Oder and broke 
his bridges. 

The victory of Liegnitz checked the progress of the 



1760-61 The Battle of Torgau. 227 

enemy in Silesia, but it did nothing more. Frederick 
could do nothing to prevent a corps of Rus- „ . 

° ^ ^ ^ Russians and 

sians and Austrians from makmg a raid on Austrians in 
Berlin, and exacting a contribution, though 
the news of his approach made their stay there a short 
one. Meanwhile the whole of Saxony was occupied by 
the Austrians, and Frederick on his return to the elec- 
torate in October, found all the strong positions in the 
possession of the enemy. Daun with 65,000 men was 
carefully entrenched at Torgau, where Frederick with 
44,000 attacked him on November 3. 

The battle was long and hotly contested. Ziethen, 
who was ordered to attack the enemy in the rear, while 
the king engaged them in front, missed the ^ , , 

° ° *^ Battle of 

road by which he ought to have advanced, Torgau, No- 
and when the sun set, the Austrians were ^^^ ^^^' 
still in possession of the heights which formed the key of 
their position. Frederick and Daun were both wounded, 
and the carnage had been frightful. Still, however, the 
battle continued. Ziethen found his road at last, and at 
nine o'clock the welcome news that the heights of Sip- 
titz were his was brought to Frederick in a little church 
near the battle-field, whither he had retired to have his 
wound dressed and to write despatches. When day 
broke, the Austrians were seen in full retreat on Dresden. 
It is believed that if the double attack had been made 
simultaneously, their whole army must have been 
driven into the Elbe or made prisoner. The Austrian 
camp at Torgau was a strong one, but, as Frederick 
saw at a glance, too small for 65,000 men to manoeuvre 
in. 

The next year was one of marches and manoeuvres, 
without a single pitched battle. The war was becoming, 
as Carlyle expresses it, "like a race between spent 



2 28 Prussia. 1761-62 

horses," Its chief event was the surprisal of Schweid- 

nitz, brilHantly performed by Laudon, who, 

Schwddnftz, however, narrowly escaped a reprimand 

October i, from Maria Theresa and the Auhc Council, 

1761. ^ ^ * 

for having done it without their orders, an 

almost incredible piece of pedantry, which, while show- 
ing how the Austrian generals were hampered in the 
field, helps to explain their remissness in making use of 
the opportunities which their great superiority in num- 
bers afforded. 

P^t no period of the war had the situation of Prussia 

looked so hopeless as at the close of this year. Probably 

the king was the only man in all his army 

condkfonof who did not despair of ultimate victory. 

^^^'^^Y' V^ '^^ The Russians after three ineffectual sieves 

end or 1761. ^ 

had reduced by famine the Pomeranian 
seaport of Colberg, and for the first time in the war took 
up winter-quarters in Pomerania, and in the New Mark 
of Brandenburg. The capture of Schweidnitz enabled 
the Austrians and 20,000 Russians, under Czernitcheff, 
to do the same in Silesia and Glatz. The Prussian do- 
minions were slipping from the grasp of the king. Fully 
half were already occupied by the enemy, and what 
remained were almost entirely exhausted. Men, horses, 
supplies, and transport were hardly to be procured. The 
Prussian army in the field was reduced by the end of 
tlie campaign to 60,000 men, and the deterioration in 
quality was greater still. The splendid well-disciplined 
troops which had commenced the war existed no longer, 
and deserters and vagabonds of all kinds were swept 
into the ranks to fill their places. The utmost severity 
failed to preserve discipline, and the low moral tone 
prevailing in the inferior ranks infected even the officers. 
Peculation was rife ; mutiny and desertion constant. 



1762 Peace between Prussia and Russia. 229 

Under these circumstances the loss of the moral and 
material support of England must almost entirely have 
turned the scale against Prussia, but for a sudden and 
complete change in the policy of Russia. On January 
q, 1762, the Czarina died, and was succeeded _ , ^^ 

-" / ' r T T 1 • Death of the 

by her nephew Peter, Duke of Holstem- Czarina, janu- 
Gottorp, a grandson on the mother's side of Acce^ssion^of 
Peter the Great, a poor silly creature of P^^^^" ^^l- 
coarse and brutal manners, capable of generous im- 
pulses, but altogether wanting in judgment and discre- 
tion. The foreign policy of Elizabeth had been largely 
influenced by personal feeling ; that of her nephew rested 
on no other foundation whatever. Peter had long enter- 
tained for Frederick the Great an admiration ^^. , 

1 . -11 1 1 ^'^ admira- 

bordermg on idolatry, and as soon as he tionfor 
was seated on the throne, he hastened to ^^ ^"^ " 
assure the king of his friendly disposition. Frederick 
adroitly replied by sending home all his Russian prison- 
ers, whereupon the czar publicly announced his inten- 
tion of m.aking peace with Prussia, and of restoring all 
the territories that had been conquered from her. 

On these terms peace was made ; but half measures 
would not satisfy Peter's enthusiasm for his 
idol, and, without the slightest regard to the pJ^ss^ialnT^'' 
honour or interests of Russia, he entered a 5,^''^^^: ^^^^ \' 

UiTensive and 

month later into an offensive and defensive defensive aiii- 
alliance with Frederick, ana ordered Czerni- 
tcheff, who had been recalled from Glatz, and had got 
as far as Thorn on his way home, to lead his 20,000 men 
back to Silesia to fight against the Austrians, with whom 
a few months back they had been in close alliance. 

The peace between Prussia and Russia gave Sweden 
an opportunity of retiring from a war which she had 
waged without honour or profit, and by the Peace of Ham- 

Q 



230 Prussia. 1762 

burg, signed May 22, she also came to terms with Fred- 
erick. 
beiween The changed attitude of Russia, which 

Prussia and would have dcHghted Pitt, caused no- 
May 22. thing but anxiety to Bute, who cared 

very little what became of Prussia, but 
Views of cared very much about putting an end to 

the war. Thinking that peace could be 
soonest attained by the unqualified submission of Frede- 
rick, he regretted the withdrawal of Russia from the 
war, because it would enable Frederick to protract his 
struggle with Austria, and baulk him of the object he 
was wilhng to purchase by the sacrifice of an ally. 

Under this impression he sought to moderate 
orl:\xl^' the enthusiasm of the Czar, representing 
con uct. ^^^ ^^ retaining East Prussia, for a time at 
least, he could induce Frederick to make the necessary 
cessions to Austria. At the same time he attempted to 
renew the old Anglo-Austrian alhance, and intimated his 
wilhngness to consent to the cession of Silesia, if the 
Court of Vienna would make common cause with Eng- 
land against the whole House of Bourbon. Neither ma- 
noeuvre succeeded. Austria with some contempt de- 
clined to listen to Bute's overtures, and Peter, in great 
indignation, acquainted Frederick with the underhand 
artifices of his ally. 

Thus England and Prussia drifted apart, and though 

the breach had little influence on the results 

Breach r , , ... 

between ol the War, its ultcrior consequences were 

Prussia^ ^"^ very important, for it was owing to Bute's 
Its con- treachery on this occasion that Frederick 

sequences. r • i 

conceived an abiding distrust of Enghsh 
statesmen and English policy, which caused him to stand 
aloof years afterwards, when England was herself in 



1762 Peter and Catharine. 231 

need of his alliance, and occasioned that intimate con- 
nection between Prussia and Russia which with few and 
slight interruptions has lasted to this day, and which bore 
as its first fruits the Partition of Poland. 

For the present, however, the friendship of Russia out- 
weighed the desertion of England, a fact clearly recog- 
nized by the Austrians, v/ho gave up all idea of regaining 
the whole of Silesia, and limited their programme to the 
preservation of the conquests already made. 
For the first time since 1758, Frederick took Frederick 

"f . commences 

the initiative. On the arrival of his new al- operations in 
lies in Silesia, he commenced active opera- 
tions against Daun, who with a large army lay en- 
trenched on the low hills in front of the Giant Mountains 
covering Schweidnitz. After several weeks of manoeu- 
vring he had all but completed his arrangements for an 
attack on Daun's position, when a courtier arrived from 
St. Petersburg announcing the deposition of the Czar, 
and the recall of the Russian troops. 

In the course of six months, Peter had contrived to 
outrage the national feeling in every conceivable way. 
His wife Catharine, a princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, was a 
woman of very remarkable ability, but, instead of allow- 
ing himself to be guided and supported by 
her superior sense, he had the folly to make E^^^^ ^?^ 
her his enemy by a series of insults, culmi- 
nating in a command to decorate his mistress with the 
order of St. Catharine at a great festival, and in a threat 
to shut her up in a convent with her son, whom he stig- 
matized as illegitimate. For years there had been no 
love between Peter and his wife. Her infidelity had 
been as shameless as his, but Catharine, while despising 
her husband, had put up with his coarseness and folly in 
the hope of one day ruling Russia in his name. It was 



232 Prussia. 1762 

only when this hope was seen to be groundless, and 
when her own safety and that of her son were threatened, 
that she began to plot the Czar's removal. 

Peter played completely into her hands. Every class 
was disgusted by his rash innovations. Large but ill- 
_ ^ ,. considered schemes of reform were mixed 

Peter dis~ 

^usts all up with trifling and vexatious changes. The 

army was offended by the preference shown 
to Holsteiners, and by the Czar's infatuation for Frede- 
rick, manifested by dressing up his guards in Prussian 
uniforms and teaching them the Prussian drill, while he 
himself appeared on all occasions in the garb of a Prus- 
sian colonel, as if prouder of a commission bestowed 
by Frederick than of being the commander of the 
Russian army. The clergy were at once alarmed by a 
project for secularizing church lands, and annoyed by 
an order to shave off their beards. 

Thus it happened that, when the Czarina^s plot was 
ready for execution, no one lifted up a hand for the Czar, 
and without a drop of blood being shed, 
deposed Peter was deposed, and Catharine assumed 

^^^' the sovereignty of Russia. On the day 

after his deposition, Peter signed a deed of abdication, 
and was shut up in the castle of Ropscha, where, a few 
days later, he was strangled by Catharine's lover, Alexis 
Orioif. 

At the commencement of her reign Catharine showed 
an inclination to revert to the policy of Elizabeth, but 
when, contrary to expectation, she found in 
co^nfirms^ her husbaud's papers proof that Frederick 

Pmssia'*^^ had Constantly sought to discourage his 
but recalls wild schemes, and exhorted him to treat 

Czernitcheff. ,..-., 

his Wife With proper respect, she experi- 
enced a revulsion of feeling in favour of the Prussian king. 



1762 Peace with the Austrians* 233 

Still, though she confirmed the treaty of peace with the res- 
titution of conquests, she was not disposed to recom- 
mence the war as his ally, and Czernitcheff was ordered 
home from Silesia. 

The order arrived, as has been observed, at a very 
critical moment. Czernitcheff could not venture to dis- 
regard it, but at the request of Frederick, to whom he 
was well disposed, he consented to keep it secret and 
delay his departure for three days. In this way the 
Austrians were kept in ignorance of the loss the Prus- 
sians had sustained until the attack had been made ; 
they saw the Russians in the Prussian camp, and could 
not guess that they were only there for show. On the 
morning of July 21, amid a general demon- 
stration all along Daun's line, which kept Burkersdorf 
him in uncertainty as to the real point of J^^^ 2^' 
attack, a Prussian detachment stormed the 
heights of Burkersdorf, which formed the key of his 
position. In the evening the Austrians retired towards 
the Silesian frontier, and the next day the Russians 
marched away. 

Frederick was now at liberty to besiege Schweidnitz, 
but the place was so stubbornly defended that he did not 
get it till October. He then made truce with Daun for 
the winter, on condition of the latter retiring into Bohe- 
mia and Glatz, and hurried off to Saxony, 
which Prince Henry was defending acrainst Peace with the 

•' 00 Austrians in 

the Austrians and the troops of the Empire. SJesia and 
The season was, however, too far advanced ^^°^y' 
for the siege of Dresden, and truce was here also made 
with the Austrians ; and thus ended what proved to be 
the last campaign of the Seven Years' War. 



234 England^ Spain and France. 1762 

\ 2. England, Spain , and France, 

Though successful in casting Frederick adrift, Bute 

found it impossible to bring the war summarily to an end 

or even to avoid extending its area. In accordance with 

the policy laid down in the Secret Convention of the 

preceding year, France and Spain demanded of Portugal 

that she should join them against England, the common 

enemy of all maritime nations, and on the demand being 

England in- refused, Spanish troops crossed the frontier. 

y°^^f^!f 7^^ Portuojal was not in a condition to resist in- 
fer the defence ° 

of Portugal, vasion, but at the first approach of danger, 
^^ ^' her king had appealed to England for help, 

and Bute, while abandoning Prussia without a scruple, 
could not refuse assistance to a nation with which Eng- 
land had been long and intimately connected, and which 
was now attacked merely because it would not give that 
connection up. 8,000 English troops were despatched 
to Lisbon together with money and stores of all kinds, 
and the Count of Lippe Bilckeburg, who had been master 
of the ordnance to Ferdinand, was brought over from 
Germany to reorganize the Portuguese army. With the 
arrival of these succours a check was given to the pro- 
gress of the invaders, and the season closed without 
Spain having gained any material advantage from her 
wanton aggression, while both in the East and West 
Indies she had to pay dearly for her rashness and dupli- 
city. 

When war with Spain was seen to be inevitable, the 

English Government began to make preparations for an 

attack on Havana, and early in March an 

Expedition ., , r t^ -i 11 

against expedition sailed from Portsmouth under the 

command of Admiral Sir George Pocock. A 

large English force was already in the Caribbean Sea 



1762 Havana. 235 

operating against the French West Indian islands. 
Martinique, the chief of them, was taken in 
February, and its fall beins: followed by the ^^p*^"^? °^ 

y ' ° ^ Martinique. 

surrender in quick succession of the lesser 
French islands, the greater part of the ships and troops 
engaged in their conquest joined Pocock on his arrival 
in the West Indies. 

Great judgment was shown in selecting Havana as 
the point of attack, for, being the mart into which all the 
merchandize of Spanish America was poured, and whence 
the galleons and flota sailed on their homeward voyage, 
its capture would greatly intercept the re- 
sources of Spain, and facilitate the conquest 
of her other American possessions. But m proportion to 
the value of the prize was the difficulty of gaining it. 
The climate was very deadly to Europeans, especially at 
the season of the year to which the attempt had been 
postponed by the reluctance of the English Government 
to declare war the autumn before. The town itself was 
well fortified, and its harbour, a magnificent basin capa- 
ble of holding 1,000 of the largest ships of those days, was 
approached by a narrow channel half a mile in length, 
guarded by two strong forts, the Moro and the Puntal. 
Including the country militia, the garrison of the place 
outnumbered the besiegers, and twelve sail of the line 
lay in the harbour, besides smaller vessels ; but for some 
reason or other the Spaniards made no use of these ex- 
cept to sink three of them in the mouth of the harbour, 
though it would have been almost impossible for the 
English fleet to force an entrance. 

On June 7 the English effected a landing without op- 
position on the side of the Moro, where the principal at- 
tack was to be made. Great obstacles were en- 
countered by the besiegers. The thinness of the soil 



236 England, Spain and France. 1762 

made it exceeding difficult for them to cover themselves 

in their approaches, while these progressed 

Difficulties 3^5 slowlv. Water had to be brought up from 

encountered -' or 

by the be- a great distance ; roads had to be cut through 
siegers. thick woods, and the artillery to be dragged 

several miles over a rough and rocky shore. 

All preliminary difficulties were, however, surmounted, 
and on July i the batteries opened fire on the Moro, 
while three of the largest men-of-war placed themselves 
close under its walls and cannonaded its seaward face. 
After a bombardment of seven hours, which produced 
no effect on the Moro, the ships were obliged to retire 

with heavy loss, but the land batteries 
th^^first^^*- pj'oved themselves superior to those of the 
tack on the enemy. By the evening of the second day 

the fire of the fort was almost silenced when 
the principal English battery took fire, and as it was con- 
structed of timber and fascines dried by the intense heat, 
the flames could not be extinguished Thus the labour 
of seventeen days was destroyed and all had to be begun 
again, a misfortune the more mortifying as the army was 
reduced by sickness to half its strength, and the hurri- 
cane season was approaching, when the fleet could no 
longer remain on that shore without exposing itself to 
almost certain destruction. 

Operations were, however, recommenced with cheer- 
ful determination, and by the 20th it became evident to 
the governor of Havana that unless something were 
done the Moro would fall. A sortie was then ordered, 
but though conducted with spirit it was resolutely 

repulsed, and the sappers and miners 

Capture of , . . ^^ 

the Moro, pushea on their works with vigour till 

J'^'y 30. a practical breach was made. The arrival 

of long expected reinforcements from New York raised 



1762 The Philippines. 237 

the spirits of the besiegers, and on the 30th, after 
a gallant defence, in which the commander of the fort 
was mortally wounded and his second killed, the Moro 
was taken by assault. 

The capture of the Moro made Havana itself unte- 
nable as soon as batteries were erected and guns brought 
to bear on it, and on the afternoon of August 11, after 
a cannonade of six hours, flags of truce were hung out 
from all quarters of the town. A capitulation ensued by 
which Havana with a district of 180 miles 
to the westward was ceded to the English. ot^Havana^'^ 
The men-of-war and merchantmen in the ^"§"^*^ ^3- 
harbour were abandoned after an obstinate struggle to 
save the former, and in ready money, tobacco and other 
merchandize collected in the town, the loss of the 
Spaniards amounted ta the immense sum of 3,000,000/. 

In the East Indies an advantage of almost equal im- 
portance was obtained by the conquest of Manilla, the 
capital of the Philippines, a group of large and fertile 
islands situated in the northern part of the 
Malay Archipelago. Owing to the decay of ^^- Philip- 
Spanish enterprise since the time of Philip 
XL, the trade of the Philippines had greatly declined, 
but the islands were capable of becoming in the hands of 
an enterprising power a possession of exceeding value, 
not more for their extent and richness than because of 
their commanding position with regard to the trade with 
China and Japan, which the masters of Manilla could 
control entirely. 

By way of offset to the loss of Martinique, Havana^ 
and the Philippines, the French and Spaniards had only 
trifling successes to boast of, such as a descent on New- 
foundland, and the capture of the Portuguese colony of 
Sacramento, while in Germany the advantage was on 



238 The Peace and its Results. 1762 

the side of the allies. Thus the year that followed Pitt's 
retirement from office was, with one exception, as rich 

in victories as any of those during which 
auributed to ^^ ^"^^ guided the war ; but it was gene- 
^^"- rally felt that to him, and not to his successor, 

the victories must be ascribed. This was not only 
because it was known that the expedition against 
Martinique had been sent out and those against Ha- 
vana and Manilla resolved on by him. The feeling 
rested on the conviction that the success which crowned 
these expeditions was due to the lofty spirit which he had 
revived in the nation, and which sent forth its soldiers 
and sailors confident of victory wherever they were en- 
gaged. Horace Walpole was anything but a friend of 
Pitt's, and Horace Walpole writes, " The single elo- 
quence of Mr. Pitt, like an annihilated star, can shine 
many months after it has set. I tell you it has conquered 
Martinico." 

^ 3. The Peace and its Results, 

The negotiations with France, which were broken off 
by the Spanish episode in the autumn of 1761, were re- 
sumed the following year, and presented the curious 
spectacle of the first minister of a triumphant power, 
suing for peace as urgently as if his country had been 
brought to the verge of ruin. Bute was incapable of 
regarding the war from a national point of 
n^ss^for^^^'^" view. He wanted peace for domestic rea- 
peace. sons, and cared little by what sacrifices 

it was purchased. Far from being elated by the tri- 
umphs which shed a lustre on his administration, he 
looked on them chiefly as possible obstacles in his path. 
In the negotiations of the previous year Pitt had insisted 
that conquests made by either party up to the date of 
signing the peace should be retained subject to ex- 



1763 Peace of Paris, 239 

changes ; but Bute, at a time when the capture of Ha- 
vana and of Manilla was imminent, consented to an 
article providing that conquests which were not known 
in Europe when the peace was signed should be restored 
without compensation. In the same spirit, when he 
heard that Havana had fallen, he wished to have it 
simply inserted in the list of places to be restored, and 
but for the remonstrances of colleagues who knew the 
temper of the nation better than he did, he would have 
had it so inserted sooner than risk a delay in sign- 
ing the preliminaries by demanding an equivalent. The 
French and Spanish Governments were not slow to take 
advantage of his pacific zeal, and raised their tone ac- 
cordingly. Still, though much was thrown away by the 
headlong haste of the English minister, much remained, 
and the advantages secured to England by the peace 
were really considerable ; as also were the indirect gains 
derived from the war which no treaty could take away. 
Preliminaries of peace were signed on November 3, 
1762, and on February 10, 1763, converted into a defini- 
tive treaty, known as the Peace of Paris, of which the 
articles were in substance as follows : In 
North America the Mississippi became the pSs^Feb. 10 
boundary between the Ens^lish and the 1763- Condi- 

•' *=• tions between 

French. The French ceded all they had England and 
ever possessed or claimed east of the river, 
except New Orleans and the island on which it is situated, 
the navigation of the Mississippi being declared free. 
They, however, retained certain rights of fishing off the 
coasts of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, 
and the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were 
given them as shelter for their fishermen, but without 
permission to erect fortifications. 

In the West Indies they were more fortunate. Guada- 



240 The Peace and its Results, 1 763 

loupe and Martinique were both restored, together with 
some of the lesser islands, so that England kept only- 
Grenada and the Grenadines, besides Tobago, Dominica, 
and St. Vincent, to which she had an old claim. 

In Africa, Goree was restored to France, and Senegal 
retained by England. All the French settlements in In- 
dia were given back, but under the restriction that no 
fortifications were to be raised, or soldiers kept, by the 
French in Bengal. 

In Europe, France exchanged Minorca for Belleisle 
(taken in 1761,) and agreed to restore any places in 
Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick, and Lippe Biickeberg that 
she might be in possession of; but no compensation 
was made to Hesse for the damage her troops had done 
there. 

It was also agreed that England and France should 
retire altogether from the German war, and that the lat- 
ter should evacuate the Prussian fortresses of Wesel, 
Cleves, and Guelders. Who should take over the for- 
tresses was, however, left undetermined. There was, 
therefore, nothing in the treaty to prevent Austrian gar- 
risons from marching in when the French garrisons 
marched out, and but for timely precautions taken by 
Frederick this would actually have happened. Frede- 
rick protested against the betrayal of his interests and 
the invidious distinction made between Prussia and the 
other allies of the King of England ; but his protests 
were without effect. The English Government seemed 
equally indifferent to the fate of their ally and to the 
reproach of treachery. 

Spain, considering how unfortunate she had been in 
the war, got out of it on easier terms than France. She 
abandoned her baseless claim on the Newfoundland 
fishery, and conceded the right of cutting logwood in 



T 7 6 3 Peace of Huberisburg. 241 

Honduras, while England agreed to demolish the forti- 
fications that had been erected there. She 
also restored to Portuc^al the town of Almeida Conditions 

^ between 

and the colony of Sacramento. These, how- England 

,, . ... . and Spain. 

ever, were all mmor pomts ; m more impor- 
tant matters Spain prevailed. She recovered the Philip- 
pines gratis, owing to Bute's article about restorations, 
and she got back Havana in exchange for Florida, a 
district useful indeed to England as rounding off her 
possessions in the North American continent, but not to 
be compared for a moment with a stronghold like Ha- 
vana, the loss of which might easily have been followed 
by the loss of all her American possessions. Moreover, 
by an agreement outside the treaty, France gave her 
Louisiana in compensation for the loss of Florida. 

The withdrawal of England and France from the Ger- 
man war left Austria and Prussia face to face, for Russia 
and Sweden had previously retired from it, and it was 
hardly necessary to take any account of Saxony and the 
States of the Empire. It was obviously use- 
less for Austria to think of accomplishing Austria and 
unassisted that which she had failed to 
achieve with half Europe fighting for her. Maria Theresa 
recognized the inevitable, and avowed herself ready for 
peace ; but, that the efforts of seven years might not 
seem wholly fruitless, she strove hard to retain the 
county of Glatz, the only portion of Prussian territory 
which remained in her possession at the end of 1762. 
Frederick, however, who at the lowest ebb 
of his fortunes had refused to purchase Peace of 

^ Huherts- 

peace by the cession of a single village, was burg. Febru- 
not disposed to be more compliant when the 
tide was running in his favour. He insisted on the re- 
storation of the status quo ante bellum, and on these 



242 The Peace and its Results, 1763 

terms, Austria restoring Glatz, and Prussia evacuating 
Saxony, a treaty of peace was signed at the Saxon castle 
of Hubertsburg on February 5, 1763. 

Looked at from a military point of view, the Seven 
Years' War was a drawn battle as far as Austria and 

Prussia were concerned, that is to say, neither 
the^war for ^^ them gained or lost an inch of territory, 
Prussia ^"^ Morally it was a great triumph for Frederick. 

Austria had formed a vast coalition for the 
purpose of destroying Prussia, and she had signally 
failed. Against overwhelming odds Frederick had main- 
tained the position he had conquered for himself in the 
Silesian wars, and by the splendour of his achievements 
had drawn upon himself the admiring attention of Ger- 
many, and inspired it with a longing for national exist- 
ence. The result of the war was the overthrow of Aus- 
trian supremacy, and the establishment of Austria and 
Prussia as equal powers, the ** Dualism," as Germans 
called it, which ended a hundred years afterwards in the 
exclusion of Austria from Germany. 

The war greatly increased the maritime and colonial 

power of Eno^land. Under the protection 

Results of ^ ^ ?.,,,, ,1 

the war for 01 a navy which had cleared the seas of 
"^ ^^ ' hostile fleets, her commerce was largely ex- 

tended in all quarters, and it was during this period that 
she began to assert the right of capturing an enemy's 
goods in neutral ships, which formed the basis of her 
Maritime Code. Territorially also her gains were* im- 
mense. Not only was North America secured to her 
by the peace, but by the events of the war a vast field 
for English enterprise was opened up in India. The 
French settlements there were indeed all restored, but 
it was impossible to replace them in the position they 
had occupied before the war. The prestige of Pondi- 



1763-86 Close of Frederick' s Reign. 243 

chery was destroyed, and English influence was para- 
mount in all the principal native courts. Still the posi- 
tion of England after the Peace of Paris was one of 
perilous isolation. Her naval power and her claims 
with regard to neutral shipping aroused the jealousy of 
all maritime nations, and she was without a single ally 
on the Continent. Her old connexion with Austria was 
at an end, and the new connexion with Prussia was 
broken off by Bute's perfidious treatment of Frederick. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

CLOSE OF FREDERICK'S REIGN. 

The peace of Hubertsburg divides the reign of Frede- 
rick into two equal parts. The first period of twenty- 
three years was occupied in gaining for Prussia a position 
among the great powers of Europe. The second was 
chiefly devoted to securing that position, and to healing 
the wounds the country had received in the struggle by 
which it was gained. The war left Prussia Condition of 
in a state of exhaustion hardly less frightful ^"J"^^^ ^^^^^ 
than that of Brandenburg after the close of 
the Thirty Years' War, the traces of which were visible 
for a century. Her population was diminished by half a 
million. Large tracts of land had fallen altogether out 
of cultivation. Towns and villages were wholly or 
partially destroyed, and in many districts hardly a trace 
was left of human habitations. Successive debasings of 
the currency, and the absorption by the army of all 
revenue that could be raised, aggravated the miseries 
wrought by the enemy. From the noble to the peasant, 
every class was impoverished. For years all civil 



244 Close of Frederick' s Reign, 1763 

officers remained unpaid. The police ceased to exist. 
A licentious and self-seeking spirit took possession of the 
people ; law and order gave place to anarchy. 

In one respect only, in her freedom from debt, could 
Prussia compare favourably with all the other belligerents 

except Russia, who was equally fortunate. 
Her freedom Frederick had borrowed nothing, and when 

peace came, he had in hand the 25,000,000 
thalers which he had provided for the next campaign, 
should one prove necessary. This sum was judiciously 
expended in the relief of the most pressing cases of dis- 
tress. Seed-corn was distributed where it was most 
needed, and 60,000 artillery, baggage, and commissariat 
horses were sent to the plough. By degrees the land 
was again got under cultivation, houses were rebuilt, 
commercial and industrial undertakings set on foot. 
_ , , . Much was done by the king; which, accord- 

Fredenck s . ° 

economical mg to nmetecnth-century ideas, ought to 
system. havc been left to private enterprise, but the 

truth is, that the country was in such a state of exhaus- 
tion that private enterprise was dead ; and the practical 
success of Frederick's measures may be taken as a proof 
of their suitability to the occasion. 

Politically the chief events of the last half of Frede- 
rick's reign were the Partition of Poland, the Bavarian 
Succession War, and the League of Princes. Frederick's 
share in the first of these events, and consequently to 
some extent the event itself, is traceable to 
of Prussia the isolation in which he found himself after 

and Russia. ^^^ p^^^^ ^^ Hubertsburg. Deserted by 

England in a way which destroyed forever his belief in 
her trustworthiness, he had no choice but to throw him- 
self into the arms of Russia, with whom, after the peace, 
he concluded a close aUiance. His pohcy then became 



~ 1763 Turks Declare War on Russia. 245 

in a measure subservient to the ambitious schemes by 
which the highly gifted young German princess, who sat 
on the throne of the czars, sought to reconcile her sub- 
jects to her foreign origin, and make them forget the im- 
perfection of her title, and the crime by which she had 
become their sovereign. 

The Seven Years' War had the effect of establishing 
Russian influence in Poland, which, though remaining 
neutral, was throughout used by the Russian troops as a 
base of operations against Prussia ; and when Augustus 
III. died a few months after the peace, the Czarina had 
little difficulty in seating on the vacant ^ . . 

-' ° Russian in- 

throne one of her discarded lovers, a Polish fluence in 
nobleman of no great reputation, named 
Stanislaus Poniatowski. Plausible pretexts were easily 
found for constant interference in the domestic affairs of 
the republic, and well-considered plans for the reform of 
its impracticable constitution were frustrated by Russia 
and Prussia, to whom the perpetuation of anarchy in 
Poland appeared a political necessity. 

Poland was becoming a mere province of Russia when 
a party of the nobles took up arms in desperation to free 
their country from foreign dominion. The 
Confederates of Bar, as the patriotic party Confederates 
were called from the place of their union, 
were attacked and defeated by Russian troops, who pur- 
sued them on to Turkish territory. Then the Turks, 
egged on by France, and fully alive them- ^ , , , 

°^ ^ ^ . ' ^ ^ Turks declare 

selves to the danger of Russian preponder- war on Russia, 
ance in Poland, declared war on Russia. "° ^^' ^^ 
They were, however, unable to sustain the part they had 
rashly undertaken, and the Czarina's troops quickly 
overran Moldavia and Wallachia. 

Hereupon Austria, alarmed at the extent and rapidity 
R 



2 46 Close of Frederick^ s Reign, 1772- 

of the Russian conquests, threatened to interfere, and 
Frederick himself was disturbed by the pros- 
Complica- p^Q^ of hostilities spreading. In accord- 

ance with his treaty with Russia he paid the 
Czarina 480,000 thalers a year during her Turkish war ; 
but in the event of Austria taking part in it, he would 
probably be personally involved, and might be attacked 
by Austria and France together. On the other hand, it 
was possible that Catharine might purchase the acqui- 
escence of Austria in Russian aggrandizement by offer- 
ing her also large acquisitions of territory at the expense 
of her ancient enemy the Porte, in which case Frederick 
would see his powerful neighbours strengthened without 
any corresponding advantage being secured by himself. 
A method of reconcihng conflicting interests and 
avoiding a general conflagration was found at the ex- 
pense of an innocent neighbour. Catherine agreed that 
Frederick should recompense himself for 
Poland, his risk and for the subsidies he paid by an- 

^^^^* nexing Polish Prussia, and Austria, when 

she found that Frederick could not be separated from 
Russia, drew back and consented to be bought off by a 
share of the spoil. Russia desisted from her intention 
of separating Moldavia and Wallachia from the Porte, 
and took an equivalent in Poland. 

Neither Catharine nor Frederick betrayed the- slightest 
compunction at the transaction ; but it was with intense 
repugnance that the noble and high-minded Maria 
Theresa consented to become a participator in the crime. 
She, however, no longer exercised the undivided power 
of former years, but with advancing age and 
a^Y Wph^^^^ declining vigour yielded more and more, 
though with constant misgivings, to the rest- 
less ambition of her son Joseph, whom, after he had sue- 



-1772 Value of Polish Prussia. 247 

ceeded, in 1765, to the Empire, she had appointed coad- 
jutor in the government of the Austrian dominions. 

By the treaty of partition Frederick obtained all Polish 
Prussia, except the towns of Dantzic and Thorn, a tract 
far less extensive than those which fell to the shares of 
Austria and Russia, but possessing for Prus- 
sia a value out of all proportion to its area, Value of Polish 
because its annexation united the detached 
and hardly defensible province of East Prussia with the 
central body of the Prussian kingdom. 

But in the king's eyes the acquisition of a province, 
however valuable, was not more important than the alli- 
ance of the three northern powers which resulted from 
the partition, and was likely to derive per- 
manence from the foundation of common sequences°of 
guilt on which it rested ; and it must be re- ^^'^ partition. 
garded as a brilliant diplomatic triumph for Frederick 
that he succeeded, on the one hand, in persuading the 
Czarina of Russia to allow two other powers to engross 
portions of a country which she looked upon as almost 
her own already ; and on the other, in entrapping Austria, 
against her honour and against her interest into becom- 
ing his accomplice. 

Frederick's confidence in the permanence of the con- 
nexion between Austria, Prussia, and Russia has been 
justified by the event, for though the concord has occa- 
sionally been interrupted, the three powers seem ever to 
be drawn together again by some inexorable necessity, 
and the triple alliance of 1772 is represented in the 
Dreikaiserbund of the other day. 

Yet in their relations to one another as German pow- 
ers the antagonism of Austria and Prussia was dur- 
ing the king's lifetime at any rate, in nowise softened. 
Opposition to any increase of- Austrian territory or 



2 48 Close of Frederick' s Reign. 177 7-8 

influence within Germany was the cardinal prin- 
ciple of Frederick's policy, and Joseph was always seek- 
ing occasions for aggrandizement. A favourable oppor- 
tunity was afforded by the extinction of the 
The Bavarian electoral Bavarian family in consequence 

Succession. •' ^ 

of the death of the Elector Maximilian Jo- 
seph, without issue, on December 30, 1777. His kins- 
man, the Elector Palatine, who represented the elder 
branch of the House of Wittelsbach, was generally re- 
cognized as the rightful successor; but his pretensions 
were disputed on certain points by Saxony, Mecklen- 
burg, and several minor states. Austria also came for- 
ward with claims to a large portion of the inheritance, 
and lost no time in occupying the districts she proposed 
to annex. The Austrian claims rested on no very sub- 
stantial foundation ; but they were fortified by an agree- 
ment with the Elector Palatine, a man of advanced age, 
without legitimate issue or expectation of it, who shame- 
fully sacrificed the interests of his presumptive heir, ihe 
Duke of Zweibriicken, and consented, in return for cer- 
tain private advantages, to cede more than half Bavaria 
to Austria. 

The great increase of power which would thus have 
accrued to Austria was hardly more distasteful to Frede- 
rick than the high-handed conduct of the Emperor in 
attempting to dismember an electorate without the con- 
sent of the Empire, and with a promptitude equal to 
Joseph's, he came forward as the champion 
opposes the of Zweibriicken and the other claimants, 
Austria by and as the protector of the Constitution of 
arms, 1778. ^^ Empire threatened by the Emperor. 
After several months of negotiation, protracted by his 
reluctance to go to war, Frederick crossed the Giant 
Mountains and entered Bohemia at the head of 100,000 



1778-9 Bloodless Issue of the Campaign, 249 

men, while Prince Henry, with a force of equal strength, 
including a Saxon contingent, invaded the country by 
the line of the Elbe. 

The campaign thus far presents an exact parallel with 
that of 1866. Then, as eighty-eight years before, the 
Prussian army, too large to be supplied from 
a single base, entered Bohemia from Silesia of^the^Bava- 
and Saxony, marching in two columns on sionWar^^" 
the important strategical point where the with the war 
roads from the passes converge, not far 
fromi the now famous village of Sadowa. But here the 
parallel ends, for while Benedek in 1866 allowed the 
Prussian armies to effect their junction, in 1778 Laudon 
and Lacy prevented it. 

On arriving within a few days' march of the intended 
point of union, the king and Prince Henry found them- 
selves separated by an Austrian army 170,000 strong, 
encamped in a vast entrenched position, constructed 
with all the skill for which the Austrian engineers were 
famous. Frederick judged the position impregnable, 
and after two months spent in surveying^ it, ^, „ 

r ^ jr .. 1 i-i Bloodless 

food and forage bemg exhausted m the nar- issue of the 
row district between the mountains and the *^^°^P^ig"- 
enemy's lines to which they were confined, the Prussians 
had no choice but to return the way they had come. 
Whether Frederick's nerve was shaken and his brain 
dulled by age, as was asserted at the time by ardent 
spirits in the Prussian army chafing at inaction, or whe- 
ther, as he himself maintained, he thought he could at- 
tain his end as well without bloodshed as with it, cannot 
now be determined ; but it is certain that his conduct 
was very different from what it would have been a score 
of years before. 

The affair was settled by negotiation in the following 



250 Close of Frederick' s Reign, 1 780 

spring. The Czarina threatened to interfere on the 
Peace f Prussian side, and Austria found that she 

Teschen, May could not count on France. By the Peace 
13, 1779- q£ Teschen, Austria surrendered the country- 

she had occupied, with the exception of a small district 
adjoining her frontier ; and Saxony and Mecklenburg 
received compensation for their claims. The disinter- 
estedness of Prussia contrasted favourably with the ra- 
pacity of Austria, and though Frederick's action was as 
much dictated by motives of self-interest as that of Jo- 
seph, it was calculated to win the confidence of the mi- 
nor German states, whose interests for the time being 
were identical with his own. 

Soon after the peace Maria Theresa died, and Joseph 
succeeded to the hereditary Austrian dominions. It is 
not possible here to dilate on the character 
of Maria or Career of this remarkable man. What 

November occurred in Austria in the first five years of 
30, 1780. -j^-g j.gign^ may perhaps best be understood 

by comparing it with what occurred in France under the 
Revolution. Except in the war-office and in the depart- 
ment of foreign affairs, where his influence was para- 
mount, he had been shut out from all power as long as 
his mother lived, and when in his fortieth year he en- 
tered on full sovereignty, he proceeded with headlong 
haste to introduce the sweeping reforms he had long 
meditated in secret. The work of generations was 
crowded into a few years, and the want of tact and reck- 
less disregard of rights and feelings with which they 
were introduced did almost more to create opposition 
than the reforms themselves. Had Joseph been able 
to execute all that he conceived, Austria would have 
become the strongest and most prosperous state in 
Europe. As it was, much of his work perished with 



^7^3''5 The Furste7ibund, 251 

him, and when he died broken-hearted at the failure of 
his noble aspirations, he left his dominions in a state of 
utter confusion. Much of it perished, but not all. The 
work was done too thoroughly for the old abuses ever 
to be simply restored, and its beneficial effects are dis- 
tinctly traceable in the Austrian institutions of to-day. 

In the affairs of the Empire Joseph displayed the 
same activity that characterized his domestic administra- 
tion and encountered the same opposition. His efforts 
to strengthen the Imperial authority awakened general 
alarm, and even drove the Catholic ecclesiastical states, 
which had always held by Austria, to draw closer to the 
Protestant Princes. Towards the end of 1783, a feeling 
began to spread among the States of the Em- 
pire that some kind of union was necessary ^^X% to Fa-°*^ 
if they wished to preserve their privileges crease his 
and their independence, and this feeling was Empire, and 
strengthened when it became known that 
the Emperor had by no means given up the idea of in- 
corporating Bavaria with his hereditary dominions. It 
was rumoured that the Elector Palatine had been offered 
the greater part of the Austrian Netherlands with the title 
of King of Burgundy in exchange for Bavaria, and that 
he had been won over by the alluring offer. 

Frederick then put himself at the head of the move- 
ment, and succeeded in forming a league of Princes (der 
Fiirstenbund) modeled to some extent on the Smalkaldic 
League of the sixteenth century, but differing 
from it in that it comprised CathoHcs and Pro- bund^o^'^*^''" 
testants indiscriminatelv. The treaty of union League of 

' , -' Frinces, 

was in the first instance signed only by the July 23, 
three great secular states of the north, Bran- ^^ ^' 
denburg, Hanover, and Saxony ; other states joined 
afterwards on the invitation of the contracting parties. 



252 The Close of Frederick's Reign, 1786 

Foremost amongst these was the Elector of Mainz, whose 
adhesion gave the League a majority in the Electoral 
college, since by the Bavarian vote being merged in the 
Palatine the number of electors were reduced to eight, 
and the Elector of Mainz, as Arch-Chancellor of Ger- 
many, possessed a casting vote when the votes were 
equal. 

The immediate object of the Fiirstenbund was resist- 
ance to Austrian encroachments and the preservation 
of the status quo in Germany, but it is probable that 
larger ideas were vaguely present to the 
Its possible minds of its founders. The mere fact that 

results. 

States were invited to join it whose small- 
ness made them from a military point of view a source 
of weakness rather than strength shows that something 
more than a defensive alliance was intended ; and in- 
deed there is good reason for believing that a complete 
reorganization of Germany was contemplated, involving 
perhaps even the abolition of the Imperial throne or its 
transfer from Vienna to Berlin. Great ideas certainly — 
but requiring a Frederick for their realization, if even 
he could have accomplished it, and when the time came 
a Frederick was not found. 

The old king's end was drawing near. A few weeks 
after the conclusion of the treaty with Hanover and 
Saxony, he caught a severe cold at a review in Silesia, 
where he sat on horseback for six hours in a drenching 
rain without even putting on a cloak. From this chill 

he never recovered. His constitution was 
^Frederfck i"uined already, and all through the winter 

his health declined. Yet with failing 
strength his devotion to the public service never re- 
laxed. Every morning at half-past four his three cabi- 
net secretaries came to receive his answers to the peti- 



1786 Death of Frederick, 253 

tions and letters which had arrived ; every evening they 
brought for his signature the rephes composed according 
to the instructions he had dictated in the morning. On 
August 15, 1786, the secretaries came as usual. The 
king did not wake till eleven, but then went through 
everything with his usual clearness. In the evening he 
signed the letters ; then fell into a kind of stupor. 
Towards noon the next day he roused him- ,^. , , 

. -^ His death, 

self, and tried to give the Parole for the August 17, 
Commandant of Potsdam, but the effort ^^ 
was beyond him. The following morning soon after 
two o'clock he died. He was seventy-four years old, 
and he had reigned forty-six. 

The formation of the Fiirstenbund fittingly closes 
Frederick's life, and rounds off his career. His was not 
the fate which has sometimes befallen great men of 
being cut off by untimely death in the midst of his 
labours. He died full of years and with his work ac- 
complished. He had found Prussia the weakest and by 
far the smallest of the great European powers, and he 
left her their acknowledged equal in strength and repu- 
tation. He had broken the Austrian supremacy in 
Germany, and taught the German nation to look up to 
Prussia as its natural leader, while his latest political 
action provided machinery by which, if his immediate 
successors had inherited his capacity, the time when the 
leadership was obtained might have been anticipated 
by a considerable period. It is strange but characteristic 
that it was only from Austria that he apprehended dan- 
ger to his own country or to Germany. He could not 
conceive a situation entirely different from that with 
which he was acquainted. Events were rapidly ap- 
proaching by which the whole social and political condi- 
tion of Europe was altered. Yet, though signs of it 



254 Frederick the Great. 

were everywhere to be seen, the old king, with all his 
shrewdness, had no presentiment of the coming change. 
Perhaps the very clearness with which he perceived 
everything within the visible horizon prevented his 
guessing at what lay beyond it. Anyhow, it is remarka- 
ble that though he lived up to its very verge, he died 
without the faintest suspicion that the French Revolution 
was at hand. 



INDEX. 



ABE 

ABERCROMBIE, General, de- 
feated at Ticonderoga, 176 

Acadia, 66. 

Aiguillon, Due d' 186. 

Aix-la-Chapeile, peace of, 64, 197. 

Albert the Bear, Margrave of Bran- 
denburg, 4. 

— Grandmaster of the Teutonic 
Order, 7 ; made Hereditary Duke 
of East Prussia, 8; put to the ban 
of the Empire, ib. 

America, North, English and French 
colonies in, 66. 

Amherst, General, chief of the Eng- 
lish forces in Canada, 174, 178. 

Anhalt Dessau. See Leopold. 

Annapolis, 70. 

Anspach, 5 ; George of, 13. 

* Anti-Machiavel,' the, 32. 

Anwaroodeen, on the throne of the 
Carnatic, 198 ; death of, 199. 

Apraxin, Russian commander, 141 

Augustus II. (Elector of Saxony), 
King of Poland, 28. 

Augustus III., King of Poland, 28 ; 
recognizes Pragmatic Sanction, 
ib. ; death of, 245 

Aulic Council, stupidity of, 227. 

Arungzebe, 194. 

Austria, as a German power, i ; 
after the peace of Utrecht, 18 ; 
dread of, 21 ; treats Frederick 
William cavalierly, 29, 30 ; repels 
Frederick's advances after the 
battle of Mollwitz, 50 ; in alliance 
with Saxony, 60 ; reforms in, 86 ; 
makes treaties with Russia, 90, 
104; forms a treaty with France 
for the partition of Prussia, 104; 
her gains by it, 105 ; at the close of 
the Seven Years* war, 241. See 
Maria Theresa. 



BAIREUTH, acquired by the 
Hohenzollerns, 5. 



BRO 

Balance of Power, 19, 22. 

Bar, Duchy of, ceded to Stanislaus, 
30 ; the Confederates of, 245. 

Bavaria, its claim* to the Austrian 
succession, 43. 

Bavarian Succession, the, 248; war 
concerning, ib. 

Beauport, French camp at, 183. 

Belleisle, Marshal, 49. 

Benkendorf, Colonel, 119. 

Berg. See Juliers. 

Bergen, battle of, 168. 

Berlin, occupied by Austrians, 127; 
by Austrians and Russians, 226. 

Bernis, Abbe de, 89, t66. 

Bevern. See Brunswick. 

Black Hole of Calcutta, the, 204. 

Bohemia, invasion of, by Frenerick, 
58, 117. 

Boscawen, Admiral, defeats the 
French fleet off Lagos, 187; lays 
siege to Pondichery, 197. 

Bourdonnais, La, Governor of the 
Mauritius and Isle of Bourbon, 196 ; 
sails to the assistance of Pondi- 
chery, ib. : dissensions betwixt 
him andjDupleix, T97. 

Braddock, General, 68. 

Brandenburg, foundation of the 
Margraviate of, 3 ; conferred on 
Frederick of Hohenzollern, 5 ; its 
electors get East Prussia, 8; and 
Cleves, Mark, and Ravensburg, 
9; its part in the Thirty Years* 
war, Q ; Silesian claims of, 12 ; to- 
gether with the Prussian duchy 
made a kingdom, 15. See Prussia. 

Brannibor, 4. 

Breslau, opens its gates to Frederick, 
47 ; peace of, 55 ; taken by the 
Austrians, 132 ; recovered, 141. 

Brieg, 12, 47. 

Brissac, Due de, 168, 173. 

Broglie, Marshal, 33 ; Duke of, 168, 
169, 171. 

Browne, Marshal, 100-103, 115. 



256 



Index. 



BRU 

Bruhl, Count, Prime Minister of 
Saxony, 62. 

Brunswick. See Ferdinand and 
Francis. 

—hereditary prince of, 169. 

Brunswick, Bevern, Duke of, 112; 
defeated and made prisoner, 132. 

— Elizabeth Christine of, 27. 

Burkersdorf, battle of, 233. 

Bussy, M. de, 211. 

Bute, Earl of, character and appear- 
ance of, 222 ; Secretary of State, 
ib. : his extraordinary policy as 
regards Prussia, 230; his desire for 
peace, 238 ; makes tlie peace of 
Paris, 239 

Byng, Admiral, 81. 

CALCUTTA, Black Hole of, 204. 
Cambrai, Congress of, 21. 

Canada, conquest of, by the English, 
175; the French surrender their 
possessions in, 192. 

Cape Breton, 70, 176. 

Cailos, Don, receives Naples and 
Sicily, 30. See Charles III. 

Carnatic, the, 196 ; Nabob of, sup- 
ports the French, 196 ; disputed 
succession in, 198. 

Carteret, Lord, ministry of, 72. 

Catherine, Czarina, wife of Peter 
III,, character of, 231 ; deposes her 
husband, ib. ; confirms the treaty 
made with Prussia by Peter III., 
232 ; meddles in Poland, 245; joins 
in partitioning it, 246. 

Chandernagore, 205. 

Charles Albert, elector of Bavaria, 
his claims to certain Austrian ter- 
ritories, 43 ; elected Emperor, 53. 

Charles of Lorraine, Prince, 54, 58 ; 
at the head of the Austrian army 
in Bohemia, 113; loses the battle 
of Prague, 115; loses the battle 
of Leuthen, 139 ; retreats to Bo- 
hemia, 140. 

Charles III., of Spain, his motives 
for desiring war with England, 
218. 

Charles VI., Emperor, determines 
the Austrian Succession by the 
Pragmatic Sanction, 21, 40; death 
ot, 42. 

Charles VII., Emperor, accession 
of, 53 ; death of, 60. 

Charles XII., of Sweden, 17, 28, 47. 

Choiseul, Duke of, appointed Minis- 



DAU 

ter of Foreign Affairs in France, 
166; ascendency of, over the other 
ministers, 167 ; his energetic plans, 
ib. ; he proposes a general pacifi- 
cation, 216 

Chotusitz, battle of, 54. 

Chunda Sahib, claims the throne of 
the Carnatic, 198, 201 ; put ^to 
death, 203. 

Clermont, Count of, 165. 

Cleves-, duchy of, 8; partitioned, 9. 

Clive, Robert, character and early 
life of, 199; attempts suicide, 200; 
gains a name for daring courage, 
ib, : captures Arcot, 201 ; his de- 
fence of Arcot, ib. ; devotion of 
the Sepoys to him, ib. ; repulses 
Rajah Sahib, 202 ; made licuten- 
ant-colonel, and Governor of Fort 
St. David, 204 ; captures Calcutta 
and defeats Surajah Dowlah, 205 ; 
captures Chandernagore, ib. ; du- 
plicity to Omichund, 206; his one 
council of war, 207 ; treaty with 
Meer Jaffier, ib ; wins the battle 
of Plassey, 208 ; defeats the Dutch, 
210; sails foi England, ib.; lore- 
shadows the future government of 
India,, 210 

Clue, Admiral de la, defeated by 
Admiral Boscawen off Lagos, 187. 

Colberg, taken by the Russians, 228. 

Conflans, Admiral, defeated by 
Hawke in Quiberon Bay, 187-189. 

Conrad, founder of the house of 
Hohenzollern, 5. 

Contades, Marshal, 165, 167; loses 
the battle of Minden, 170. 

Coete, Colonel Eyre, defeats the 
French at Wandewash, 214. 

Cracow, peace of, 8 

Culmbach, 5, 7 

Cumberland, Duke of, 79 ; in com- 
mand of the English and Hano- 
verian forces, no; 121 ; defeated by 
the French at Hastenbeck, 122; 
signs the convention of Kloster- 
Seven, 123 

Czaslau, battle of, 55 

Czernitscheff, 226, 228, 229, 233 

DAUN, Count Leopold, Austrian 
commander, 114; wins the 
battle of Kollin, 118; anecdote of 
him and the peasant, 137 ; called 
the Fabius Cunctator of Austria, 
149; defeats the Prussians at 



Index. 



257 



DEC 

Hochkirch, 152 ; presented with a 
consecrated hat and sword by the 
Pope, 153; his supiiieness after the 
battle of Kunersdorf, 161 ; captures 
a Prussian army at Maxen, 163; 
defeated at Burkersdorf, 233 

Deccan, the, disputed succession in, 
198 ; Dupleix's influence in, 203 ; 
M. de Bussy recalled from, 211 

D'Estrees,^ Marshal, 121; wins the 
battle of Hastenbeck, 122 ; super- 
seded, ih. 

Dettingen, battle of, 56 

Devonshire, Duke of, 108 

Dresden, peace of, 64; capitulation 
of, to the Austrians, 160 

Dumas, governor of Pondichery, 194 

Dupleix, Joseph Fianyois, the dis- 
tinguished Indian statesman, 195 ; 
his schemes regarding India, ib. ; 
made governor of Pondichery, ib. ; 
influence with the Nabob of the 
Carnatic, 196 ; dissensions between 
him and La Bourdonnais, ib. ; 
loaded with honours by Mozuffer 
Jung, 198 ; sets up a pillar of vic- 
tory, ib. ; his courage under re- 
verses, 203 ; recall of, 204 

Dupleix-Futteh-abad, 199 

Duquesne, Fort, in North America, 
68', 177 

Dutch, the, send an expedition from 
Java to Bengal, 209 

ELIZABETH, Czarina of Russia, 
character of, 90 ; cause of her 
hatred of F'rederick the Great, 91 ; 
pursues the policy of her father, 
ib. ; dangerous illness of, 141 ; her 
persistent dislike to Frederick the 
Great, 155 ; death of, 229 

Empire, the, its condition in 1715, 
18; declares war against Prussia, 
103 ; army of, assembles, 125 ; in 
Saxony, 151 ; Joseph's encroach- 
ments in it, 251 

England, her influence on the Con- 
tinent in 1713, 18; at war with 
Spain, 41 ; as an ally of Austria, 
50; her colonies in North America, 
64 ; unprepared for a continental 
war, 79 ; feeble policy of, 80 ; dis- 
solution- of her alliance with Aus- 
tria, ib.; her treaty with Russia, 
ib ; concludes Convention of West- 
minster, ib. ; her fear of a French 
invasion, 81 ; at war with France, 



FRA 
81 ; seeks the aid of Austria against 
France, 86 ; subsidizes Prussia, 
148; her troops aid Ferdinand of 
Brunswick, 165 ; bravery of Eng- 
lish troops in the battle of Minden, 
172 ; threatened invasion of, by 
France, 186 ; declares war against 
Spain, 224; involved in war for the 
defence of Portugal, 234 : treaty of 
peace with France, 239 ; her posi- 
tion after the peace, 242 

Eugene, Prince, his remarks, 15 ; 
parallel with Laudon, 149 

Europe, condition of, in 1740, 39 

FAMILY Compact, the, a treaty 
between the Kings of France 
and Spain, in 1761, 216 
Ferdinand I., Emperor, 12 ; his will, 

43. 

Ferdinand of Brunswick, Duke, in 
command of the electoral army, 
146 ; defeats the French at Cre- 
feld, 165 ; lose:^ the battle of Ber- 
gen, 168; wins the battle of Min- 
den, 170 

Fermor, Russian commander, 147 ; 
defeated at Zorndorf, 150 ; retreats 
into Poland, 151 

Finck, General, in command of the 
Prussian army after Kunersdorf, 
159 ; at Maxen, 163 

Fleury, Cardinal, 41, 45 

Fouquet, General, 225 

Fox, Henry, talents of, as a debater, 
76; want of political morality, 77; 
refuses the leadership of the House 
from the Duke of Newcastle, ib. ; 
Secretary of State, ib. ; resigns the 
seals, 108; Paymaster of the Forces, 

143 

France, after the peace of Utrecht, 
18 ; at war with the Emperor, 29 ; 
in alliance with Prussia, 51 ; de- 
clares war against England and 
Austria, 58; her share in the par- 
tition treaty of Versailles, 105 ; 
anarchy of the government of 
Louis XV., 166; remodels her 
treaties with Austria, 167; causes 
of her ascendancy in America in 
1757? ^75 .' loses Canada, 192 ; her 
Family Compact with Spain, 217; 
makes a treaty of peace with Eng- 
land, 239 

Francis of Lorraine, obtains Tuscany 
instead of Lorraine, 31 ; husband 



2S8 



Index. 



FRA 

Ox Maria Theresa, 40, 43 ; elected 
Emperor, 62 ; his advice to Maria 
Theresa with respect to Silesia, 
84 ; condemns Frederick the Great 
as a disturber of the peace, 104 
Francis of Brunswick, killed at the 

battle of Hochkirch, 153 
Frankfort, the Union of, 57 
— capture of, by the French, 167 
Frederick I., Elector of Branden- 
burg, 6 
Frederick III., Elector of Branden- 
burg, becomes first King of Prus- 
sia, 14 
Frederick the Great, as Crown 
Prince, 24 ; his character and edu- 
cation, 25; attempts to escape 
from the tyranny of his father, 26 ; 
is imprisoned and sentenced to 
death, ib. ; th j sentence reprieved, 
27; is reconciled to his father, ib.\ 
marries, ib. ; personal appearance, 
31 ; his life before his accession, 
32 ; his innovations, 33 ; character 
of his government, 34; qualities as 
a ruler, 35 ; freedom of speech per- 
mitted by him, 35 ; his statesman- 
ship, 36; fortitude, 37, i-i6; mili- 
tary talents, 37; personal charac- 
ter, 38 : popularity, ib. ; asserts his 
claims to Silesia, 44 ; the question 
if its seizure by him was justifiable, 
45 ; invades Silesia, 46 ; is wel- 
comed by the Protestants there, 47 ; 
surprised by the Austrians under 
Marshal Neipperg, 48 ; wins the 
battle of Mollwitz, ib. ; enters into 
a defensive alliance with France, 
51 ; makes a secret compact with 
Neipperg, 53 ; defeats the Aus- 
trians at Chotusitz, and by the 
peace of Breslau gains Silesia, 55 ; 
makes a treaty with France, 58; 
the plan of his operations for war 
with Austria, ib. , invades Bohe- 
mia, ib ; captures Prague, 59 ; out- 
manoeuvred by Marsh il Traun, 
60 ; abandons Prague, ib- ; defeats 
the Austrians and Saxons at Ho- 
henfriedberg and Sohr, 61 ; defeats 
the Austrians and Saxons at Hen- 
nersdorf, 63 ; makes peace with 
Austria and Saxony, 64; hailed by 
universal acclamation as Frederick 
the Great, ib. ; forms the < "onven- 
tion of Westminster with England, 
80; his satirical verses on Madame 
de Pompadour, 88 ; Russian ani- 



FRE 

mosity to, 90 ; his devotion to the 
study of military tactics, 94 ; his 
secret sources of information, ib. ; 
perilous position, 95 ; tries to re- 
new an alliance with France, 96; 
declares war against Austria, after 
a final effort for peace, 97; in- 
vades Saxony, 98 ; his plan of 
operations, 99 ; blockades Saxons 
at Pirna, 100 ; fights the battle of 
Lobositz loi ; takes possession of 
Saxony, 103 ; is pat to the ban of 
the Empire, 104 ; his plans for the 
defence of Hanover, no: invades 
Bohemia, 112 ; wins the batde of 
Prague, 115; blockades Prague, 
116; loses the battle of Kollin^ 118; 
evacuates Bohemia, 120 ; is sur- 
rounded on all sides by enemies, 
126; writes verses in the midst of 
his anxieties, 126; wins the battle 
of Rossbach, 129 ; attempts to re- 
gain Silesia, 132; his address to 
his army at Parchwitz, 1:54; en- 
thusiasm of his army, 135 ; wins the 
battle of Leuthen, 139; his stra- 
tegy, 147 ; lays siege to Olmiitz, 
148: raises tne siege and invades 
Bohemia, 150; wins the battle of 
Zorndorf, ib. ; relieves Niesse, 
154; is defeated at Hochkirch, 
155 ; the deterioration of his army, 
157; his pecuniary difficulties, /<^. ; 
loses the battle of Kunersdorf, 
158 ; despairs after his defeat, 159 ; 
loses an army at Maxen, 163 ; 
precarious position of, 226 ; wins 
the battle of Liegnitz, ib. ; and of 
Torgau, 227 ; sends Russian pri- 
soners home, 229 ; wins the battle 
of Burkersdorf, 233 ; loses the Eng- 
lish Alliance, 240 ; makes peace 
with Maria Theresa, 241 ; his po- 
sition at the end of the war, 242 ; 
his economical system, 244; takes 
part in the partition of Holland, 
246-7 ; espouses the cause of the 
Duke of Zweibriicken in the Bava- 
rian succession, 248 ; forms the 
Fiirstenbund, 251 ; death of, 253 

Frederick William, called the Great 
Elector, 10; his poiicy and ad- 
ministration, 11; offers shelter to 
French Protestants, 12; resigns his 
Silesian claims, 14 

Frederick William, King of Prussia, 
16 ; his merits as a sovereign, ib. ; 
his economy, 16 ; increases and re- 



Index. 



259 



FRE 

forms the army, ib. ; his one war 
17; his reign a period of transition, 
18, 31 ; forms the alliance of Hano- 
ver with England and France, 22 ; 
abandons it under the influence of 
Seckendorf, 23 ; and concludes 
treaty of Wusterhausen with the 
Emperor, 23 ; his Court, 24 ; educa- 
tion of his son, 25 ; breach with 
his son, 25 ; offers aid to Austria, 
29 ; his last years, 30 
Frederick, Prince of Wales, 71,222 
Fiirstenbund, the, or League of 

Princes, 251 
Fiissen, peace of, 60 

GALLISONI^RE, La, e^ 
George IL, of England, at the 
battle of Dettingen, 56: dislike of 
Pitt, 72, III ; foreign policy of, 79 ; 
policy in regard to Hanover, no; 
dislike of Temple, in ; disap- 
proval of the convention of Kloster- 
Seven, 123 ; refuses his ratification 
to it, 145; political attitude. 220; 
contrast between him and George 
IIL, 221 

George IIL. 221 

George William, Elector of Branden- 
burg, 9 

Germany, foundations of its unifica- 
tion laid, I ; a gainer by Austria's 
losses, 2; in 1713, 18; public 
opinion in, in favour of Prussia, 
123; national enthusiasm over the 
battle of Rossbach, 131 

Gvbraltar, 18, 20, 218 

Gilsen, General, 173 

Glatz, 55; taken by the Austrians, 
227 

Glogau, 47 ; taken by storm, 47 

Godeheu, M. 204 

Granby, Lord, 168, 173 

Granville, Lord, his reply to Pitt, 223 

Gross- Jagersdorf, Russian victory at, 
141 

Grumbkow, General von, 23 

Gustavus Adolphus, of Sweden, 9 

HAMBURG, Peace of, 229 
Hanov-er, Alliance of, 22; 
Pitt's saying that Hanover should 
be as dear to Englishmen as 
Hampshire, 109; perfidy of the 
Hanoverian ministers, no; the 
French invade, 120; Pitt's belief 
that co-operation with Prussia WaS 



KAU 

the best way of securing Hanover, 

145 
Harsch, General, 154 
Hastenbeck, battle of, 122 
Havana, description of, 235; siege 

of, 236; capitulates to the English, 

237 

Havre, Ducd', 173 

Hawke, Admiral Sir E., 187; his vic- 
tory over the French fleet, 188 

Henneisdorf, battle of, 63 

Henry, Prince, brother of Frederick 
the Great, 151, 163, 164 

Henry the Fowler, 4 

Hesse Cassel, Landgrave of, 57 

Highland clans, the, utilized by Pitt 
for the formation of British soldiers, 
109 

Hildburghausen, Prince of, 125, 129 

Hochkirch, battle of, 152 

Hohenfriedberg, battle of, 61 

flohenzollern, house of, its founda- 
tion, 5 ; electors from 1440-1640, 6; 
the Hohenzollerns of Culmbach, 7 

Holdernesse, 142 

Hooghly, town of, taken by the Eng- 
lish, 205 

Howe, Colonel, 183 

Hubertsburg, Peace of, 141-2 

Hulsen, General, 118 

Hungary, Queen of, see Maria Ther- 
esa ; supports her loyally, 53 

INDIA, rivalries of the French and 
English in, 193 et seq.; rival 
claims of native princes in the Dec- 
can and Carnatic, 198 ; England 
without a rival in, 214 

Iron ramrods, introduction of, 17; at 
Moilwitz, 4« 

TAGERNDORF, 13, 55 

J Joachim II. , Elector of Bran- 
denburg, 12 

John George of Jagerndorf, 14 

Joseph IL, son of Maria Theresa, 
his noble aims and aspirations, 250 

Juliers and Berg, 9, 22, 46; guaran- 
teed by the Emperor to Prussia, 24 ; 
succession likely to be vacant, 39 ; 
Frederick resigns his claim to 
them, 51 

KATTE, Lieutenant von, execu- 
tion of, 26 
Kaunitz, Prince, counsels Maria 
Theresa as to Silesia, 84; career 



26o 



Index, 



KAY 

of, ib. ; character, 85 ; his efforts 
to establish friendly relations with 
France, 86; endeavours to win over 
Madame de Pompadour, ib. ; makes 
a defensive alliance with France, 
90; triumph of his policy, 105 

Kay (or Ziillichau), battle of, 157 

Keith, Marshal, Prussian general, 
152 ; killed at Hochkirch, 153 

Kesselsdorf, battle of, 63 

Khevenmiiller, Count, 54 

Klein-Schaellendorf, compact of, 53, 

54 
Kloster-Seven, convention of, 123 
Koliin, battle of, 117 
Konigsberg, 14 
Kunersdorf, battle of, 158 



LACY, Russian general, 28 
— Austrian general, 163, 226, 

249 

Lagos, naval fight off, 188 

Lally, Comte de, commander of the 
French forces in India, 210; cap- 
tures Fort St. David, 211; his am- 
bitious schemes, ib. \ difficulties of, 
212 ; he alienates the natives, ib. ; 
his ineffectual siege of Madras, 213 

Landeshut, battle of, 225 

Laudon, Major-General, career and 
abilities of, 149; joins Soltikoff, 
158; his share in the battle of 
Kunersdorf, 160; defeated at Lieg- 
nitz, 226; takes Schweidnitz, 228 

Lawrence, Major, dive's superior 
officer in his early military career, 
203 

Legge, Henry, Chancellor of the Ex- 
chequer, 108; dismissed, 222 

Lehwaldt, Marshal, defeated by the 
Russians, 141 ; drives the Swedes 
out of Pomerania, 141 

Leopold, Emperor, 13 

Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, Prince, 
inventor of the iron ramrod, 17; 
Frederick's answer to him, 34 

Leuthen, battle of, 139 

Levis, Chevalier de, commander of 
the French army in Canada, 191 ; 
besieges Quebec, ib. ; surrenders to 
General Amherst, 192 

Liegnitz, 12 ; taken by the Austnans, 
132; recovered, 141; battle of, 226 

Lippe Biickeburg, Count of, organizes 
Portuguese army, 233 

Lobositz, battle of, loi 

Lorraine, invaded by France, 29 ; 



MAR 

ceded to Stanislaus, 29; Duke of. 
See Francis 

Loudoun, Earl of, 176 

Louis XV., 49; prefers an alliance 
with Austria from religious mo- 
tives, 88; pressure put upon him 
by the Dauphiness in favour of 
Austria, 103; weakness of his cha- 
racter, 166 ; influence of Madame 
de Pompadour over him, 166 

Louisburg, 176, 178 



MACHI AVELLFS '« P r i n c e /' 
Frederick's refutation ot, 32. 

Madras, capture of, by the French, 
197 

Mahomed Ali, son of Anwaroodeen, 
recognized by the English as Na- 
bob of the Carnatic, 199 

Mahrattas, the, 194, 195 ; support 
the English, 202 ; won over by 
Dupleix, 203 

Manilla, capture of, by the English, 
236 

Mannstein, General, at the battle of 
Prague, 115 ; and at the battle of 
Koliin, 118 

Manoeuvres, Autumn, 93 

Mansfield, Lord, 76 

Maria Theresa, daughter of Charles 
VL, 21 ; accession and character 
of, 42 ; refuses to enter into nego- 
tiations with Frederick the Great 
respecting Siesia, 47 ; loyally 
supported by the Hungarians, 52; 
cedes Silesia, 55 ; her ambitious 
projects, 56 ; her dissatisfaction 
with the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
65 ; determines to regain Silesia, 
83 ; approves of Kaunitz's policy, 
85 ; her detestation of Frederick 
the Great, ib. ; her relations with 
Madame de Pompadour, 88 ; re- 
gards the war with Prussia and 
England as a religious war, 106; 
gives a commis>ion to Laudon, 
after his rejection by Frederick 
the Great, 148; determines to 
prosecute the war with Prussia, 
155; her mortification at Daun's 
dilatoriness, 161 ; makes peace 
with Frederick the Great, 241 ; 
her repugnance at participating in 
the partition of Poland, 246 ; death 
of, 250 

Maritime Code of England, 242 

Martin, Commodore, his action at 



Index, 



261 



MAR 

Naples in coercing Charles, King 

of the Two Sicilies, 218 
Martinique, capture of, 235 
Maupenuis, 33 
Maurice of Dessau, Prince, 116, 118; 

wounded and taken prisoner at 

Hochkirch, 153 
Maxen, capitulation of, 163 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 157 
Meer Jaffier, 206; made Nabob of 

Bengal, 209 ; intrigues with the 

Dutch against the English, 206 
^lenzel, 94 
Minden, capture of, by the French, 

168 ; battle of, 171 
Minorca, 18, 20; capture of, by the 

French, 82 ; exchanged for Belie 

Isle, 240 
Mogul power, the decline of the, 194 
Mollwitz, battle of 48 
Montcalm, Marquis of. character of. 

176; defeats the English at Ticon- 

deroga, ib. ; his defence of Quebec, 

180-185; death, 185 ; his predicton 

that the English colonies would 

throw off allegiance to the mother 

country, 193 
Montreal, capitulation of, to the 

English, 192 
Morar: Rao, 202 
Moravia, invaded by Frederick, 54, 

147 

Mozuffer Jung, Subadar of the Dec- 
can, his relations with Dupleix, 
198 

Munich, taken by Pandours, 54 

Miinster, capture of, by the French, 
i63 

Murray, General, governor of Que- 
bec after its capture by Wolfe, 
temerity of, 191 ; defeated by the 
French, zd 

—William, 71, 76. 

NADIR Shah of Persia, 194 
Nantes, the edict of, 12 
Napoleon, his opinion of Frederick, 

142. 
Nazir Jung, a claimant of the Vice- 

royship of the Deccan, 198 
Neipperg, Austrian Marshal, 48, 53 
N sisse, 47 ; surrendered to Frede- 
. -ick, 53 ; besieged by the Austrians, 

54- 
Nt^uburg, Count Palatine of, 9, 22 
Ne vcastle, Thomas Pelham, Duke 
c'", his character and abilities, 69; 
I ade First Lord of the Treasury, 



PIR 
71 ; offers Fox the leadership o* 
the House, 77 ; makes Sir T. 
Robinson leader of the House, 77 ; 
makes Fox Secretary ot State, 77; 
dismisses Pitt from the Paymaster- 
ship, 78 ; political incapacity of, 
82 ; his enforced resignation, 108 ; 
exercises an influence when out of 
power, 108 ; coalesces with Pitt 
and returns to office, 143 

Nieuport, 105 ; French garrison in, 
144 

Nuremberg, Hohenzollern Burg- 
graves of, 5 

<< /^BLIQUE order,' the, 118, 

yj 136-8. 

Oder river, 55 

Ohio Company, the, 67 

Olmiitz, siege of, 148 

Omichund, the traitor, Clive's du- 
plicity towards, 206 

Orloff, Alexis, strangles Peter IH., 
232 

Ostend, 105 ; French garrison in, 144 

Ostend Company, the, 20, 22 ; abo- 
lished, 24. 

PALATINE, Elector, 22, 57 
Pandours, in Bavaria, 54, 
Parchwitz, Frederick's speech at, 

Paris, peace of, 239 

Parliamentary corruption in Pitt's 
time, 74 

Parma and Piacenza, 20 ; Spanish 
garrisons in, 24 ; revert to the 
Emperor, 31 ; given to Don 
Philip of Spain, 64 

Pavilion of Hanover, 123 

Pelham, Henry, ability of, as Prime 
Minister, 70 ; George II.*s remark 
on his death, jd. 

Peter, Grand-duke, afterwards Peter 
III., of Russia, his admiration for 
Frederick the Great, 97, 229 ; ac- 
cession of, 228 ; character of, z<5. ; 
makes peace with Frederick, 230 ; 
disgusts all classes of his subjects, 
232 ; is deposed and murdered, 
zb. 

Peter the Great, 17, 19 

Philip, Don, 64. 

Philip of Anjou, King of Spain, 18, 
20 

Philippines, the, 237 

Piacenza. See Parma. 

Pima, 100 ; capitulation of, 102 



262 



Index. 



PIT 

Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, edu- 
cation and early life of, 71 ; George 
II. 's dislike to him, 72; made 
Paymaster of the Forces, 73 ; dis- 
interestedness of, 73 ; talents as 
an orator, 73 ; personal appear- 
ance, 74 ; true source of his great- 
ness, 74 ; patriotism of, 75 ; flaws 
in his character, 75 ; dismissed 
from office, 78 ; made Secretary 
of State in the Devonshire admin- 
istration, 108 ; vigorous nature of 
his continental policy, 108 ; es- 
pouses warmly the cau-.e of Fred- 
erick the Great, 1x0; his dismissal 
from oftice, 11 1 ; consternation in 
th" country on his dismissal, 142 : 
coalition with Newcastle, 143 ; 
their division of authority, 143 ; 
condition o^ England when he took 
office in 1757, 144 ; secret of the 
success of his plans, 144; his 
scheme of war, 144; subsidizes 
Frederick the Great, 145 ; sends 
English troops to join Ferdinand of 
Brunswick, 165 ; his selection of 
commanders for an at ack on Ca- 
nada, 176 ; his relations with 
George II., 220 ; resignation of, 
224 ; English victories ascribed to 
his policy, 227 

Pittsburg, 177 

Plassey, battle of, 208 

Pocock, Admiral, 234 

Poland, II ; constitution of, 28; dis- 
sensions among the powers in 
the election of her king, 28 ; par- 
tition of, and its ulterior conse- 
quences, 246 

Polish election w^r, the, 28 

Pomerania, divided between Sweden 
and Brandenburg, 10 

Pomeranian war (1715), 17 

Pompadour, Madame de, 85 ; her 
hatred of Frederick the Great, 88 ; 
her growing interference with 
political matters, 97 ; her influence 
over Louis XV., 166 

Pondichery, presti2;e of the French 
possessions at, 195 ; siege of, by the 
English, 197 ; surrender of, to the 
English. 214 

Poniatowski, Stanislaus, King of 
Poland, 244 

Pope, the, presents a consecrated 
hat and sword to Marshal Daun, 
for his victory at Hochkirch, 153 

Portugal, attacked by Spain, 234 



RUS 

Potsdam, the edict of, 12 

Powers, the Great, complexity o! 
their relations, 96 

Pragmatic San^^tion, the, 21 ; condi- 
tions on which Prussia guaranteed 
it, 23, 45 ; guaranteed by France, 
30; its validity contested, 43 

Prague, French and Bavarians be- 
sieged in, 53; capture of, by the 
Prussians, 58; battle of, 114; 
blockade of, 116 

*' Protestant hero," 145 

Prussia, as a German power, 2 ; oc- 
cupied by the Teutonic Order, 7 ; 
takes her position as a Great 
Power, 20 ; power of tfie crown in, 
34; paternal despotism suited to, 
in 1740, 35; perilous position of, 
95; the odds against her in 1757, 
106; advantages she possessed, 
107; attacked on all sides, 126; 
subsidized by England, 147; her 
hopeless condition at the end of 
1 761, 228 ; condition after the Seven 
Years' War, 243 ; her freedom from 
debt, 244 

Prussia, East, 7; knights do homage 
for it, 8; converted into a here- 
ditary duchy, ib. ; homage re- 
nounced by Poland, li ; occupied 
by the Russians, 146 ; restored by 
Russia, 229, 232 

Prussia, West, ceded to Poland, 7 ; 
acquired by Frederick, 246 

QUEBEC, situation of, 178: 
strength of its position, 179; 
capitulation of, to the Englisli, 
185 ; the French attempt to recap- 
ture it, 191 ; besieged by the French, 
ib. ; the siege raised, ib. 
Quiberon Bay, naval fight in, 186-90 

RAJAH Sahib, besieges Clive in 
Arcot, 201 ; attacks Arcot, 202 
Recruiting, Prussian, 17, 156 
Reinsberg, 32 
Richelieu, Marshal, 122; rapacity 

of, 122 ; makes the convention of 

Kloster-Seven with the Duke of 

1 umberland, 123 
Robinson, Sir Thomas, as leader of 

the House of Commons, 77 
Rossbach, situation of, 127; battle 

of, 129 
Rudolph, Count, of Hapsburg. 5 
Russia, rise of, 19 ; makes the Treaty 

of St. Petersburg with Austria, 90; 



Index. 



263 



SAC 
proposes to Austria the partition of 
Prussia, 92 ; makes peace, 229 ; 
her aims in Poland, 244 

SACKVTLLE, Lord George, 168; 
his conduct at the battle of Min- 
den, 172; dismissed his Majesty's 
service, 174 

St. David, Fort, 214 

St. Petersburg, treaty of, 90 

Salza, Hermann von der, 7 

S<3.1zwede], 4 

Saunders, Admiral, 178, 183 

Saunders, Mr., governor of Madras, 
supports Clive's plans, 201 

Saxony, her claims on Austrian ter- 
ritories, 46; joins Frederick, 51; 
in alliance with Austria, 59, 6t; 
subjugated by Prussia, 63 ; de- 
feated in the first campaign of the 
Seven Years' war, 102 

Schmettau, surrenders Dresden, 192 

Schwarzenberg, 10 

Schweidnitz, 132, 141 ; taken by Lau- 
don, 227 

Schwerin, Marshal, 48, 113; killed 
at the battle of Prague, 115 

Schvviebus, the Circle of, 13, 14 

Seckendorf, Count von, his influence 
over Frederick William, 23 

Seidlitz, General, the dashing Prus- 
sian Cavalry officer, 130, 150, 156; 
wounded at Kunersdorf, 159 

Seven Years' War, the, as an epoch 
in history, 1-3 ; its causes, 83 ; re- 
sults of, for Austria and Prussia, 
242 ; condition of Prussia at the 
end of, 243 

Sigismund, Emperor, 5 

Silesia, Prussian claims to, 44, 46; 
seizure of, 4^; Frederick's invasion 
of, 48 ; ceded to Prussia, 55 ; its 
value and importance, 55; Maria 
Theresa's affection for it, 83 

Sohr, battle of, 62 

Soltikoff, Russian general, 157, 161 

Soubise, Prince, m command of the 
French army, 124, 125, 126; eager- 
ness of his troops to fight Frederick 
the Great, 128; defeated at Ross- 
bach, 129 ; in discipline and ex- 
cesses of the forces commanded by 
him, 132, takes Frankfort, 167 

Spaia, her unsatistactory relations 
with the Emperor, 20; and Eng- 
land, 21 ; war with Austria, 29-52 ; 
war with England, 41 ; makes the 
Family Compact with France, 217; 



WAS 
makes the Treaty of Paris witfi 
England, 239 

Sporcken, General, 172 

Stahremberg , Count, Austrian am- 
bassador at Paris, 87, 89, 90 

Stanislaus, Lesczinsky, elected King 
of Poland, 28; his expulsion, 29 

Stanislaus Poniatowski, King of Po- 
land, 245 

Stettin, II, 18 

Stuart, Prince Charies Edward, 64 

Surajah Dowlah, captures Calcutta 
and confines Europeans in the 
Black Hole, 204 ; defeated by 
Clive, 205 ; his cowardly conduct 
at the battle of Plassey, 208 

Sweden, decline of, 28; her share in 
the partition treaty of Versailles 
104; her aid important in Austria's 
war with Prussia, from a religious 
point of view, 105; makes peace, 
229 

Swedes, the, invade Pomerania, 126 ; 
defeated, 141, 155 



TEMPLE, Earl, First Lord of the 
Admiralty in the Devonshire 
administration, 108 ; dismissed, 
III ; resigns, 224 

Teschen, 5s ; peace of, 249 

Teutonic Order, the, 7 

Thurot, Admiral, 186, 189 

Ticonderoga, 176, 181 

Tobacco Parliament, 23 

Traun, Count, 58, 60 

Trichinopoly, besieged by the Eng- 
lish, 199 

Turkey, at war with Russia, 245 

UTRECHT, peace of, 18; its 
terms and aims, 19 ; an un- 
satisfactory settlement of affairs, 
20, 66 

VERSAILLES, treaty of, 90, 96* 
97 ; second or partition treaty 
104 
Vienna, treaty of, in 1731, 24 
Voltaire, 32, 88 

WALPOLE, Sir Robert, 41, 71 
Wandewash, battle of, 214 
Wangenheim, General, 121, 169 
Warsaw, treaty of, 61 
Washington, George, 68 : defeated by 
the French, at Great Meadows, 68; 



264 



Index, 



WAT 

Watson, Admiral, refuses to sign the 
fictitious duplicate treaty with 
Meer Jaffier, 206 
Weingarten, Maximilian. 95 
Wends, the, subjugation of, 4 
Wesel, no, 210 

Westminster, convention of, 80, 96 
Westphalia, the peace of, 10 
Wilhelmina, Frederick's sister, death 

of, 153 
Winterfeldt, General, 95; death of, 

126 
Wolfe, General, career of, 177; cha- 
racter and appearance, 178; his 
first ineffectual assault on Quebec, 



ZWE 

180 ; ill health of, 181 ; and " Gray's 
Elegy," 182 ; his indomitable gal- 
lantry, 184 ; captures Quebec^ 185 ; 
his death, 185 

Wurtemberg, the troops of, mutiny 
rather than fight against Prussia, 
124 

Wusterhausen, treaty of, 24 



ZIETHEN, celebrated cavalry 
officer, 118, 156, 227 
Zorndorf, battle of, 150 
ZuUichau, battle of, 157 
Zweibrucken, Duke of, 151, 248 



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of Greece from the earliest times to the death of Alexander. 

EARLY ROME— From the Foundation of the City to its Destruc- 
tion by the Gauls. By W. Ihne, Ph.D. 

ROME AND CARTHAGE— The Punic Wars. By R. Bosworth 
Smith, M.A. 

THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SULLA. By A. H. Beesly, M.A. 

THE ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. By the Very Rev. Charles 
Merivale, D.D. 

THE EARLY EMPIRE— From the Assassination of Julius Caesar 
to the Assassination of Domitian. By the Rev. W. Wolfe 
Capes, M.A. 

THE AGE OF THE ANTONINES— the Roman Empire of the 
Second Century. By the Rev. W. Wolfe Capes, M.A. 

The six volumes above give the History of Rome from thi 
founding of the City to the death of Marcus Amelius Antoninus, 



EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY. 

A NEW VOLUME JUST READY. 

THE EARLY HANOVERIANS. ByEDWARD E.Morris, 
Professor of English in the University of Mel- 
bourne, Editor of the Series. 

One volume, i2mo, with Nine Maps and Three Tables. 
Price, $1.00. 

Though the name of this volume. is taken from English History, "The 
Early Hanoverians," like others of the series, is devoted largely to Con- 
tinental affairs, and is, in fact, a brief history of Europe from the Peace of 
Utrech to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. This period, itself, so full of interest, is 
treated with the same vividness and charm which marked the autlior's former 
contribution to the series, of which the Hartford Times says: *'Such history, 
told with the interest of a story, makes the most lasting impression on the 
memory of the reader." 

To all interested in Modem History this volume will be welcome as the 
best brief account of Europe at an important epoch, and to readers of the 
series it will have an additional value, as filling the interval between the "Age 
OF Anne," by the same author, and "Frederick the Great," by F. W. 
Longman. 

EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY. 

A NEW VOLUME JUST READY, 

THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES. 
By Charles Sankey, M.A., late Scholar Queen's 
College, Oxford, joint Editor of the Series. 

Onq volume, i6mo, v^ith Three Maps and Two Plans. 
\ g .-X Price, $i.oo. 

The period of history covered by this little book is full both of interest 
and importance. It was the transition period from the glories of the Athenian 
empire to the degradation of the Macedonian conquest, and it was then that 
Athens numbered Socrates and Xenophon among her citizens. As descriptive 
of the time of these writers, or as a text-book to accompany their study, the 
book is invaluable. 

With three others of the series — "The Greeks and Persians," "The 
Athenian Empire," and "The Macedonian Empire "—it makes, perhaps, 
the best short history of Greece, and one particularly adapted to the general 
reader and the class-room. 

Copies of the above two volumes will be supplied in 
Roxburgh style, Maroon or Green, to those - ^^^ 
,^ fy c\ "^^^ wishing to complete their sets. /> f^ />^ll 

ThT volumes of this Series are for sale by all avoksellerSy or 
will be sent J prepaid^ on receipt of price by the publishers. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

743 AND 745 Broadway, New York. 






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